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In this dissertation, my aim is to develop some important new resources for explaining 
probabilistic phenomena in the life sciences. In short, I undertake to articulate and defend a 
novel account of stochastic mechanism for grounding probabilistic generalizations in the life 
sciences.   
To do this, I first offer some brief remarks on the concept of mechanism in the history of 
philosophical thought. I then lay out some examples of probabilistic phenomena in biology for 
which an account of stochastic mechanism seems explanatorily necessary and useful: synaptic 
transmission in the brain, protein synthesis, DNA replication, evolution by natural selection, and 
Mendelian inheritance. Next, I carefully examine the concept of regularity as it applies to 
mechanisms—building on a recent taxonomy of the ways mechanisms may (or may not) be 
thought to behave regularly. I then employ this taxonomy to sort out a recent debate in the 
philosophy of biology: is natural selection regular enough to count as a mechanism? I argue that, 
by paying attention to the forgoing taxonomy, natural selection can be seen to meet the regularity 
requirement just fine. I then turn my attention to the question of how we should understand the 
 
 
chance we ascribe to stochastic mechanisms. To do this, I form a list of desiderata that any 
account of stochastic mechanism must meet. I then explore how mechanisms fit with several of 
the going philosophical accounts of chance: subjectivism, frequentism (both actual and 
hypothetical), Lewisian best-systems, and propensity. I argue that neither subjectivism, 
frequentism, nor best-system-style accounts of chance will meet all of the proposed desiderata, 
but some version of propensity theory can. Borrowing from recent propensity accounts of 
biological fitness and drift, I then go on to explore the prospects for developing a propensity 
interpretation of stochastic mechanism (PrISM) according to which propensities are (i) 
metaphysically analyzable and operationally quantifiable via a function of probability-weighted 
ways a mechanism might fire and (ii) not causally efficacious but nonetheless explanatorily 
useful. By appealing to recent analyses of deterministic and emergent chance, I argue further that 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Abstract: The two main goals of this introductory Chapter are (1) to supply some motivation for 
why my reader should care about this dissertation, and (2) to provide some historical, conceptual, 
and lexicographical framework for what is to follow.  
 
1.1 A Brief Introduction to the idea of Mechanism in the History of Philosophical Thought 
 
For quite a long time, the heart beat was deeply puzzling. It wasn’t until William Harvey (1628) 
discovered that the beating heart produces a continuous circulation of blood through the 
interconnected vasculature at the extremities of the body that an explanation of it could be given. 
Harvey discovered that the beating heart was a central part of the mechanism for blood 
circulation in animals.  French researchers Francois Jacob and Jacques Monod discovered 
messenger RNA (1961): the missing link between DNA and protein; they found a key part of the 
protein synthesis mechanism. In order to explain puzzling phenomena in the living world, life 
scientists often search to find and describe underlying mechanisms. 
Recently, much work in the philosophy of science has been devoted to understanding 
what exactly it is that scientists look for when they search for mechanisms. One now widely 
accepted philosophical characterization of mechanism was put forward in Machamer, Darden, 
and Craver’s seminal paper “Thinking about Mechanisms” (MDC 2000). 
MDC: Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of  




On this characterization of mechanism, the beating heart clearly qualifies as a mechanism. It is 
composed of entities (aorta, ventricles, arteries, and so on) and activities (beating, pumping etc..) 
that are organized to produce regular changes (blood circulation) from the start of an animal’s 
life to its end.   
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 Similar characterizations have been put forward by Glennan (1996, 2002) and Bechtel & Abrahamsen (2005), but 




As elegant and straight-forward as it seems, however, the MDC characterization of 
mechanism raises some difficult questions. One such question has to do with how to appeal to 
mechanisms, a concept traditionally associated with regular, machine-like, deterministic 
behavior, to explain probabilistic phenomena. This question becomes especially important once 
it is recognized that the life sciences are rife with probabilistic generalizations. Mendel 
discovered that the chance of a hybrid green and yellow pea plant to produce yellow peas in the 
(what we now call the) F2 generation is .75. In neuroscience, the release of neurotransmitters can 
fail to result in the successful initiation of electrical activity in a particular postsynaptic neuron 
up to 90% of the time
2
. Evolution by natural selection is subject to the whims of genetic 
mutation—where the evolutionary consequences of genetic mutation are conceptualized in terms 
of the chance (per unit of time) a gene has of changing from one state to another. A question of 
significant import to philosophers of science is: what makes these statements true? What in the 
world, if anything, grounds these probabilistic facts?    
 In this dissertation, my aim is to develop some important new resources for explaining 
probabilistic phenomena in the life sciences. In short, I undertake to articulate and defend a 
novel account of stochastic mechanism for grounding probabilistic generalizations in the life 
sciences.  
Before beginning this difficult task, some context and framework needs building. The job 
of this introductory chapter is to motivate this project by providing some background-giving 
historical context to the discussion of mechanism—a concept that once played a dominant role in 
our explanations of the natural world, but one that fell dramatically out of favor in the past 
century. I then briefly apprise the reader of the recent resurgence of mechanisms in recent 
philosophy of science, some of the reasons why mechanisms have resurfaced in contemporary 
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scientific thought, and the way that several leading advocates of mechanistic philosophy of 
science have explicitly formulated what mechanisms are and how they function in scientific 
explanations. I then begin to draw attention to an area of this recent mechanisms literature that 
needs more development: how are we to appeal to mechanisms, a concept commonly associated 
with regular, deterministic operation and outputs, to explain probabilistic phenomena in the life 
sciences? To show why this question is important, I formulate a few examples of probabilistic 
phenomena of interest to proponents of mechanistic explanation in biology. Having these 
examples on hand will help as I refer back to them in order to show (1) that extant accounts of 
mechanism are under-equipped to explain these probabilistic phenomena, and (2) that the 
account of stochastic mechanism I develop can. This chapter concludes by laying out the central 
task of this dissertation, some key terms and distinctions on which I will rely, as well as the goals 
and thesis of the dissertation as a whole.       
 
1.2 A Brief History of Mechanism 
 
Why should you, or indeed anyone, read a dissertation about mechanisms? Hasn’t the concept of 
mechanism fallen away like Aristotle’s hylomorphic soul or Ptolemy’s crystalline spheres? What 
use could such an old-fashioned atavism of early thought possibly be to us now?  
 To begin to answer these questions, it is worth briefly looking back at the varied role of 
the idea of mechanism in the history of philosophical thought—if only to distinguish a 
contemporary understanding of mechanism from the many ways it has been understood 
throughout history.   
At first thought, the word ‘mechanism’ seems easy enough to define. A mechanism, 
many of us would imagine, is simply a structure of moving parts that perform some function. A 
clock is a mechanism; a tractor is a mechanism; so is particle accelerator. In the history of 
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philosophy, however, the term ‘mechanism’ came to represent a great deal more than this simple 
notion.    
As with most (if not all) important philosophical concepts, the origin of ‘mechanism’ 
traces back to the ancient Greeks. The Greeks’ idea of mechanism derived from the machines 
they created to do work, work that they conceived of as being opposed to natural forces (Bechtel 
2006, 42). Nature, on the ancient Greek view, did not operate mechanistically. This is apparent in 
the ancient text Mechanica: 
Nature often operates contrary to human interest, for she always follows the same 
course without deviation, whereas human interest is always changing. When, 
therefore, we have to do something contrary to nature, the difficulty of it causes 
us perplexity and art has to be called to our aid. The kind of art which helps us in 
such perplexities we call Mechanical Skill. (Mechanica 847a14f  as quoted by 
Whewell 1837, 94)   
 
This view of mechanisms began to change with Aristotle. Rather than mechanisms operating in 
the natural world, Aristotelians envisaged nature as composed of entities made up of distinct 
forms—each with a specific telos (goal). Natural entities, on the Aristotelian (and later 
scholastic) worldview, are of certain substantial forms each with their own directed behaviors. 
Rocks and other Earthly entities fall downward because their natural goal is to be part of the 
Earth.  Fire rises up because its goal is to reach the heavens. On the Aristotelian/Scholastic 
worldview, objects move almost as if they intend to reach their natural goal.   
 This worldview began to change dramatically in the 17
th
 century at which time the 
teleological Aristotelian/Scholastic worldview ultimately gave way to the mechanical worldview. 
The distinguishing feature of the mechanical worldview, according to Richard Westfall, was to 
conceive of nature as “a huge machine” such that the role of natural philosophy was to “explain 
the hidden mechanisms behind phenomena” (Westfall 1971, 1). The beginning of this change is 
exemplified by the development of Galileo’s mechanics. According to Galileo, the same 
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mechanics explain mundane Earthly bodies as apply to celestial bodies like the sun and moon. 
With his three laws of falling bodies, Galileo single-handedly succeeded in undermining the 
Aristotelian theory of motion
3
. And it was this idea—that the same few laws of motion succeed 
in explaining the movements of earthly and celestial bodies alike—that ushered in the new 
mechanistic worldview, a worldview according to which the universe is composed of a collection 
of moving parts all working together under the same basic forces, a worldview that saw the 
working parts of the universe like the gears of a clock.  
The early-modern mechanistic worldview reached its culmination with Descartes. With 
the Scholastics squarely in aim, Descartes undertook to replace the “mentally” influenced 
depiction of physical qualities in Scholastic natural philosophy with a theory that requires only 
extensional properties (e.g., size, shape, and motion) to describe the manifest order of the natural 
world. He writes, “I have described this earth and indeed the whole universe as if it were a 
machine: I have considered only the various shapes and movements of its parts” (Cottingham et 
al. 1985, 188), On Descartes’s mechanical view, the movement of one object necessarily moved 
another, because he did not believe there to be any empty space. Like a jar full of tiny ball 
bearings, there is no moving one without the movement of many others. Descartes not only 
conceived of the universe in mechanistic terms, he also conceived of living things this way. He 
writes,  
I should like you to consider that these functions (including passion, memory, and 
imagination) follow from the mere arrangement of the machine’s organs every bit 
as naturally as the movements of a clock or other automaton follow from the 
arrangement of its counter-weights and wheels." (ibid, 108) 
 
Modulo only the disembodied soul, the function of which for Descartes was surprisingly limited, 
human bodies were fully mechanical arrangements of interconnected parts.  
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 A generation later, Boyle coined the term “mechanical philosophy” (Boyle 1666)
4
. On 
Boyle’s view the explanation of natural phenomena should make reference only to particles of 
matter (which he called corpuscles), their motion, and their interaction under the governance of a 
few basic laws of nature. Because of its insistence that reference to particles of matter, their 
motion, and their interaction was sufficient to fully explain any given natural phenomenon, the 
mechanistic worldview became associated with metaphysical determinism. Just as the working 
gears of a clock determine that it must strike 3:00 an hour after striking 2:00, all phenomena in 
the mechanistic universe must be completely determined, past, present or future. As Laplace 
famously claimed,  
We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of the past and the 
cause of the future. An intellect which at any given moment knew all of the forces 
that animate nature and the mutual positions of the beings that compose it, if this 
intellect were vast enough to submit the data to analysis, could condense into a 
single formula the movement of the greatest bodies of the universe and that of the 
lightest atom; for such an intellect nothing could be uncertain and the future just 
like the past would be present before its eyes. (Laplace 1814) 
  
The mechanistic worldview dominated the early-modern period of philosophy and science. It 
was not until the beginning of the 20
th
 century that the mechanistic worldview began to fall out 
of favor, and with it, the predominant position of mechanisms in philosophical thought. The 
reason for its demise was, in large part, a growing suspicion that matter—at least on its smallest 
scale—does not behave like the gears of a clock.  
 The beginning of the end of the classical mechanistic worldview came with the 
development of the theory of quantum mechanics. Early quantum mechanics discovered that, 
while elementary particles behave fairly predictably in many experiments, they become highly 
unpredictable in others—such as when attempting to measure individual particle trajectories 
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 Although, it is worth pointing out that there are many historiographical disputes as to its precise origins. See 
Garber (2013, 3-4) for an excellent discussion of this.  
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through a simple physical apparatus. As a result of this discovery, new models were needed to 
explain this behavior, models that violated several of the central tenets of classical, deterministic 
physics. Nature no longer seemed to fit into a clock-like, mechanical worldview. Instead, 
scientists and philosophers had to come to terms with the fact that nature had to be described in 
terms that were deeply and essentially probabilistic.    
 
1.3 The Return of Mechanistic Explanation in Biology 
 
“At least in biology, most scientists see their work as explaining types of phenomena by 
discovering mechanisms, rather than explaining theories by deriving them from or reducing them 
to other theories, and this is seen by them as reduction, or as integrally tied to it.” (Wimsatt 1976, 
671) 
 
Why, after its spectacular fall from grace at the hands of the quantum mechanics, have 
mechanisms returned to favor among philosophers of science interested in biology? A brief look 
at the history of scientific explanation will help to supply an answer to this.  
The modern discussion of explanation begins in earnest with the Deductive-Nomological 
(D-N) model developed by Hempel (1942, 1965) and advocated by many others (Popper 1959, 
Braithwaite 1953, Gardiner 1959, Nagel 1961). On the D-N model of explanation, what is 
required for a description of a phenomenon (an explanandum) to be explained by a set of 
sentences (an explanans) is: 1) the explanandum must follow deductively from the explanans; 2) 
the sentences that constitute the explanans must be true; and 3) the explanans must contain at 
least one “law of nature”.   
 There are many well-known problems with the D-N model of explanation. For one thing, 
there are intuitive cases that show that the satisfaction of the D-N model is neither required for a 
good explanation, nor does it guarantee one. Suppose, for example, that I witness my dog knock 
a cup off the coffee table in a fit of exuberant tail-wagging. There is a sense in which the 
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explanation of why this event occurred does not require reference to the initial position of the 
cup, and the relevant laws of nature. A simple, “…because my dog hit it with her tail” would 
suffice. Furthermore, there seem to be instances when explanations seem bad even when the D-N 
model is satisfied. Woodward describes a particularly devastating one (owing originally to 
Bromberger 1966):  
There are many cases in which a derivation of an explanandum E from a law L 
and initial conditions I seems explanatory but a “backward” derivation of I from E 
and the same law L does not seem explanatory, even though the latter, like the 
former, appears to meet the criteria for successful DN explanation. For example, 
one can derive the length s of the shadow cast by a flagpole from the height h of 
the pole and the angle θ of the sun above the horizon and laws about the 
rectilinear propagation of light. This derivation meets the DN criteria and seems 
explanatory. On the other hand, a derivation of h from s and θ and the same laws 
also meets the DN criteria but does not seem explanatory. Examples like this 
suggest that at least some explanations possess directional or asymmetric features 
to which the DN model is insensitive. (Woodward 2009)    
 
What this example illustrates is that there is a deeply problematic asymmetry to D-N explanation. 
The D-N model appears to explain when we derive the length of the shadow from the height of 
the pole and the position of the sun, but it seems not to when we derive the height of the pole 
from the length of the shadow and the position of the sun—this despite the fact that both 
instances meet the requirements set forth by the D-N model.   
 Many philosophers of science have taken this explanatory asymmetry as an indication 
that the D-N model leaves something important out of scientific explanation. Salmon argues 
forcefully that the missing ingredient is causation. The reason we find that the height of the pole 
explains the shadow length (and not vice versa) is because the pole-height plays an important 
causal role in the length of the shadow it casts and not the other way around. As such, Salmon 
(1989) famously concludes that to explain, at least in the context of science, necessarily involves 
locating an event in “a causal nexus”.  
9 
 
 Asymmetry problems aside, D-N explanation does not seem to cohere well with the 
special sciences for additional reasons. The main reason is its requirement that all explanations 
make reference to at least one law of nature. Here is an argument, implicitly supported in the 
literature, for why the generalizations made in the special sciences should not be construed as 
laws:  
(1) Generalizations made in the special sciences are contingent.   
 
(2) Whatever else a law is, it must be more than contingently true.   
 
(3) Therefore, generalizations made in the special sciences should not be construed as 
laws (Smart 1963; Schiffer 1991; Beatty 1995; Earman and Roberts 1999; Woodward 
2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003).   
 
Some have disagreed with this conclusion, maintaining that these differences merely show that 
we need to have two categories of laws: ceteris paribus laws and strict laws, where the special 
sciences should only be seen to have the former (Fodor 1991; Hausman 1992; Pietroski and Rey 
1995; Lange 2000, 2002). Still other philosophers have dismissed ceteris paribus formulations of 
laws as deeply problematic, but have nevertheless maintained that certain of the generalizations 
made in the special sciences should count as laws. Adherents to this last sort of view have either 
proposed that these laws need not be more than contingently true (Mitchell 1997, 2000, 2002, 
2003), or they have attempted to reformulate their generalizations so that they are not contingent 
at all (Sober 1997, Elgin 2006). The result of all of this debating about the prospects of laws in 
the special sciences is that there appears to be no real consensus on the matter.  
 Perhaps biologists don’t need laws of biology in order to do D-N explanation. Perhaps 
biologists can do all the explaining they need by appeal, say, to the fundamental laws of physics 
together with initial conditions and do their explanatory derivation that way. Unfortunately, there 
are well known problems here too. For one, there are some who argue that there are no 
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fundamental laws of physics (e.g., Cartwright 1983). And second, among those who allow for 
fundamental physical laws, there is very little agreement among philosophers as to what is 
required of a generalization for it to qualify as a law of nature. Do they need to be necessary 
relations between universals (a la Armstrong 1983)? Are laws no more than regularly occurring 
conjunctions of events (a la Hume 1739)? Do laws of nature have to be exceptionless? Support 
counterfactuals? Do laws get confirmed by their own instances (a la Goodman 1947)? Each of 
these positions has its proponents, and its critics. And little progress, if any, has been made in 
reaching agreement.   
Even if a philosophical consensus on laws of nature could be accomplished, there is a 
remaining difficulty with D-N explanation: that it simply doesn’t deliver satisfying answers to 
many of our explanation-seeking questions. This is because D-N explanation, at its base, is a 
kind of subsumption. That is, it takes an explanandum event and purports to explain it by 
showing that it can be subsumed under some law of nature. But, if we stop and think about it, 
there is an important sense in which this kind of explanatory subsumption strategy does not 
deliver a satisfactory explanation. When I ask a why some event x occurred, should I be satisfied 
by the explanation that x occurred because it is the sort of event that gets subsumed under a class 
of events that we already know always occurs? Put another way, there is a sense in which D-N 
explanation merely tells us that x occurred because x has to occur. But that doesn’t so much tell 
me why x occurred as that x is the sort of event that some law (whatever that is) tells us must 
occur.     
At the very least—given all of this consternation—it would be nice if we could do 
explanation in the special sciences without laws. That is precisely what mechanisms portend to 
do.      
11 
 
 So what is mechanistic explanation? In short, the idea is this: 
 
ME: Some description of a phenomenon (explanandum) is explained by some set of 
sentences (explanans), just in case the explanans is a description of the mechanism that 
produces this phenomenon.  
 
Because ‘produces’ in this context is a causal notion, I take mechanistic explanation to be a kind 
of causal explanation. What is a causal explanation? I follow Woodward’s view that the 
distinguishing feature of causal explanations is that “They show how what is explained depends 
on other, distinct factors, where the dependence in question has to do with some relationship that 
holds as a matter of empirical fact rather than for logical or conceptual reasons” (Woodward 
2003, 4-5). Mechanistic explanation does just this. It explains some phenomenon by showing 
how it depends on some other, distinct factor: the mechanism responsible for its production. So a 
mechanistic explanation is a causal explanation—but one of a certain sort. And not only does 
ME satisfy Salmon’s requirement that good scientific explanations be causal, it does so without 
any appeal to laws of nature. That is a good thing. 
 Furthermore, the manifest fact is that life scientists, as a matter of actual practice, have 
done (and continue to do) incredibly successful science by searching for and describing 
mechanisms. A keyword search for articles appearing in the journal Nature (and its subsidiary 
journals) turned up 3,380 articles with the word ‘mechanism’ in their title published between 
2000-2014. Machamer, Darden, and Craver’s 2000 article “Thinking about Mechanisms” is the 
most cited paper published in the journal Philosophy of Science over the last three years. Since 
its publication, its total current number of citations is 1062.  
 
1.4 Taking stock 
  
This brief glance at the some of the history of the role that the idea of mechanism has played in 
the history of philosophy and explanation serves to draw attention to a fundamental tension 
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which will motivate the rest of the dissertation. On the one hand, the mechanical worldview has 
been associated with the thesis that any phenomenon can be entirely explained by reference to its 
material constituents, their motion, and some basic physical laws. However, on the other hand, 
the post-mechanical worldview is committed to the thesis that some phenomena are 
fundamentally random, and their behavior cannot be explained merely by reference to the 
arrangement of their material constituents, their motion, and some basic physical laws. My hope 
in what follows is to begin to forge a middle path, a path on which we can maintain the benefits 
of understanding, at least some of, the living world in mechanistic terms while at the same time 
admitting that much of the world we seek to explain behaves in a probabilistic fashion. Before 
tackling this project, however, a bit more framework is needed.     
 
1.5 Current Characterizations of Mechanisms  
 
In section 1.3, we saw some of the history of mechanistic thought as well as some of the reasons 
for its resurgence in the life sciences. Now we can begin to talk more specifically about how the 
idea of mechanism is understood in contemporary philosophy of science. There are several 
current philosophical characterizations of mechanism. Because much of the discussion that 
follows will draw on various aspects of these characterizations, it will be helpful to list them at 
the outset.  They are as follows.  
Glennan 1: A mechanism underlying a behavior is a complex system which produces that  
behavior by the interaction of a number of parts according to direct causal laws (Glennan  
1996, 52).   
 
Glennan 2: A mechanism for a behavior is a complex system that produces that behavior  
by the interaction of a number of parts, where the interactions among parts can be  
characterized by direct, invariant, change relating generalizations. (Glennan 2002, S344) 
 
MDC: Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of  




B&A: A mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue of its components  
parts, component operations, and their organization. The orchestrated functioning of the  
mechanism is responsible for one or more phenomena. (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005, 
47).   
 
Cartwright: A nomological machine is a stable enough arrangement of components 
whose features acting in consort give rise to (relatively) stable input/output relations 
(Cartwright 2009, p. 8). 
 
As is evident by the forgoing list, there are many prominent philosophers of science interested in 
how we should philosophically characterize mechanisms. However, as we will see in the coming 
Chapters, there are many interesting questions that arise from these attempted characterizations.   
 
1.6 Some Mechanism Lexicography 
 
As with any area of intellectual area of discourse, the philosophical literature on mechanisms 
carries with it its own jargon—some of it somewhat idiosyncratic. As such, it will also be helpful 
to offer a brief lexicon of some of the central terms at play in the mechanisms literature.  
Activities: what goes on in a mechanism, or as MDC describes them, activities are the 
producers of change (e.g., binding between neurotransmitters or bonding between a DNA 
base and its complementary base) (MDC, 3) 
 
Entities: the things in a mechanism that engage in activities (e.g., neurotransmitters, 
strands of DNA) (Ibid, 3). MDC’s entities, for our purposes, may be thought of as 
analogous to Glennan’s and B&A’s notion of parts.  
 
Set-up conditions: background conditions that, when satisfied, allow for the possibility of 
a mechanism’s start-up conditions to obtain. 
 
Start-up conditions: conditions that, when satisfied, initiate the operation of a mechanism 
(a.k.a. its firing).  
 
Triggering: that which occurs upon the instantiation of a mechanism’s start-up 
conditions. 
 
Firing: a general way of saying the mechanism has begun operation. (may also refer to 
the whole operation span of a mechanism).  
 
Termination conditions: conditions that, when satisfied, indicate that the mechanism is 




Behavior: may refer to that which entities do internal to the mechanism (in which case it 
is analogous to MDC’s activities), or it may refer to the outcomes produced by a 
mechanism (in which case it is analogous to MDC’s ‘phenomenon’).  
 
Function: may refer to roles played by entities and activities or that which the mechanism 
as a whole is set up to do.  
 
Phenomenon: the observable stuff in the world that a mechanism description purports to 
explain. 
 
1.7 Some Probability Lexicography 
 
Since my primary topic will be to understand the mechanistic explanation of probabilistic 
phenomena in biology by appeal to, what I will call, ‘stochastic mechanisms’, we need to have 
some understanding at the outset of what is meant by probabilistic phenomena and stochasticity 
as well as some of the concepts closely surrounding it. So more lexicography is needed. Many of 
the terms defined below will get more careful definitions later in the dissertation. But the ones I 
offer here, I hope, will suffice for getting us off and running.  
Time: a set of points (call them T points) ordered linearly. 
 
History: a temporal path through some state space. 
 





Indeterministic History: a history that, for at least one of its T points, has more than one 
possible continuation. 
 
Deterministic Phenomenon: an observable state of affairs with a deterministic history, 
i.e., a state of affairs whose preconditions together with the laws of nature were sufficient 
to bring about its occurrence. 
 
Metaphysical Global Determinism: the view that the actual world is entirely a 
deterministic one. 
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 Here, I am happy to understand possibility in terms of possible worlds or in terms of nomological possibility in the 
actual world.  
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Deterministic World: A deterministic world is one whose entire history supervenes on the 
world’s laws of nature with the complete state of the world at any given time (Earman 
1986). 
 
Metaphysical Indeterminism: the view that at least some of the world’s histories have 
been non-deterministic.   
 
Indeterministic Phenomenon: an observable state of affairs which has a non-deterministic 
history. 
 
Probabilities: a measure of the likelihood that an event will occur.   
 
Probabilistic Phenomenon: an observable state of affairs that is best described by appeal 
to [non-extremal] probabilities. (note: this may be because it is indeterministic, but it may 
also be that it is deterministic and too complex to be described as such). 
 
Probabilistic Behavior: the activity of some observable state of affairs that is best 
described by appeal to [non-extremal] probabilities.  
 
Stochasticity: the property instantiated by a state of affairs by virtue of the fact that it 
behaves probabilistically. 
 
Objective Chance: an understanding of probabilities that meets a set of commonly 
accepted platitudes regarding its relationship to several related concepts: credence, 
possibility, future, lawfulness, intrinsicness, and lawfulness (to be laid out in detail in 
Chapter 6)  
 
Probabilistic Statement: a sentence that makes reference to a probability. 
 
Having now specified preliminary definitions for several of philosophy of probability-related 
terms that will arise in many of our discussions to come, I should pause to point out a few 
troubling ambiguities.  
Sometimes non-philosophers use the above terminology in ways that are different from 
what I have just stipulated. For example, biologists will often use the term ‘stochastic’ to be 
synonymous with ‘unpredictable’. For reasons I’ll give in Chapter 4, I do not want to use the 
term this way. ‘Stochastic’ also gets used a lot to describe a particular kind of scientific model, 
e.g., one that does not make determinate predictions. Stochastic models of this sort are, no doubt, 
interesting and useful in science. But again, this is not how I will be using the term.  For me, 
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stochasticity is a metaphysical property, one that is instantiated by actual states of affairs (e.g., 
mechanisms). So when I use the term ‘stochastic mechanism’ I will be referring to actual, 
existing structures that, for various reasons to be specified in the following Chapter, are disposed 
to behave irregularly.   
But before we get to the project of trying to develop a more detailed understanding of the 
ways in which a mechanism might be thought to behave irregularly, it will be helpful for me to 
lay out some of the primary scientific examples to which I’ll be referring in the upcoming 
Chapters.     
 
1.8 Examples of Probabilistic Phenomena Targeted for Mechanistic Explanation 
 
 Now that much of the lexicographical framework for both our upcoming discussion of 
mechanisms and probability has been laid out, we can begin to explore some science. In what 
follows, I offer brief descriptions of five phenomena from across the life sciences for which 
biologists seek mechanistic explanation. Each one is probabilistic. Although these phenomena 
are not meant to represent all of biology, they exhibit sufficient range to proffer the hefty extent 
to which probability permeates across the life sciences—and as such—the explanatory potential 
for the novel explanatory framework I will be offering in what is to come.   
 
1.8.1 Initiation of Electrical Activity in Post-synaptic Neurons (Synaptic Transmission) 
 
There are gaps between the neurons in our brains called synapses (see figure 1 below). 
Electrical signals must traverse these gaps in order to continue on their path through our nervous 
system. This process begins when a brief pulse of electricity called an action potential travels 
down a hollow tube in the neuron called an axon. This occurs because the axon is filled with 
(and surrounded by) an aqueous solution containing charged ions. At rest, the membrane 
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surrounding each neuron is polarized; its inner surface is negatively charged relative to its outer 
surface. Upon contact with the action potential, however, the charge of the axon’s membrane 





) into the cell causing the membrane to depolarize. Other positively charged ions (mainly K
+
) 
flow out of the membrane to cause repolarization in its wake. What results is a wave of 
electricity flowing down the axon until it reaches the synapse, at which point a chemical called a 
neurotransmitter is released and moves across the synapse binding to specific proteins on the 
neighboring neuron.  
This phenomenon coheres nicely with the mechanistic approach to explanation because it 
is composed of entities (e.g., axons, neurons, synapses, neurotransmitters, etc.) and activities 
(e.g., polarization, electricity flow, etc.) organized to produce an outcome (transmission of 
electrical activity across a synapse). Here we can think of the set-up conditions of the synaptic 
transmission mechanism as the presence of the requisite anatomical and chemical structures in a 
living organism; we can think of the start-up conditions as the arrival of an action potential at the 
start of an axon; and we can think of the termination conditions as the successful initiation of 





Figure 1.  Biochemical mechanisms at chemical synapses. (From Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000, p. 9).  
 
This mechanism will be of particular interest to us in this dissertation because the process 
of synaptic transmission is not entirely dependable. In fact, according to Kandel et al.,  
 
The release of a quantum of transmitter is a random event. The fate of each 
quantum of transmitter in response to an action potential has only two possible 
outcomes—the quantum is or is not released. The event resembles a binomial or 
Bernoulli trial (similar to tossing a coin in the air to determine whether it comes 
up heads of tails). (Kandel et al. 2013, 270) 
 
Kandel et al. estimate that the mean probability of synaptic transmission (from a single active 
zone), “varies widely among different presynaptic terminals, from less than 0.1 (that is, a 10% 
chance that a presynaptic action potential will trigger release of a vesicle) to greater than 0.9” 
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(ibid, 271). That is, the release of neurotransmitters can fail to result in the successful initiation 
of electrical activity in a particular postsynaptic neuron up to 90% of the time. Because synaptic 
transmission is (i) a process that fits within the mechanistic framework, and (ii) because 
scientists characterize it probabilistically, I will go on to argue that it is a prime target for 
analysis as a stochastic mechanism. 
 
1.8.2 Protein Synthesis 
 
In its most abstract schematization, protein synthesis takes place when DNA is 
transcribed into messenger RNA, which is translated into protein (see Figure 2).   
 
Figure 2. Watson’s central dogma diagram (Redrawn, based on Watson 1965). 
 
The process of protein synthesis also fits nicely within the mechanistic framework. It is 
composed of entities: DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid in the shape of a double helix), RNA 
polymerase (a core enzyme), and mRNA (ribonucleic acid, usually single stranded, which carries 
information to the protein synthesis machinery of the cell). And it has activities associated with 
it: binding of RNA polymerase to the DNA’s promoter sequence, and elongation (when the RNA 
polymerase traverses the template DNA strand, using base pairing complementarity with the 
DNA template to create an RNA copy). Furthermore, protein synthesis has set-up conditions 
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(e.g., the presence of DNA in a living organism), start-up conditions (e.g., initiation of 
transcription), and termination conditions (e.g., the successful synthesis of a new protein). 
 Despite the universality of this process among living organisms, however, protein 
synthesis fails to operate exactly the same way in many circumstances. Different DNA sequences 
can produce different proteins. In bacteria, different RNA polymerases operate than in 
eukaryotes. Even among bacteria there is variation in how error-prone various different RNA 
polymerases are. Once again, this means that there is an important sense in which protein 
synthesis fails to work the same way each time it operates. As such, like synaptic transmission, it 
is best thought of as a probabilistic phenomenon (more on this in Chapter 2).    
 
1.8.3 Mutations During DNA Replication 
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) comprises two polymers made up of units called a base 
and a backbone made of sugars and phosphate groups—all organized into the shape of a double 
helix. DNA replication begins when the parent molecule gets "unzipped" as the hydrogen bonds 
between the base pairs are broken. Once separated, the sequence of bases on each of the 
unzipped strands becomes a template for the insertion of a complementary set of bases. The new 
strands assemble in an order that complements the order of bases on the strand serving as the 
template. When the process is complete, two DNA molecules have been formed identical to each 
other and to the parent molecule. Here, again, we have entities: DNA, a purine base, individual 
molecules, etc. And we have activities: unzipping, separating, and inserting. We have start and 
set-up conditions: the presence of DNA in a living organism and the initiation of hydrogen bond 
separation. And we have termination conditions: the existence of a replicated strand of DNA.   
However, just as with protein synthesis, there are several ways that the process of DNA 
replication can (and does) go wrong—resulting in mutation. One such way is when a base is 
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changed by the repositioning of a hydrogen atom, altering the hydrogen bonding pattern of that 
base resulting in incorrect base pairing during replication. Another way is when there is a loss of 
a purine base (A or G) to form an apurinic site (AP site). There can also be denaturation of the 
new strand from the template during replication, followed by renaturation in a different spot 
("slipping"). This can lead to insertions or deletions.  
With regard to the occurrence of the above sorts of replication errors, biologists use 
probabilities (a more detailed discussion of which will follow in Chapter 2) to describe them. So, 
yet again, we have a probabilistic phenomenon regarding which mechanistic explanation seems 
readily available.    
1.8.4 Natural Selection 
 
Nature tends to preserve those traits that afford their possessors the greater chance to 
survive and reproduce, and it tends to reject those that do not. The result is that species become 
increasingly matched to their respective environments; they become exquisitely adapted over 
time. In its most basic form, this is natural selection (NS).  
Modern biologists (and philosophers of biology) give a somewhat more specific account 
of what is required for NS to occur. On one account, put forth by Skipper and Millstein (2005)
6
, 
NS can be precisely formulated as follows: 
I. Initial conditions 
1. A population of Os exist. 
2. Os vary according to forms of T, which are heritable. 
3. Os are in environment E with critical factor F. 
 
II. Interaction 
1. Os in virtue of the varying forms of T interact differently with 
environment E. 
2. Critical factor F affects that interaction. 
3. This may lead to 
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III. Effects (1) 
1. differential survival rates of Os across forms of T in E. 
2. This may lead to 
 
IV. Effects (2) 
1. differential reproductive rates of Os across forms of T in E. 
2. This may lead to 
 
V. Effects (3) 
1. differential representation in the population of Os across forms of T in 
E. 
 
2. This may lead to 
 
VI. Effects (4) 
1. the predominance of Os with a certain form of T over other forms of T 
in E. 
2. This may lead to 
 
VII. Effects (5) 
1. adaptation of the lineage with respect to T in E. 
 
Filling instructions: 
‘O’ is to be replaced by the name of some organism 
‘T’ is to be replaced by some determinable organismic trait 
‘E’ is to be replaced by the description of the environment of ‘O’ 
‘F’ is to be replaced by the description of a critical factor in ‘E’ 
   




Figure 3. Natural selection schema (From Skipper and Millstein 2005, 331). 
 
As we shall see in the coming chapters (esp. Chapter 3), natural selection is also a probabilistic 
process. This is, in part, because NS operates on genetic variation, and in evolutionary biology, 
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the evolutionary consequences of genetic mutation are conceptualized in terms of the chance 
(per unit of time) a gene has of changing from one state to another. But it is also in part due to 
the fact that natural selection is subject to many highly contingent environmental factors, factors 
which are too complex to predict.   
 As to whether NS should qualify as a mechanism, this is the subject of a heated debate in 
the literature: a debate I shall focus on in detail when we get to Chapter 3.  
 
1.8.5 Mendelian Segregation  
 
By breeding pea plants in his monastery garden, Gregor Mendel made invaluable strides 
towards understanding the mechanisms that rule heredity. When he crossed two pea plants with 
different traits—for example, a yellow pea producing plant with a green pea producing plant—he 
came to see a pattern in the results. In the first generation (which we now call the F1 generation), 
all the peas were yellow. He, therefore, called the yellow trait the dominant one.  But when he 
allowed the all-yellow peas to self fertilize in the subsequent generation (which we now call the 
F2 generation), both yellow and green seeds appeared at a rate of near exactly 3:1. He, therefore, 
called the green trait the recessive one—since it had been hidden by the yellow ones in the 
previous generation.  
 Although Mendel himself lacked the modern resources for explaining this observed 
pattern, we now understand the mechanism underlying this phenomenon. Understanding it 
requires postulating the existence of paired material elements (later called “alleles”)—one 
coming from the father and one coming from the mother—which segregate during meiosis. One 
of these alleles (capital ‘A’) is dominant, and the other (lowercase ‘a’) is recessive. In the pea 
plant example, these alleles combine in various ways such that some of the seeds have matching 
pairs of alleles (called homozygous) and some have mismatched pairs (called heterozygous).  
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This combination of alleles is called genotype, and its resulting character—yellowness or 
greenness—is called phenotype. To clearly visualize how alleles are distributed amongst 
descendents, we can use a Punnett Square: 
 
 A A 
A AA Aa 
a aA Aa 
 
In the case of the green and yellow peas, the yellow character is dominant, so it is represented by 
the uppercase ‘A’, and the green character is recessive, so it is represented by the lowercase ‘a’. 
The upper case ‘A’ always dominates over the lower case ‘a’, so the only time we get green peas 
is when there are two lowercase ‘a’s.  In the initial generation, the yellow pea plant will give 
each of its progeny a dominant yellow allele, and the green pea plant will give each plant a 
recessive green allele. So all the pea plants in the F1 generation will be yellow heterozygous. But 
in the F2 generation, when the yellow heterozygous peas have interbred, the resulting progeny 
could have any of the combination of alleles (as illustrated by the Punnett Square)—showing a 
ratio of 3:1 yellow to green phenotypes.  We now know that the mechanism works like this: ‘A’ 
and ‘a’ segregate in the formation of germ cells, which then combine randomly at fertilization to 
give offspring according to the formula: 1AA + 2Aa + 1aa, and this mechanism explains the 3:1 
ratio that Mendel observed. 
 Importantly, however, the 3:1 ratio observed in the F2 generation is not exact. Mendel’s 
own results when breeding yellow and green peas in the F2 generation were actually 6022 





 As such, Mendelian segregation is not fully deterministic, but rather 
must be considered stochastic. As with our previous examples, however, Mendelian segregation 
also seems to fit perfectly well into the mechanistic explanatory framework. It has entities: 
alleles, chromosomes, genes, etc. And it has activities: meiosis, interbreeding, segregation, etc. 
And it has intuitive start and termination conditions beginning with meiosis in the formation of 
germ cells and ending with the production of a new organism.    
 
1.9 Anticipating the Central Task of this Dissertation  
 
As we’ve just seen, many of the phenomena that biologists explain by appealing to mechanisms 
appear to behave probabilistically. But for something to be a mechanism, it is commonly thought 
to have to behave regularly. Depending on how we understand regularity, however, it seems 
difficult to understand how a regularly behaving mechanism could underlie and produce a 
probabilistic phenomenon. That is the central task I take on in what remains of this dissertation.  
In short, I aim to defend the following thesis: 
Dissertation Thesis: In this dissertation, I will argue that the best way to ground (at least 
some) of the probabilistic generalizations in the life sciences is by appeal to stochastic 
mechanisms.   
 
Now let me set some goals I hope to achieve along the way.  
 
 
1.10 Primary Goals of this Dissertation 
 
In this dissertation, I hope to: 
 
(I) successfully taxonomize all the ways a mechanism can be thought to behave regularly (and 
irregularly),  
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(II) argue that regularity should not be seen to be a metaphysically demarcating feature of 
mechanisms—but that mechanisms with high degrees of regularity should be seen to hold an 
explanatorily privileged position, 
(III) use this taxonomy of regularity to show how we can make sense of natural selection as an 
explanatorily privileged  mechanism,  
(IV) show that a version of a propensity theory is the best analysis of chance for underpinning an 
account of stochastic mechanism,  
(V) explore the prospects for applying three important lessons from recent propensity 
interpretations of fitness and drift, 
(1) Propensities are aptly understood as having probability-weighted possibilia as their 
categorical base,  
(2) Propensities are quantifiable via a function of these probability-weighted possibilia, 
(3) If we can, we should avoid committing to a view which requires defending the causal 
efficacy of propensities (and dispositional properties in general),   
(VI) use these lessons to specify a propensity interpretation of stochastic mechanism (PrISM), 
(VII) explain how this novel PrISM analysis can handle the threat of metaphysical determinism. 
1.11 What is to Come: Chapter Summaries 
 
Chapter 2. Mechanisms and Regularity 
 
There is widespread disagreement in the mechanisms literature regarding how regularly a 
causal process needs to behave in order to qualify as a mechanism. In this Chapter, I 
explore a recent argument offered by Andersen (2012) in favor of placing a broadened 
regularity requirement on mechanisms. I argue, contra Andersen, that the reasons she 
gives for adopting this regularity requirement ultimately rest on a confusion between 
metaphysical, epistemological, and pragmatic considerations. Instead of requiring of all 
mechanisms that they behave regularly in order to be mechanisms, I’ll suggest that 
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mechanisms come in degrees of regularity: some highly regular, some not very regular at 
all. In agreement with the spirit of Andersen’s arguments, however, I’ll concede that 
mechanisms with a high degree of regularity should hold a privileged position in 
scientific explanation. 
 
Chapter 3. Is Natural Selection Regular Enough to be a Mechanism?      
 
In this chapter, I apply several ideas developed in the previous Chapter to help sort out an 
active debate in the philosophy of biology: whether natural selection qualifies as an MDC 
mechanism. I argue that, by paying careful attention to some key distinctions drawn in 
the discussion of mechanistic regularity undertaken in Chapter 2 as well as some recent 
work on abstract mechanism schemas, natural selection can be seen to qualify as an MDC 
mechanism just fine—at least in the context of many legitimate explanatory contexts. 
More than a mere terminological dispute about what to call natural selection, I conclude 
by suggesting that this debate evinces a deeper point about the prospects for appealing to 
mechanisms to ground probabilistic generalizations in a contingent biological world.   
 
Chapter 4. Stochastic Mechanisms and Theories of Chance  
 
My goal in this Chapter is to further develop my characterization of stochastic 
mechanism by exploring how we should best understand the chanciness we attribute to 
them. To do this, I form a list of desiderata that any account of stochastic mechanism 
must meet. I then take the general characterization of mechanism offered by Machamer, 
Darden, and Craver (2000) and explore how it fits with several of the going philosophical 
accounts of chance: subjectivism, frequentism (both actual and hypothetical), Lewisian 
best-systems, and propensity. I argue that neither subjectivism, frequentism, nor a best-
system-style account of chance will meet all of the proposed desiderata, but some version 
of propensity theory can. I conclude by showing the proposed account of propensity-
backed stochastic mechanism has the added benefit of allowing us to escape many of the 
traditional objections to propensity theories of chance. 
 
Chapter 5. A Propensity Interpretation of Stochastic Mechanism: Lessons from Fitness and Drift  
 
The goal of this chapter is to introduce and motivate a propensity interpretation of 
stochastic mechanism (PrISM). I approach this, first, by examining some recent 
propensity interpretations of fitness and drift to see what lessons might be learned from 
them. I then lay out my own formal characterization of the propensity interpretation of 
stochastic mechanism and show how it enjoys an important advantage over propensity 
interpretations of fitness and drift. I conclude by hinting at how the PrISM might apply to 
one of the biological phenomena targeted for mechanistic explanation introduced in 
Chapter 1 
 





In this chapter, I explore whether—and if so, how—the propensity interpretation of 
stochastic mechanism (PrISM) developed thus far can handle the threat of metaphysical 
determinism. The answer I pursue is that it can. To show how, I first outline a few 
influential arguments for and against biological indeterminism and suggest that the only 
tenable philosophical conclusion available is an agnosticism as to whether there is 
genuine indeterminism at play in the biological world. As such, I pursue a disjunctivist 
strategy according to which what we say about the PrISM depends on which side of the 
biological determinism debate prevails. To accommodate the more difficult determinism 
disjunct, I draw on recent view from the philosophy of probability, emergent chance, 
according to which objective chance can exist at one level of description even if 
determinism holds at a different level. I then apply this idea to mechanism levels to show 
that genuine propensities may be able to exist at one mechanism level even if another 
mechanism level (within the same mechanism hierarchy) is characterized 
deterministically.     
 
Chapter 7. Conclusion: Prospects for Future Research 
 
In this concluding Chapter, I briefly summarize the main arguments offered in the 
dissertation; I revisit the central biological examples set forth in Chapter 1 in order to 
recapitulate some of the explanatory lessons afforded to them by my account; and I 





















Chapter 2. Mechanisms and Regularity 
 
Abstract: There is widespread disagreement in the mechanisms literature regarding how 
regularly a causal process needs to behave in order to qualify as a mechanism. In this Chapter, I 
explore a recent argument offered by Andersen (2012) in favor of placing a broadened regularity 
requirement on mechanisms. I argue, contra Andersen, that the reasons she gives for adopting 
this regularity requirement ultimately rest on a confusion between metaphysical, epistemological, 
and pragmatic considerations. Instead of requiring of all mechanisms that they behave regularly 
in order to be mechanisms, I’ll suggest that mechanisms come in degrees of regularity: some 
highly regular, some not very regular at all. In agreement with the spirit of Andersen’s 
arguments, however, I’ll concede that mechanisms with a high degree of regularity should hold a 




The topic of this dissertation is to explore the prospects for appealing to mechanisms to ground 
probabilistic generalizations in the life sciences. As we saw in the previous Chapter, however, 
these prospects might seem dim at the outset because, throughout the history of philosophical 
thought, mechanisms have been associated with machine-like, deterministic behavior. But how 
could a deterministic machine produce results that are indeterministic, statistical, and/or 
probabilistic? As hinted in the introduction, my approach to answering this question will be to 
articulate and defend an account of mechanism that does not require mechanisms to behave like 
deterministic machines—an account of mechanism according to which (at least some) 
mechanisms operating in the natural world behave stochastically—an account of stochastic 
mechanism for the life sciences.  
 So far, however, nothing has been said about what these stochastic mechanisms are, what 
their defining characteristics might be, or how we should go about understanding them. By way 
of taking an initial step in this direction, in this Chapter I’ll focus on one of the defining features 
of stochastic mechanisms. Whatever else they are, I suggest, stochastic mechanisms have the 
following characteristic: they fail to do exactly the same thing each time they operate. In other 
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words, stochastic mechanisms fail to operate entirely regularly. Indeed, this is the feature of 
stochastic mechanisms that distinguishes them from deterministic ones.  
But why, you might wonder, should we begin by focusing on this aspect of stochastic 
mechanisms? Here is my reason. The failure of stochastic mechanisms to behave regularly seems 
to run up against a difficult problem. As we shall see, many philosophers have thought that a 
causal process must behave regularly in order to count as a mechanism at all. From the 
standpoint of these authors, it is a metaphysical prerequisite that mechanisms behave regularly—
that they operate the same way (or very nearly the same way) each time they fire. If these authors 
are correct, the project of developing an account of stochastic mechanism seems it might be 
doomed from the start.  
Given this seeming difficulty, the topic of this Chapter is to seek an answer to what I call 
the regularity question. The regularity question asks this: to what extent is it a necessary feature 
of mechanisms that they work the same way (or near enough to the same way) each time they 
operate? To explore this question, I’ll look at the space of answers that have been given: those 
who argue that there are strong reasons for requiring that mechanisms behave highly regularly, 
and those who argue that mechanisms need not behave regularly at all. Because of its subtlety 
and rigor, I’ll focus specifically on the recent defense of a broadened appeal to regularity offered 
by Holly Andersen (2012). Although Andersen’s work has made invaluable strides towards 
laying the groundwork for addressing the regularity question, I’ll disagree with many of her main 
conclusions. Specifically I will argue, contra Andersen, that the reasons she gives for adopting 
her broadened regularity requirement rest on a confusion between metaphysical, epistemological, 
and pragmatic considerations. Instead of requiring of all mechanisms that they behave regularly 
in order to be mechanisms, I’ll suggest that mechanisms come in degrees of regularity: some 
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highly regular; some not very regular at all. In agreement with the spirit of Andersen’s 
arguments, however, I’ll suggest that mechanisms with a high degree of regularity should hold a 
privileged position in scientific explanation.      
Here is my plan. In Section 2.2, I’ll draw attention to a rift in the mechanisms literature 
regarding whether regularity should be included in philosophical characterizations of 
mechanism. In Section 2.3, I’ll briefly outline Andersen’s case for placing a broadened regularity 
requirement on mechanisms. In 2.4, I’ll evaluate Andersen’s case by: (i) highlighting and 
illustrating the positive attributes of her case, (ii) augmenting her taxonomy of mechanistic 
regularity with two considerations of my own, and (iii) offering some argument against the 
reasons to which she appeals to motivate her case for a regularity requirement. And In 2.5, I’ll 
offer my own response to the regularity question.  
 
2.2 A Rift on Regularity 
 
Over the last two decades, a rift has emerged in the mechanisms literature. Some philosophers 
require that the component entities and activities of a mechanism behave in a regular fashion; 
some do not.  
The most explicit appeal to regularity in the current literature appears in Machamer, 
Darden, and Craver’s characterization of mechanism (henceforth, MDC). As we saw in the 
previous Chapter, MDC give the following characterization of mechanisms:  
MDC: Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of  
regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions (MDC 2000, 3. 
Italics added for emphasis).   
 
For MDC, something is a mechanism just in case its entities engage in activities that produce 
regular changes from start to finish. They add, further, that “[M]echanisms are regular in that 
they work always or for the most part in the same way under the same conditions” (MDC 2000, 
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3). Similar appeals to regularity can be found in Darden 2008; Craver 2007; Craver and Darden 
2013; Glennan 1996, 2002; and Bechtel and Abrahamson 2005. A careful analysis of what an 
appeal to regularity might mean in the context of mechanism is coming in the next section. But 
for now it will be helpful to gesture at what I take to be the main prima facie reason why we 
might want a characterization of mechanism with an appeal to regularity.  
 The main reason why it might be tempting to place a regularity requirement on processes 
we wish to deem as mechanisms is so that they can take over the roles that laws of nature once 
played in scientific explanation. That is, mechanisms, when understood to behave the same way 
(or near enough to the same way) each time they fire, can serve as the basis for making scientific 
generalizations, predictions, and explanations. Whereas, if no such regularity requirement is set 
forth, then they seem far less capable of taking over these roles. If mechanisms do not have to 
behave roughly the same way each time they operate, what basis do we have for generalizing 
about the phenomena that typically result from a certain kind of mechanism? What basis do we 
have for predicting the occurrence of a certain phenomenon that we believe will result from a 
certain kind of mechanism? And how can we explain general patterns of phenomena based on 
these mechanisms?  
Despite the intuitive appeal of requiring mechanisms to behave regularly, there are some 
philosophers who argue against placing any kind of regularity requirement on mechanisms. 
James Bogen, (2005) concludes, “Mechanists need not include regularities and invariant 
generalizations in their account” (Bogen 2005, 399). Peter Machamer, influenced by Bogen, also 
drops his appeal to regularity. In a footnote (2004) Machamer writes, “I think ‘regular’ should be 
dropped from the definition.  Jim Bogen argues forcefully that there might be mechanisms that 
operate only once in a while or even one that works only once” (Machamer 2004, 37). Stuart 
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Glennan, in a recent paper, offers another characterization of (certain type of) mechanism with 
no appeal to regularity. He calls them ‘ephemeral mechanisms’.  
I take an ephemeral mechanism to be a collection of interacting parts where: 
 
1. the interactions between parts can be characterized by direct, invariant, change-relating 
generalizations 
 
2. the configuration of parts may be the product of chance or exogenous factors 
 
3. the configuration of parts is short-lived and non-stable, and is not an instance of 
a multiply-realized type. (Glennan 2010, 260) 
 
For Glennan, ephemeral mechanisms are fleeting and short-lived; they only exist while the 
mechanism is operating and disappear once it is finished. This type of mechanism clearly makes 
no appeal to regularity at all—since it makes little sense to say of an ephemeral mechanism that 
it operates the same way each time it fires. By definition, it only ever fires once. 
 What reasons might these philosophers have for suggesting that the regularity constraint 
be dropped? The main reason is what Andersen calls the argument from science. In short, the 
science just doesn’t support a conception of mechanisms that requires them to behave the same 
way each time they operate. The fact is, opponents of the regularity requirement will point out, 
several (if not all) of the processes that scientists analyze mechanistically do not seem to behave 
very regularly. To support this claim, Bogen cites the transmission of electrical activity to 
postsynaptic neurons in the brain—a process that (as we saw in 1.8.1) fails up to 90% of time.   
Much more detail is to follow on the synaptic transmission case in the next section. For 
now, let’s look at the general form of Andersen’s argument. 
  
2.3 Andersen’s Case for a Broadened Appeal to Regularity 
 
Now that we’ve seen that there is widespread disagreement in the mechanisms literature on 
whether mechanisms need to operate regularly, let us look at a particularly subtle and rigorous 
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case for placing a regularity requirement on mechanisms: that offered by Andersen (2012). I 
suggest Andersen’s account is a good place to focus because, more than any of the other 
participants in this debate, (i) she makes explicit several plausible reasons why a regularity 
requirement seems attractive to philosophers interested in characterizing mechanisms, and (ii) 
she adeptly taxonomizes several of the many senses of regularity that are implicit in the 
literature. Although I’ll ultimately disagree that the considerations Andersen offers constitute 
good reasons for placing a regularity requirement on mechanisms, I’ll suggest that her taxonomy 
of mechanistic regularity lays an invaluable framework for addressing the regularity question—a 
framework I will borrow and add to in order to arrive at my own answer to the regularity 
question. 
  
2.3.1 Reasons for Mechanistic Regularity 
 
Andersen gives three main reasons why we should want to make some kind of regularity 
requirement on mechanisms. First, a regularity requirement makes it possible to individuate 
mechanisms in a non-arbitrary way. Second, a regularity requirement endows us with the means 
for drawing a distinction between mechanisms and causation in general. And third, a regularity 
requirement better facilitates the role of mechanisms for grounding generalizations in science.  
 Regarding the first reason, Andersen writes,  
When a mechanism operates with at least some kind of regularity, we have 
grounds by which to draw the mechanism boundary around the entities and 
activities that were actually involved in bringing about the phenomenon in 
question. (Ibid, 426) 
And,  
The more often a mechanism occurs, and the more regularly it occurs, the clearer 
it becomes which entities and activities are part of the mechanism (i.e., what the 




The idea pursued by Andersen here is that, unless we require mechanisms to behave regularly (in 
some sense), we’ll have a much harder time individuating mechanisms from their surroundings. 
If a mechanism has to do (roughly) the same thing each time it operates, on the other hand, it 
becomes much easier to figure out, by observing it over time, what its component entities and 
activities are—and thereby distinguish the mechanism from its surroundings.  
 Regarding the second reason, Andersen writes,  
One of the consequences of dropping the regularity requirement from the 
definition of a mechanism is that of collapsing the distinction between 
mechanisms and causation in general. Any chain of causes could be called a 
mechanism; we could add another causal interaction to a given chain, or take 
some away, and it would still be a mechanism. (Ibid, 428) 
 
Here, Andersen suggests that placing a regularity requirement on mechanisms better facilitates a 
distinction between mechanisms and causation in general. Unless mechanisms are required to 
behave in a regular fashion, she contends, it seems much less clear what separates a mechanism 
from any kind of regular-old cause. To illustrate this point, consider the MDC characterization of 
mechanism with its appeal to regularity removed. Let’s call it MDC-. 
MDC-: Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of 
changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions. 
 
Now consider what sorts of causal process seem to meet this characterization. Andersen suggests 
the answer is: any causal chain whatsoever. But, for Andersen, this won’t do. Whatever else 
mechanisms are, they have to be something more than run-of-the-mill causal chains.    
  Regarding the third reason, Andersen writes,  
The regularly recurring chains of entities and activities that constitute a 
mechanism make them more useful in explanations of other chains of causal-
activity-connected entities because regularity grounds generalization from one 




When mechanisms are conceived of as regular, Andersen points out, they also do a much better 
job of grounding the sorts of generalizations scientists appeal to mechanisms to make. If I know 
of a given mechanism (call it M1) that it regularly produces a certain kind of outcome (call it O1) 
I can then formulate a generalization of the following sort: mechanisms of the M1-kind produce 
outcomes of the O1-kind. But if mechanisms aren’t required to behave regularly, no such 
generalization seems available.     
Ultimately, I’ll find these considerations inadequate for motivating the inclusion of a 
regularity constraint on processes we wish to deem as mechanisms. But my arguments against 
them will come in a later section. For now, let’s look at the second part of Andersen’s case.  
 
2.3.2 Taxonomizing Mechanistic Regularly   
 
As we’ve just seen, Andersen thinks there are powerful reasons for placing some kind of 
a regularity requirement on mechanisms. But this leaves her vulnerable to the difficult objection 
mentioned in 2.2. Namely, many of the processes that the mechanistic philosophy of science 
aims to explain mechanistically do not seem to behave very regularly. This objection has been 
articulated forcefully by Bogen (2005) who cites vesicle release when an action potential is 
present—a process that fails up to 90% of time—as a causal process that scientists analyze 
mechanistically, but one that cannot be considered to behave regularly. Since this is a 
paradigmatic target for mechanistic explanation, and it fails to behave very regularly at all, 
mechanists had better not require regularity of mechanisms.  
In order to address this objection, Andersen develops a taxonomy of regularity for 
mechanistic explanation. She then makes a disjunctive argument for a broadened appeal to 
regularity. When regularity is properly taxonomized, Andersen argues, even Bogen’s examples 
can be seen to qualify as regular—in at least one important sense of regularity.  
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On Andersen’s taxonomy, there are three parameters along which a purported mechanism 
can exhibit regularity (or irregularity). These three parameters are:  
- the organizational location of regularity in terms of stages within a mechanism;  
 
- the strength of connection between component elements in a mechanism; and  
 
- the failure pattern by which a mechanism could fail to operate always or for the most part 
while still exhibiting sufficient regularity to count as a mechanism. (Andersen 2012, 419) 
The first parameter involves the organizational location of a mechanism’s regularity. According 
to Andersen, there are four places in a mechanism in which they might behave regularly, or fail 
to behave regularly: 
R1) Regular occurrence of [a mechanism’s] set‐up conditions8,  
 
R2) Regular triggering of the mechanism once its set‐up conditions occur,   
 
R3) Regular operation of specific activities connecting the entities within a single  
mechanism, 
 
R4) Regular production of termination conditions once the mechanism has been 
triggered. (Ibid, 419, my use of ‘R’) 
 
As a simple way of illustrating the forgoing distinctions between disparate organization locations 
of a mechanism’s regularity, think for a moment about your household toaster. Ask yourself: 
how regularly does your toaster produce acceptably toasted pieces of toast? Suppose you 
estimate that your toaster only puts out an average of 2 pieces of toast per week. Now ask, what 
is the reason for this? One reason might be that you are on a low-carbohydrate diet, and simply 
do not allow yourself to indulge in toast on very many occasions. In this imagined scenario, your 
toaster may work perfectly wonderfully, in that it produces perfectly adequate toast every time 
you use it; you just don’t happen to use it very much. This is a lack of regularity in the sense 
                                                          
8
 In her formulation of R1-R4, Andersen uses the term “start-up conditions” in R1 and R2. But, as I’ve defined 
“start-up conditions” (in 1.6), they necessarily result in triggering. As such, I have changed it to ‘set-up’ 
conditions—which is what I think she must have meant anyway.   
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described by Andersen’s (R1). Your toaster fails to regularly produce yummy toast because its 
set-up conditions (e.g., your placing toast into it and depressing its lever) do not obtain very 
often. Suppose, instead, that you are an avid morning jogger who likes a bit of carbo-loading 
before you set off. You make toast nearly every morning. Your toaster, in this scenario, would 
have a much higher degree of (R1) regularity. Now suppose, staying with this (R1) regular 
scenario, that you put toast in your toaster and depress its lever every morning. But you only get 
acceptable toast on 4 out of 7 mornings. The other mornings, your bread either remains untoasted 
or it gets burnt beyond the point of being edible. What could account for this? It might be that 
your toaster fails to be (R2) regular: you put bread into the slot, you press the lever, but on some 
mornings your toaster fails to start toasting because its old and (for whatever reason) its lever 
doesn’t always trigger the heating coils. Or perhaps it is because there is faulty wiring between 
the lever trigger and the heating coils such that, even when the lever is correctly depressed, an 
electrical short prevents the coils from beginning to heat. On this scenario, your toaster fails to be 
(R3) regular. Finally, it might be that, even when your toaster lever successfully triggers the 
heating coils to heat, your bread fails to pop-up at the right time resulting in charred toast on a 
few mornings. This would be a failure of (R4) regularity. As Andersen has it, when we speak of 
how regularly your toaster produces yummy toast, we might be referring to any one of these 
organizational locations. 
The second parameter of Andersen’s taxonomy or mechanistic regularity points to the 
fact that the term “regular” could also indicate a different strength of connection between the 
forgoing organizational stages of a mechanism. She cites four levels regarding the strength of 
connection between mechanism stages: 




(b) Reliable but not exceptionless: most of the time, the cause brings about the effect, but 
there are occasions on which it does not, and we may or may not be able to provide an 
explanation for the exception 
 
(c) Sporadic: the cause fails to act often enough that it cannot be considered merely an 
exception when this failure occurs 
 
(d) Infrequent: most of the time, the cause fails to bring about its effect, but once in a 
while it does. (Ibid, 420) 
 
Returning to your toaster, it might be have a strength of connection of the sort described by level 
(a)—in which case it never fails to produce yummy toast when you put toast in it and press its 
lever. It might be (b)-level strength of connection, in which case it produces acceptable toast 
most of the time. Or, much to your dismay, you might have a toaster that has a strength of 
connection of (c) or (d), in which case your toaster either sporadically produces edible toast or 
rarely does.  
Regarding the third and final parameter of Andersen’s taxonomy of mechanistic 
regularity, Andersen suggests that there are at least two failure patterns by which a mechanism 
can fail at a given organizational location, but nevertheless exhibit some kind of regularity. If at 
least one of these failure patterns is discernible—even at an organizational location with low 
connection strength—she argues that the mechanism can still qualify as regular. These two 
failure patterns are: 
(i) Known statistical distribution of indeterminacy: the mechanism succeeds some 
consistent percentage of times, even though we may not be able to account for why it 
succeeds or fails when it does. 
 
(ii) Known interfering factors: when the mechanism fails at a given organization location, 
we can identify factors that interfered on this occasion, whether or not we know the 
precise quantitative impact of such factors on the mechanism function in general. (Ibid, 
421) 
 
Let’s consider your toaster one last time. Suppose, like many of us, you know very little about 
the inner workings of your toaster. But you’ve astutely observed a very consistent pattern of its 
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success and failure: you get perfect toast on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday; but your toast is 
inedible on the other days. Despite the fact that it fails to produce acceptable toast more often 
than it succeeds, your toaster is (i)-regular. That is, it succeeds some consistent percentage of the 
time. Suppose, on the other hand, that on certain mornings your toaster fails and you know why. 
It’s because you’re trying to use too many kitchen appliances at once, and your kitchen fuse gets 
overloaded. On this scenario, your toaster is (ii)-regular despite failing on these mornings.   
 
2.3.3 Countering the Argument from Science 
 
Now that we’ve understood Andersen’s taxonomy of mechanistic regularity, let’s explore 
how it is meant to help support her case for regularity. Recall that Bogen’s central example of an 
irregular process that scientists analyze mechanistically is the purported mechanism by which 
action potentials induce the release of neurotransmitters by vesicles in presynaptic neurons. 
Bogen argues that this process cannot be seen to be regular because this it fails up to 90% of the 
time. But scientists analyze this process mechanistically. So, he concludes, mechanisms should 
not be required to behave regularly.   
Andersen responds to this charge, first, by arguing that there are really two distinct 
mechanisms operating here: one embedded in the other. While Bogen is right that the inner 
mechanism fails to qualify as regular (in any of the senses), Andersen argues that the embedding 
mechanism qualifies as regular enough. The inner mechanism she describes as the process by 
which the action potential induces the vesicles to move towards and fuse with the cell surface at 
the active zone of the presynaptic neuron. She calls this the vesicle mechanism. In agreement 
with Bogen, she acknowledges that “there is a relatively high failure rate—as many as 90% of 
vesicles fail to release their quanta of neurotransmitter when the triggering conditions are 




For vesicle release of neurotransmitter, then, the organizational location is the 
triggering of the mechanism given start-up conditions (R2); the strength of 
connection is sporadic—it is not an exception or unusual when a vesicle fails to 
dock and release transmitter (c). And the failure pattern is that of a known 
statistical distribution without known factors (i). Scientists are not entirely sure 
what factors block the mechanism running from action potential leading to release 
of neurotransmitter, but they have reliable means to calculate the probability of 
failure for a given vesicle, or a given neuron with many vesicles. In sum, for this 
mechanism, the taxonomy provides a label of (R2-c-i). (Ibid, 423) 
 
She then asks us to consider the broader mechanism in which the forgoing vesicle mechanism is 
embedded: that of a presynaptic action potential triggering a postsynaptic depolarization. Call 
this the depolarization mechanism. According to Andersen, the vesicle mechanism is actually a 
stage in the depolarization mechanism. But when we consider the broader depolarization 
mechanism, the degree of regularity shoots up. Here is what she says.  
The previous mechanism now figures as a stage within this mechanism. In terms 
of the taxonomy, the organizational location in question is the release of 
neurotransmitters in the presynaptic cell given the triggering of the start-up 
conditions, which is now an intermediary stage leading from presynaptic cell 
firing to postsynaptic cell firing (R3). The strength of connection is now sufficient 
to count as reliable (b)… This parameter is based on the vesicles’ likelihood of 
releasing sufficient neurotransmitter to trigger postsynaptic depolarization. Yet it 
is stronger than the strength of connection in the vesicle mechanism just 
discussed. This is because even though there is a low chance that a given quantum 
of neurotransmitter will release, there are multiple quanta that must all fail for the 
mechanism to fail. (Ibid, 424) 
 
Despite the very low probability that any given vesicle mechanism will succeed in producing 
neurotransmitter, the overall depolarization mechanism in which the vesicle mechanism is 
embedded still has a relatively reliable strength of connection. The strength of connection goes 
up in the overall depolarization mechanism since there are many vesicles that would need to fail 
together for the overall mechanism to fail. Thus, she concludes: 
…there is an instance-by-instance indeterminacy: for any single action potential 
on a given occasion, we can’t say whether any given vesicle will release 
neurotransmitter, and thus whether sufficient vesicles will release so as to trigger 
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postsynaptic depolarization. However, in spite of this, there is a meta-regularity 
concerning the single-case indeterminacy that justifies calling the whole process a 
regularly occurring mechanism. (Ibid, 424) 
 
In other words, despite the failures of the embedded vesicle mechanism to operate regularly, the 
broader depolarization mechanism qualifies just fine. Thus, when regularity is properly 
taxonomized, the argument from science against placing a regularity requirement on mechanisms 
fails.   
 
2.4 Evaluating Andersen’s Case  
 
Now that we’ve outlined Andersen’s case for a broadened regularity requirement, let’s ask 
ourselves which aspects of it are convincing—and which are not. The answer that I’ll pursue in 
2.4.1 is that Andersen’s taxonomy of mechanistic regularity takes several steps in the right 
direction towards laying the groundwork for answering the regularity question—and I’ll show 
this by applying it to the cases of probabilistic phenomena I laid out in Chapter 1. In 2.4.2, 
however, I’ll suggest there are a few features relevant to mechanistic regularity that Andersen 
either under-specifies or doesn’t mention, and which I believe should be added to her taxonomy. 
And in 2.4.3, I’ll conclude my evaluation of Andersen’s case by offering some argument against 
the reasons she gives for motivating her disjunctive argument for a broadened appeal to 
regularity.  
 
2.4.1 The Positive 
 
I wholeheartedly agree with much of Andersen’s approach. I take her taxonomy of 
regularity to be a helpful step toward laying a theoretical groundwork for answering the 
regularity question. To illustrate what I take to be the most helpful aspects of her taxonomy, I’ll 
apply it to some of my own examples of probabilistic phenomena cited in Chapter 1.  
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With regard to (R1), we might ask: does this kind of regularity feature in any of the 
examples of probabilistic biological phenomena listed in the previous Chapter? And if so, what 
strength is it? I think it plausibly does exist in our examples, and I think it exists at varying 
degrees of strength. The set-up conditions for the protein synthesis mechanism (e.g., the presence 
of DNA, mRNA, and initiation of transcription) are met nearly universally in all living 
organisms; protein synthesis mechanisms have a very high degree of (R1) regularity. The same is 
true for synaptic transmission—the mechanism by which one nerve cell communicates with 
another. Kandel et al. estimate the human brain houses at least 10
11
 neurons—each one with a 
cell membrane that contains clouds of positive and negative ions spread over its inner and outer 
surfaces, and each one with an at-rest extracellular excess of positive charge and an intracellular 
excess of negative charge. (Kandel et al. 2013, 175). These neurons have all met the set-up 
conditions for synaptic transmission which starts up when an action potential travels down an 
axon causing depolarization in its wake. Thus, synaptic transmission has exceptionally high 
degree of (R1) regularity. There are, however, mechanisms we might be interested in whose 
start-up conditions occur quite rarely. We might consider, for example, the conditions for human 
evolution as an example of a mechanism with a very low degree of (R1)-type regularity. As 
Bogen (2005) points out, it (probably) only ever happened once that the conditions were 
precisely correct for humans to branch off the evolutionary tree from our primate ancestors.    
There are also mechanisms that behave more or less regularly once their set-up 
conditions have been met. Mendelian inheritance appears to be an example of a mechanism with 
a high degree of (R2)-(R4) regularity. Once a pea plant’s genes (call them A and a) segregate in 
the formation of germ cells, they will very nearly always combine at fertilization to give 
offspring according to the formula: 1AA + 2Aa + 1aa.  On the other hand, there are some 
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biological mechanisms that have a much lower degree of (R2)-(R4) regularity. As we’ll see, the 
mechanism for vesicle release when an action potential is present is an instance of a mechanism 
with quite a low strength of connection at the (R2) organizational location. Indeed, according to 
Kandel et al. (2013), it is estimated that the mean probability of synaptic transmission from a 
single active zone, “varies widely among different presynaptic terminals, from less than 0.1 (that 
is, a 10% chance that a presynaptic action potential will trigger release of a vesicle) to greater 
than 0.9” (Kandel et al., 271).      
 
2.4.2 Augmenting Andersen’s Taxonomy 
 
 As we’ve just seen, Andersen’s taxonomy proves quite helpful for analyzing the many 
ways in which mechanisms can be thought to behave regularly (or irregularly). There are, 
however, a few ways in which I think her taxonomy could be augmented. Some of the features 
I’ll propose adding to Andersen’s taxonomy are, to varying degrees, implicit in her account but 
worthwhile to make explicit. Some are entirely absent from her account.  
 
2.4.2.1 Mechanism Internal vs. External Sources of Irregularity 
 
One way in which I think it would be helpful to add to Andersen’s taxonomy is by 
pointing to the following fact: a mechanism can fail to be regular because of inhibitory sources 
either internal or external to the mechanism. And this, I suggest, makes a difference as to how 
regularly we should take a given mechanism to behave.  
To illustrate this, think again about your toaster. Suppose that you and a colleague both 
put 12 slices of bread in your respective toasters during a week, but after depressing your toaster 
levers, you only end up with 4 adequate pieces of toast—whereas your colleague gets 12. Here, 
there is an important sense in which your toaster produces adequate toast less regularly than your 
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colleague’s. But in this scenario, it is not a failure of regularity of type (R1) because the set-up 
conditions for both toasters have equally been met. Imagine, however, that the reason why your 
toaster only rendered 4 adequate pieces of toast this week is because you were attempting to use 
too many electrical appliances at once and this overloaded the electrical system and caused your 
kitchen’s circuit board switch to flip off. In this case, there is a failure of regularity, but it is one 
caused by interfering factors external to the mechanism. That your kitchen’s circuit board switch 
is in the on position is a feature of the background conditions of a working toaster mechanism, 
but not a feature internal to the toaster mechanism itself. Imagine, on the other hand, that the 
reason for your fewer number of adequate toast pieces is because you have an old toaster that 
overheats and shuts itself off on those mornings when you’ve attempted to use it too many times 
in a row. This would be a mechanism-internal source of irregularity because it’s a problem 
within the toaster itself. 
 To further illustrate the importance of distinguishing between mechanism-internal and 
mechanism-external sources of irregularity, consider a few biological mechanisms of both of 
these sorts operating in the natural world. Synaptic transmission can be disrupted by a variety of 
factors outside of the mechanism itself. In Alzheimer’s disease, patients have an abnormal 
aggregation of a microtubule-binding protein called ‘tau’.  These proteins form long, thin 
polymers that wind around one another to form what are called neurofibrillary tangles which 
accumulate in neuronal cell bodies, dendrites, and axons. These tangles, when present, interfere 
with axonal transport of electrical signals in the brain (Kandel et al. 2013, 78). This is an 
example of mechanistic irregularity due to inhibitory features (e.g., neurofibrillary tangles) 
outside the mechanism. However, synaptic transmission can also fail to occur due to problems 
inside the mechanism. Normal conduction of nerve signals in the brain can be disrupted, for 
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example, by defects in myelin proteins—proteins that insulate the very axons that carry electrical 
signals. This can result in serious disturbances in sensory and motor function (ibid, 91). Since 
axons are among the entities internal to the synaptic transmission mechanism, this should be seen 
as a mechanism-internal source of irregularity.    
There are also examples of both mechanism-internal and mechanism-external sources of 
irregularity in the mechanism of DNA replication. DNA can fail to replicate fidelously because 
its purine base (internal to the mechanism) is changed by the repositioning of a hydrogen atom, 
altering the hydrogen bonding pattern of that base resulting in incorrect base pairing during 
replication. And since a particular purine base for a particular strand of DNA is internal to the 
DNA replication mechanism, this should be seen as a mechanism-internal source of irregularity. 
However, there may also be instances where DNA replication fails to occur perfectly due to 
outside inhibitory forces (e.g., epigenetic methylation). 
Andersen implicitly acknowledges this distinction between mechanism-internal and 
mechanism-external sources of irregularity in her discussion of ecological succession. 
Ecologists may know the start-up conditions for ecological succession in a given 
ecosystem, involving disturbances to habitat or creation of new habitat. Yet not all 
start-up conditions lead to the termination conditions of climax communities, 
because there are a range of external factors governed by chance that could 
prevent the mechanism from working. (Andersen 2012, 422) 
 
Implicit in this passage, Andersen acknowledges that mechanisms sometimes fail to produce 
regular outputs do to “external factors”. But she doesn’t say much about how this relates to 
whether we end up deeming a mechanism to be regular. For reasons that shall become clear in 
the next Chapter, it is worth making this feature of mechanistic regularity explicit. 
 In short, the point is as follows. Even the most regular mechanism can be made to fail 
given the right kind of external factors. But there is definitely a sense in which we still want to 
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say of a mechanism (e.g., a perfectly good toaster) that it is regular even if it frequently gets 
prevented from working by sources external to it. In other words, let’s make sure we separate 
how regularly a mechanism works given that it’s free from inhibitory influences, and how 
regularly a mechanism works given the presence of inhibitory features.  
 
2.4.2.2 Abstract vs. Concrete Regularity 
 
In addition to the three parameters offered by Andersen (organizational location, strength 
of connection between stages, and patterns of failure), I’ll suggest that how regular a mechanism 
can be seen to behave also depends in interesting ways on (A) whether the mechanism in 
question is a type or a token, and if represented as a type (B) how abstractly it is schematized.  
Andersen acknowledges that mechanisms come in types and tokens. But (again) she says 
nothing about how this relates to how regularly a mechanism can be seen to behave. Regarding 
the distinction between type and token, here is what she says, 
[T]he term “mechanism” may apply to either a type or a token. On one hand, the 
term can be used to pick out a single individual causal chain in the world. When a 
particular neuron fires on a given occasion, a mechanism led to that firing. On the 
other hand, the term is often used to indicate a type of causal chain, one that could 
recur on multiple instances: when a neuroscience textbook describes the 
mechanism for neuron firing, it does not describe a single instance, but rather a 
type of causal chain that presumably occurs on many occasions. In this way, 
mechanisms can explain both what happens on a single occasion, as well as what 





As Andersen rightly points out, scientists explain by appeal to both individual, actualized 
mechanisms (i.e., mechanism tokens) and general, idealized mechanisms (i.e., mechanism types). 
When appealing to the latter, a mechanism type often gets depicted as a schema—“a truncated 
abstract description” of a mechanism type in which entities are often depicted in boxes and their 
activities depicted as arrows (MDC, 15). These mechanism-type schemas vary in their degree of 
                                                          
9
 This feature of mechanisms has also been discussed in detail in Illari, P. M., & Williamson, J. 2010 
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abstraction. That is, mechanism-type schemas vary in how much detail they include. The more 
abstract a mechanism schema is, the more detail it leaves out. Here is an example. The protein 





Figure 4. Concrete protein synthesis schema (From Genentech: http://www.gene.com). 
 





Figure 5. Watson’s central dogma diagram (Redrawn, based on Watson 1965). 
  
Both figures 4 and 5 are schematic representations of the mechanism-type of protein synthesis. 
Both are generalized pictorial representations rather than illustrations of a particular protein 
synthesis mechanism operating in the world. However, the first schema has a much lower degree 
of abstraction; it contains much more detail. The second schema, on the other hand, has a much 
higher degree of abstraction: it leaves a great deal of the detail out.   
 But how does any of this relate to regularity? The answer I suggest here is that there are 
interesting correlations between how abstractly a mechanism is schematized and how regularly it 
can be understood to behave. I’ll describe two such correlations.  
Given:  
 
(a) the existence of a large number of working mechanism tokens with  
(b) at least some features in common and  
(c) a high degree of variance in the specific make-up of the features schematized, 
  
CR1: the more abstractly a mechanism-type is schematized, the more of these mechanism 
tokens instantiate it—that is, the more of these mechanism tokens work in the way 
specified in the abstract mechanism schema.   
 
CR2: the less abstractly a mechanism-type is schematized, the more it will be the case 




To illustrate these correlations, let’s think one more time about toasters. There are toaster tokens, 
like the one that actually sits on your kitchen counter. There is also a toaster type, a generalized 
idealization of a toaster’s entities and activities. Like protein synthesis, toaster types can be 
represented with higher or lower degrees of abstraction. A toaster type with a low degree of 
abstraction would include many details (e.g., how many toast slots, how many toast settings, 
what kind of materials used, etc.). A toaster type with a high degree of abstraction would leave 
these details out—opting instead only to depict the bare-bones necessary features something 
needs to be a toaster. Regarding (CR1), the point I wish to emphasize here is that, (a) as long as 
there are a large number of working mechanisms, (b) these mechanisms have at least some 
features in common, and (c) there is a high degree of variance in the specific make-up of the 
schematized features, the more abstractly a mechanism type is schematized, the more of these 
mechanism tokens it will cover. In other words, (given the existence of a large number of 
working toaster tokens with some features in common and a high degree of variance in the 
specific make-ups of these schematized features) the more abstract a toaster type, the more 
toaster tokens will be subsumed under it. This, I suggest, is a new kind of regularity. Let’s call it: 
abstract regularity. A highly abstract schematization of a toaster represents a kind of toaster 
regularly in this sense because (provided the schematization is abstract enough) every single 
toaster that exists operates in the way specified by the schema. 
 On the other hand, there is a sense in which less abstract mechanism schemas represent a 
different kind of regularity. As described in (CR2), the less abstract a mechanism schema is (i.e., 
the more detail it includes), the more it will be the case that the mechanisms instantiating it 
operate in exactly in that fashion. There just won’t be many of them. Call this kind of regularity: 




2.4.3 Evaluating Andersen: The Negative 
 
 As articulated in the previous sections, I entirely agree with Andersen that there are many 
senses according to which a mechanism can be seen to behave regularly. Indeed, I’ve now added 
two other considerations to Andersen’s helpful taxonomy
10
. Despite our agreement on the 
importance of taxonomizing mechanistic regularity, however, I disagree that a process needs to 
exhibit a high degree of any of these senses of regularity in order to be a mechanism. In short, I 
argue that the reasons to which Andersen appeals to motivate her case for a regularity 
requirement rest on confusion between metaphysics and epistemology/pragmatics.  
 Recall that Andersen appeals to three primary reasons in order to motivate her case for a 
broadened regularity requirement: (1) a regularity requirement makes it possible to individuate 
mechanisms in a non-arbitrary way, (2) a regularity requirement endows us with the means for 
drawing a distinction between mechanisms and causation in general, and (3) a regularity 
requirement better facilitates the role of mechanisms for grounding generalizations in science.  
 Regarding (1), I agree it is easier to individuate mechanisms that behave in a highly 
regular manner. But I take this to be an epistemological and pragmatic concern—not reason to 
include regularity as a metaphysical demarcating feature of mechanisms. To illustrate this point, 
think for a moment about classifying species. Some species have characteristics, whether they be 
morphological or behavioral, that make them relatively easy to identify and classify. It’s pretty 
easy, for example, to tell if an organism is a western black-widow spider (Latrodectus hesperus). 
All members of this species are between 14 and 16 millimeters and have an hourglass-shaped red 
mark on their abdomen. Even someone who knows next to nothing about spiders would be able 
to look at a random sampling of spiders and pick out the western black widows. Now compare 
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the western black widow to Canus lupis, the species that includes wolves, dingos, and dogs. 
More than any other species, there is an enormous amount of variability in the morophology and 
behavior across the members of this species. If a person had no background knowledge, it would 
be next to impossible for her to know that a Chihuahua, a Great Dane, and a Grey Wolf are all 
members of the same species.  
 Much like with mechanisms, it would be easier for biologists to individuate species if we 
required of them a high degree of regularity in their appearance and behavior.  But this is an 
epistemological and pragmatic concern—one that deals with how easy it is to determine the 
boundaries around a species. It would be a mistake to conclude anything about the metaphysical 
demarcating features of species based on these epistemological and pragmatic concerns. 
Likewise with mechanisms. It may well be the case that imposing a regularity requirement on 
mechanisms would make them easier to individuate. But that, by itself, is a poor reason for 
imposing any metaphysical requirement on what it is to be a mechanism.  
 Regarding (2), is it really the case that we need mechanisms to be regular in order to be 
able to distinguish between mechanism and causation in general? Why might one think this? To 
show why, recall MDC- according to which “mechanisms are entities and activities organized 
such that they are productive of changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions.” 
(MDC 2000 [minus ‘regular’]). Now consider the following example.  
WWI: on the 28
th
 of June, 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand was shot and assassinated in 
Sarajevo. As a direct result, Austria-Hungary declared war against Serbia. This, in turn, 
directly caused Germany and Italy (countries allied with Austria-Hungary) to declare war 
on the United Kingdom, France and the Russian Empire (countries allied with Serbia). As 




This is a clear example of a singular causal chain; it only happened once. However, on the MDC 
characterization minus regularity, it apparently qualifies as a mechanism. In other words, we 
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 See DesAutels (2011) for more discussion of this example.  
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have entities (Franz Ferdinand and the forgoing countries) and activities (assassination and 
declarations of war) that are productive of change (the start of World War I). What we have, on 
such a characterization, is apparently a mechanism. But most of us would not consider this to be 
a mechanism, but rather, an instance of run-of-the-mill causation. So, it appears regularity is 
necessary for distinguishing causation in general from mechanisms.  
 By way of response to the above argument, I point to the following: it only succeeds if 
regularity proves to be the only means by which we can make the distinction between 
mechanisms and causation—but I don’t think it is. To show why, consider again MDC-. At first 
glance, it seems Andersen is right that the MDC- characterization of mechanism is 
underequipped for making a distinction between mechanisms and run-of-the-mill causation. 
However, I disagree that this is the case. Even without its appeal to regularity, the MDC- 
characterization still makes an appeal to organization. It says, “Mechanisms are entities and 
activities organized so as to produce outcomes”. Indeed, it is precisely this appeal to organization 
that I believe endows even MDC- with the capability to draw a distinction between mechanisms 
and causation in general. The reason why WWI isn’t a mechanism is not the fact that it only ever 
happened once. Rather it’s the fact that it lacks the right kind of organization. Regarding the 
organizational properties of mechanisms, the MDC view states that entities in a mechanism must 
be located, structured, oriented; and a mechanism’s activities must have temporal order rate, and 
duration. The key feature of a mechanism’s organization to focus on here is structure. 
Mechanisms have an organizational structure. Run-of-the-mill causation need not. Of course, 
much more would need to be said to make this story precise (see section 7.2.1 for some hints as 
to how this might go). However, that is a topic for another paper. For now, it suffices to have 
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shown that regularity need not be the only available resource for distinguishing between 
mechanisms and general causation. Organizational structure might serve this purpose just fine.   
 What about Andersen’s reason (3) for placing a broadened regularity requirement on 
mechanisms? Is it true that mechanisms need to be regular in order for scientists to base 
generalizations on them? Analogously to my response to reason (1), I think this (again) rests on a 
conflation between metaphysics, epistemology, and pragmatics. Of course, it would make it 
easier for scientists to generalize based on highly regular mechanisms. But we shouldn’t make 
requirements on the metaphysically demarcating features of mechanism solely based on what 
would make scientific explanations easier. We should look at the processes that successful 
science analyzes mechanistically, and figure out from there what can be said about their 
metaphysical characteristics.   
  
2.5 My Answer to the Regularity Question 
 
So far, I’ve drawn attention to a rift in the mechanisms literature regarding whether causal 
processes need to behave regularly in order to qualify as mechanisms. And because of its 
subtlety and rigor, I’ve outlined Andersen’s case for a broadened appeal to regularity. By way of 
evaluating Andersen’s case, (i) I’ve  shown the applicability of Andersen’s taxonomy of 
mechanistic regularity by showing how it applies to the cases of probabilistic phenomena I 
introduced in Chapter 1; (ii) I’ve augmented this taxonomy by drawing attention to a few 
additional features of mechanistic regularity; and (iii) I’ve argued, contra Andersen, that the 
reasons she gives for adopting this regularity requirement rest on a confusion between 






2.5.1 Regularity in Degrees 
 
 Here is my answer to the regularity question. Instead of requiring of all mechanisms that 
they behave regularly in order to be mechanisms, I suggest that mechanisms come in degrees of 
regularity: some highly regular, some not very regular at all. 
 There are two distinct but related reasons why I propose this answer to the regularity 
question. First, allowing regularity to come in varying degrees means that we can consider even 
highly irregular processes (e.g., vesicle mechanisms) count as mechanisms when the science tells 
us we should. Second, this approach gives the mechanistic framework more explanatory power.  
 To motivate the first reason, recall Andersen’s response to the argument from science. 
Andersen’s response to Bogen was to reframe the irregular vesicle mechanism in terms of the 
broader mechanism in which it is embedded. As we saw, Andersen argued that, when we turn 
our attention to the broader depolarization mechanism, its level of regularity becomes much 
higher—such that it becomes eligible for mechanism status. What I wish to point out, however, 
is that this strategy only works at the cost of having to ignore the inner mechanism.  
 Consider, however, what would happen if we accepted the following answer to the 
regularity question. There is simply no threshold of regularity that should be required of a 
process to count as a mechanism. Rather, mechanisms come in varying degrees of regularity on 
each of the dimensions outlined in the previous sections. The advantage of this approach, I 
suggest, is that we can analyze processes with low degrees of regularity in mechanistic terms just 
fine. And since that means that there are more mechanisms operating in the natural world, this 







2.5.2 Privileging Regular Mechanisms   
 
That said, there is something compelling about the spirit of Andersen’s reasons for 
wanting mechanisms to have a regularity requirement. Namely, it is true that mechanisms do a 
better job of supporting scientific generalizations, predictions, and explanations if they operate 
regularly.  
 The crucial point I offer here is this: we don’t need to require of all mechanisms that they 
operate regularly in order for them to fill these explanatory roles. Instead, let’s admit that some 
mechanisms are better-suited for grounding generalizations/predictions/intervention strategies 
than others. The more regular they are, the better they do in this regard. Following this line of 
thought, I see no problem with bestowing a special privilege to the highly regular mechanisms 




In this Chapter, I’ve explored the regularity question: to what extent is it a necessary feature of 
mechanisms that they behave regularly. To do this, I first drew attention to a rift in the 
mechanisms literature between those who require of candidate mechanisms that they behave 
regularly and those who make no such requirement. I focused specifically on Holly Andersen’s 
(2012) case for a broadened appeal to regularity. By way of evaluating this case, (i) I highlighted 
the positive steps Andersen’s taxonomy takes towards laying the groundwork for an answer to 
the regularity question; (ii) I added a few features to her taxonomy that were either under-
specified or absent from Andersen’s account; and (iii) I offered some negative argument against 
a few of her conclusions. The crux of my negative argument was to show that the considerations 
offered by Andersen to support her broadened appeal to regularity rest on a confusion between 
metaphysical, epistemological, and pragmatic considerations. Rather than requiring of a causal 
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process that it behave regularly (in any sense) in order to be  a mechanism, we should allow that 
mechanisms come in varying degrees of regularity along a myriad of dimensions. This approach, 
I suggested, has the benefit of being able to analyze even the most irregular of processes as 
mechanistic when the science tells us we should. In agreement with the spirit of Andersen’s 
arguments, however, I conceded that mechanisms with a high degree of regularity should hold a 































Chapter 3. Is Natural Selection Regular Enough to be a Mechanism?      
 
Abstract: In this chapter, I apply several ideas developed in the previous Chapter to help sort out 
an active debate in the philosophy of biology: whether natural selection qualifies as an MDC 
mechanism. I argue that, by paying careful attention to some key distinctions drawn in the 
discussion of mechanistic regularity undertaken in Chapter 2 as well as some recent work on 
abstract mechanism schemas, natural selection can be seen to qualify as an MDC mechanism just 
fine—at least in the context of many legitimate explanatory contexts. More than a mere 
terminological dispute about what to call natural selection, I conclude by suggesting that this 
debate evinces a deeper point about the prospects for appealing to mechanisms to ground 





In Chapter 2, I examined the question of how regular a process needs to behave in order to count 
as a mechanism. The answer I pursued was that regularity should not be conceived of as a 
metaphysical requirement for counting as a mechanism. Mechanistic regularity, I argued, is a 
matter of degree: some behave highly regularly, and some do not. However, there are good 
epistemological and pragmatic reasons for wanting to search for and describe mechanisms with 
some kind of regularity if mechanisms are to take over for laws of nature in their role as 
grounding generalizations, predictions, and explanations in science. The question I now 
undertake to explore is whether natural selection qualifies as regular enough to take on the role 
of one of these privileged mechanisms. The answer that I pursue is that it can.  
To support this answer, I’ll look at a recent argument from Skipper and Millstein (2005) 
in which they suggest that natural selection fails to operate regularly enough to qualify as an 
MDC mechanism. I then appeal to the expanded taxonomy of mechanistic regularity offered in 
the previous Chapter to clarify precisely what kind of regularity natural selection has.  
Here is my plan. I begin in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 by characterizing NS and offering prima 
facie reasons for why it seems to fit within the framework of a mechanistic philosophy of 
science. I then, in Section 3.4, review one significant argument against NS as an MDC 
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mechanism: that it fails to meet the regularity requirement set forth in the MDC characterization 
of mechanism. In Section 3.5, I review a response offered to this argument by Barros (2008) and, 
in Section 3.6, offer two reasons for Barros’s response falls short of answering Skipper and 
Millstein’s regularity critique. In Section 3.7, I draw attention to a couple of important resources 
from Chapter 2 as well as some current literature on abstract mechanisms to dismantle the 
regularity critique, showing that (at least in certain legitimate explanatory contexts) NS can be 
seen to behave regularly enough to qualify as a MDC mechanism. I conclude in Section 3.8 by 
suggesting that, rather than being a mere terminological dispute about what to call NS, this 
debate evinces a deeper point about grounding probabilistic generalizations in a contingent 
biological world.          
 
3.2 Clarifying the Analysandum: What is Natural Selection? 
 
“Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution.” (Dobzhansky 1973) 
 
“I am fully convinced that species are not immutable… Furthermore, I am convinced that 
Natural Selection has been the main but not exclusive means of modification.” (Darwin 1859, 6) 
 
“This preservation of favourable variations and the rejection of injurious variations, I call Natural 
Selection.” (Darwin 1859, 81) 
 
In the late 1830s, after his voyage on the H.M.S. Beagle, Darwin slowly came to the realization 
that, contrary to the prevailing view of his time, species are not immutable: species were not 
created in definitive packages to remain static and unchanging. His own experience as a breeder 
of animals showed that, by choosing to mate individuals with certain characteristics with each 
other, he could affect change on the form of future generations. He, therefore, knew that species 
could change over time. He further argued, by analogy, that nature affects its own kind of change 
to species over time. Nature tends to preserve those traits that afford their possessors the greater 
chance to survive and reproduce, and it tends to reject those that do not. The result is that species 
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become increasingly matched to their respective environments; they become exquisitely adapted 
over time. In its most basic form, this is natural selection (NS). 
For NS to occur, Darwin argued that three conditions must obtain. (1) There must be 
variation among members of a population (e.g., some wolf pups are born with faster running 
abilities than others); (2) These variations must be heritable (e.g., those faster wolf pups will tend 
to have faster offspring); and (3) There must be, what he termed, a ‘struggle for existence’ (e.g., 
there must be more wolf pups in a given generation than can survive)
12
. Given, these three 
preconditions, it follows that those individuals with advantageous variations will tend to survive 
and reproduce while those with deleterious ones will tend to die off.  
Modern biologists and philosophers of biology give a somewhat more complicated 
account of what is required for NS to occur. On one account, put forth by Skipper and Millstein 
(2005)
13
, NS can be precisely formulated as follows: 
I. Initial conditions 
1. A population of Os exist. 
2. Os vary according to forms of T, which are heritable. 
3. Os are in environment E with critical factor F. 
 
II. Interaction 
1. Os in virtue of the varying forms of T interact differently with 
environment E. 
2. Critical factor F affects that interaction. 
3. This may lead to 
 
III. Effects (1) 
1. differential survival rates of Os across forms of T in E. 
2. This may lead to 
 
IV. Effects (2) 
1. differential reproductive rates of Os across forms of T in E. 
2. This may lead to 
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 There is debate as to whether (3) is really required for NS. Since nothing I go on to say in what remains of the 
Chapter turns on this debate, I shall go on under the presumption that SFE is required. 
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 It should be noted that Skipper and Millstein’s characterization of NS draws heavily from Darden and Cain (1989) 




V. Effects (3) 
1. differential representation in the population of Os across forms of T in 
E. 
 
2. This may lead to 
 
VI. Effects (4) 
1. the predominance of Os with a certain form of T over other forms of T 
in E. 
2. This may lead to 
 
VII. Effects (5) 
1. adaptation of the lineage with respect to T in E. 
 
Filling instructions: 
‘O’ is to be replaced by the name of some organism 
‘T’ is to be replaced by some determinable organismic trait 
‘E’ is to be replaced by the description of the environment of ‘O’ 
‘F’ is to be replaced by the description of a critical factor in ‘E’ 




Figure 6. Natural selection schema (From Skipper and Millstein 2005, 331). 
 
To illustrate their formulation of NS, Skipper and Millstein refer to Darwin’s famous Galapagos 
finches.  
There exists a population of finches, Os. The finches vary according to their beak 
length T, the form of a trait that is heritable. And the finches are in a rocky 
environment E where there is a critical factor, F—variously shaped edible seeds 
varying in availability. Notice that the critical factor F in conjunction with 
differences in T is what sets up the selective interaction. Certain beak lengths 
enable some of the finches to obtain seeds that other finches, lacking the 
appropriate beak length, are unable to obtain. This constraint on environmental 
resources that leads to a struggle for existence and a check on the population is 
the interaction step of the schematic. Given the initial conditions and the causal 
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interaction between the environment and the finches, we expect various 
downstream effects. (Ibid, 331) 
 
As helpful as the above schematization of NS is, it leaves open the answer to a question that has 
long interested philosophers of biology is: what kind of a thing is NS? How should we represent 
what sort of process it is?  
 Indeed, Darwin himself seems to have been unsure about the answer to this question. In 
the Origin of Species, He referred to NS in a myriad of ways: an “action” (1859/1964, 90,108, 
129, 133, 211), a “doctrine” (5, 95), a “means” (6, 246), a “power” (43, 109, 205, 238, 454), a 
“theory” (237, 245, 281, 320, 325, 338, 345, 460, 462, 472, 474, 478), a “principle” (80, 95, 116, 
127, 188, 206, 239, 475), and a “process” (93, 104, 109, 179, 203, 235, 280, 350). In part due to 
Darwin’s own apparent indecision in the Origin, contemporary philosophers of biology have 
been hard at work arguing for a more precise understanding of what kind of a process NS 
actually is. Some have argued that NS is best understood as a force (Sober 1984); some that NS 
is a purely statistical trend manifesting in natural histories (Matthen and Ariew 2002, 2009); 
some that NS results from causal processes operating at the individual level (Glennan 2009); 
some that NS is a causal process, but one that necessarily operates at the population level 
(Millstein 2013), and some that it is a multi-staged mechanism characterizable on both the 
individual and population level (Barros 2008). Each of these positions has outspoken critics. But, 
here I’ll focus on one particular critical position: a recent argument against NS as an MDC 
mechanism (Skipper and Millstein 2005).   
In what follows, I hope to show that there are some good reasons for wanting to 
understand NS as an MDC-type mechanism, and by appealing to some resources afforded by the 
previous Chapter, NS can be seen to escape at least one of the serious problems set forth against 




3.3 Prima Facie Reasons for NS as a Mechanism 
 
It would be nice if NS could be characterized as a mechanism. For reasons already articulated in 
this dissertation, mechanistic explanation (at least in the life sciences) affords several important 
advantages over laws-based deductive-nomological accounts of explanation. To review, 
mechanisms, unlike laws, physically exist in the world, so are more easily investigable by 
empirical science. Furthermore, generalizations based on mechanisms need not be exceptionless, 
necessary, or contain universals as is commonly required of laws of nature. Mechanistic 
explanation also matches intuitions, originally highlighted by Salmon (1984) that giving a 
scientific explanation must involve laying bare the causal structure of the world: locating a 
puzzling phenomenon in its causal nexus. And, as a matter of coherence with current practice, 
biologists actually do engage in searching for and describing mechanisms.  
 Prima facie, NS seems amenable to a mechanistic analysis. There are several reasons for 
this. For one thing, central to the notion of mechanism is the idea that mechanisms, among other 
things, are set up for something; mechanisms are productive of some regularly observed behavior 
or phenomenon. This feature of mechanisms is highlighted in many of Stuart Glennan’s early 
works. In his 1996 article, “Mechanism and the Nature of Causation”, Glennan points out the 
“one cannot even identify a mechanism without saying what it is that the mechanism does” 
(Glennan 1996, 52). Put another way, whatever else a mechanism is, it at least needs to have a 
function; it needs to be set up to do something. Here, it seems NS fares quite well. Quite clearly, 
NS is a system for something: it is that which brings about adaptation
14
.  
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 In making this point, I don’t mean to attribute any problematic teleology to NS. It isn’t that NS is directed towards 
any specific goal (e.g., to approach perfection or the like). Rather, I mean only to draw attention to the fact that NS 
has a function (in the Cummins sense of function). It is that which brings about adaptation.  
64 
 
Another central feature of mechanisms is that they support reductionist explanation. That 
is, one of the reasons why mechanisms are explanatorily useful is that they can be decomposed 
to their component parts and operations, and by doing so, crucial insight into the why the 
phenomenon in question regularly occurs can be achieved. This feature of mechanistic 
explanation gets emphasized in Bechtel and Richardson’s seminal 1993 book, Discovering 
Complexity: Decomposition and Localization as Strategies in Scientific Research. In their 
discussion of (what they call) ‘complex localization’, Bechtel and Richardson write, “Complex 
localization requires a decomposition of systemic tasks into subtasks, localizing each of these in 
a distinct component. Showing how systemic functions are, or at least could be, a consequence of 
these subtasks is an important element in a fully mechanistic explanation” (Bechtel and 
Richardson 1993, 125). At first glance, there is a clear sense in which NS fits into this 
reductionistic explanatory framework: it seems decomposable into its component parts as well as 
the tasks these parts perform. NS, we might think, is composed of entities (e,g,, populations of 
organisms with varying traits and a critical environmental factor) and activities (e.g., interaction 
of organisms with the environment and differential reproduction). In this respect, NS fits in quite 
well with the reductionistic approach to scientific explanation afforded by the mechanistic 
approach.   
  
3.4 The Regularity Argument against NS as a Mechanism 
 
Despite the ease with which various aspects of NS appear to cohere with the mechanistic 
approach, there has been a spate of authors arguing, for varying reasons, that there are significant 
problems with understanding NS as a mechanism. In this section, I review one especially 
forceful argument put forward by Skipper and Millstein: that NS fails to qualify as an MDC 
mechanism because it doesn’t operate regularly enough.   
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In their 2005 paper, Skipper and Millstein write, “With respect to regularity on MDC’s 
account, recall that ‘[m]echanisms are regular in that they work always or for the most part in the 
same way under the same conditions.’ However, we see natural selection as probabilistic” 
(Skipper and Millstein 2005, 342). To demonstrate the force of this objection, they ask us to 
return to Darwin’s finches. We are to suppose there is a collection of one hundred equal-sized 
populations of finches with the same distribution of beak lengths, all located in the same 
environment. We are to suppose, further, that these finches engage in their usual survival and 
reproduction activities. Skipper and Millstein ask us then to imagine examining the distributions 
of beak length in the subsequent generation. They write,  
In this thought experiment, we would not expect the same distributions of beak 
length in each of the one hundred populations. In some of the populations longer 
beaks may prevail, in others, shorter beaks may prevail, and in some populations 
the distribution may be roughly equal… The bottom line is that natural selection 
is not regular in the way that MDC require (presumably because natural selection 
is not regular in the way the mechanisms that MDC discuss are, such as DNA 
transcription and protein synthesis). (Skipper and Millstein 2005, 342-343, italics 
added) 
 
This thought experiment is supposed to reinforce the reader’s intuition there is there is something 
inherently probabilistic about NS. And due to its probabilistic nature, NS should not be seen to 
behave regularly enough to be an MDC mechanism. In a collection of 100 populations of finches 
with identically distributed beak lengths—all of which engage in their normal survival and 
reproduction activities—we simply should not expect the evolutionary outcomes of each of these 
populations to be identical after several generations. Why?—presumably because there are just 
too many factors involved in deciding the eventual evolutionary outcome that might go slightly 
differently in each respective evolutionary iteration. The eventual distribution of beak lengths 
depends, after all, on spontaneous, chance mutations at the molecular level as well as all kinds of 
contingent environmental factors. Indeed, it would be something of a miracle if all of these 100 
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populations ended up with identical beak-length distributions after only a few generations. But, 
as Skipper and Millstein point out, if NS is to be an MDC mechanism, it needs to behave 
regularly (or nearly regularly). And if NS were to behave regularly, then we should expect there 
to be identical (or near enough to identical) distributions of beak lengths after a few generations. 
So much the worse, we are to suppose, for NS as an MDC mechanism.     
In argument form, the regularity critique looks like this.   
P1. MDC requires that mechanisms behave regularly (i.e., they ‘work always or for the 
most part in the same way under the same conditions’). 
 
P2. But NS is inherently probabilistic. 
 
P3. Given (2), NS cannot behave regularly. 
 
C1. Therefore, NS cannot be a mechanism. 
 
Let us call this argument the Skipper and Millstein (S&M) Regularity Critique. 
 
 
3.5 Barros’s Reply to Skipper and Millstein 
 
Before developing my own response to this charge, it is worth taking a look at another recent 
attempt at circumventing the S&M Regularity Critique, one that I suggest ultimately falls short. 
In his paper “Natural Selection as a Mechanism” Barros (2008) attempts to respond to the S&M 
Regularity Critique by offering a novel way of characterizing NS: one that avoids the force of 
their critique. As Barros understands it, NS is (what he terms) a ‘two-level multistaged stochastic 
mechanism’.  
 To understand what this means and why Barros thinks that understanding NS this way 
affords an escape from the S&M Regularity Critique, let’s look at a few of Barros’s definitions. 
He defines stochastic mechanisms as “those whose outcome can be predicted in advance in terms 
67 
 
that are probabilistic” (311). He further distinguishes two types of stochastic mechanism: biased 
and unbiased. He writes,  
…stochastic mechanisms should be divided into two categories. First, unbiased 
stochastic mechanisms are those that operate with outcome probabilities of 50% 
or less. The fair-coin flipping mechanism is an example. Another example is the 
mechanism that releases neurotransmitters and initiates electrical activity in 
postsynaptic neurons described by Bogen (2005). Looking forward at any 
particular operation of a neurotransmitter mechanism, it is at best possible to say 
that the probability of the initiation of electrical activity is a percentage less than 
50%... biased stochastic mechanisms are those that operate with probabilities of 
greater than 50% and whose operations can be characterized by terms like ‘are 
likely to’ or ‘probably will’. Natural selection, discussed further below, is an 
example of a biased stochastic mechanism. 
 
In addition to distinguishing between biased and unbiased stochastic mechanisms, Barros 
suggests, further, that the only way to fully characterize NS is by referencing two levels: the 
individual level and the population level. To illustrate his claim, he appeals to the case of 
predatory crabs (C. maenas) selecting for shell shape in a population of intertidal snails (L. 
obtusata). In the population of intertidal snails, there are high-spired shells and low-spired shells, 
but crab predation is more successful on the high-spired shells because they are more easily 
crushed by the crab pincers. Selective pressure thereby leads to the gradual prevalence of low-
spired rather than high-spired shells. This is clearly an instance of NS in action. For Barros, 
however, this instance of NS can only be fully encapsulated by appeal to two levels
15
: the 
individual and the population. Figure 7 depicts the former, and Figure 8 depicts the latter.  
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Figure 7. Predatory crabs (C. maenas) selecting for shell shape in a population of intertidal snails (L. obtusata): 




Figure 8. Predatory crabs (C. maenas) selecting for shell shape in a population of intertidal snails (L. obtusata): 
population level (From Barros 2008, 316). 
 
Barros’s central argument is that NS must be represented at both levels because neither one alone 
can capture it. Only at the level of individual crabs and snails are there differences in shell-
crushing abilities. However, to fully capture NS, one must make reference to the population-level 
effects over time: namely, the predomination of low-spired shell types. No one level alone 
captures NS. He thus defines NS as,     
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…a two level, multistage stochastic mechanism that explains the phenomenon of 
adaptation. It is two-level because the phenomenon of adaptation cannot be fully 
explained using either individual or population level mechanisms alone. (Barros 2008, 
318)  
 
Barros argues that this new conception of NS allows an escape from the S&M Regularity 
Critique. Barros rests his case on his characterization of NS as a biased stochastic mechanism. 
He writes, “[it] occurs when a particular trait gives an individual organism a selective advantage 
over other individuals who do not possess the trait. In marked contrast to the example of drift, it 
is possible to look forward from the starting conditions and predict that it is likely that the trait’s 
prevalence in the population will increase because of the selective bias in favor of the trait” 
(Barros, 319). The point here seems to be that NS, unlike drift, is predictable. And since NS is 
predictable, it must be likely to occur. And if it’s likely, then it must have greater than a 50% 
probability of occurring. So, NS is a biased stochastic mechanism. And if NS is a biased 
stochastic mechanism, then it meets the requirement set for by MDC that mechanisms operate 
regularly, as in it produces the anticipated result always or for the most part. 
 
3.6 A Couple of Problems for Barros’s Reply to Skipper and Millstein 
 
As we’ve just seen, Barros’s general point appears to be that NS, characterized as a biased 
stochastic mechanism, endows it with enough regularity to pass muster as an MDC-type 
mechanism. By virtue of being a biased stochastic mechanism, on Barros’s account, we are to 
understand NS to have over a 50% probability of success in a given instance of selection. As 
such, we are licensed to speak of it as if it ‘probably will’ or ‘is likely to’ occur.   
As will soon become clear, I am sympathetic to this general strategy. In fact, in the next 
Section, I will follow Barros in suggesting that just because a mechanism is stochastic doesn’t 
necessarily mean it behaves in a problematically irregular fashion. I will also follow Barros in 
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suggesting that there are certain advantages afforded by characterizing NS on both the concrete, 
individual level and the abstract, population level. That said, some of the details of Barros’s 
account are worrisome. For one thing, Barros’s definition of stochastic mechanisms as “those 
whose outcome can be predicted in advance in terms that are probabilistic” (311), appears to 
identify stochasticity with a lack of predictability, and that makes his notion of stochasticity look 
entirely epistemic. This runs counter to an argument I’ll offer in the next chapter (4.3.1) against a 
subjective understanding of stochastic mechanism. But for now, I’ll say this. It may be true that 
the outcomes of stochastic processes are not predictable. But, my view is that this 
unpredictability is not the defining characteristic of a stochastic mechanism; it is merely a 
byproduct of its mind-independent stochasticity—a feature of mechanisms that I will define (in 
Chapter 5) as a function of probability-weighted ways a mechanism might fire.  
Let’s put aside for a moment our definitional quibbles regarding stochasticity. Recall that 
Barros rests his response to Skipper and Millstein on his claim that NS is a biased stochastic 
mechanism: one that succeeds more often than it fails. However, Barros troublingly doesn’t offer 
any evidence for this biased nature of NS—which, it seems quite clearly to me—is an empirical 
claim. Is it really the case that NS succeeds over 50% of the time? What would this even mean?  
All Barros says by way of defense of this claim is that NS is biased because “[it] occurs when a 
particular trait gives an individual organism a selective advantage over other individuals who do 
not possess the trait. In marked contrast to the example of drift, it is possible to look forward 
from the starting conditions and predict that it is likely that the trait’s prevalence in the 
population will increase because of the selective bias in favor of the trait” (Barros 2008, 317). Is 
it really possible to look forward and predict at a degree of certainty over 50% that a particular 
population will adapt to a particular key environmental factor? Are there examples in the 
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literature supporting this claim? It strikes me that, for Barros to substantiate his claim that NS is 
a biased stochastic mechanism, more empirical evidence is needed.    
There is another, even more troubling, aspect of Barros’s account worth pointing out. 
Barros seems to suggest that biased stochastic mechanisms (mechanisms that succeed over 50% 
of the time) meet the regularity requirement set forth by the mechanists, while unbiased ones 
(mechanisms that succeed less than 50% of the time) do not. And, recall, that Barros’s idea of 
success has to do entirely with whether we can predict its outcome. However, it seems to me that 
there is a confusion here. Consider a fair roulette wheel with 99 wedges, one third of which are 
red, one third of which are black, and one third of which are green. Now ask yourself what the 
probability of landing on green is after a fair spin of the wheel. The answer is .3 repeating, no? 
So, on Barros’s account, the roulette wheel is an unbiased stochastic mechanism when it comes 
to the result of landing on green (or either of the other colors). And because it’s unbiased, we 
cannot say that any particular outcome is likely to occur. Here’s the worry. Although the 
probability of landing on green is less than 50%, wouldn’t we be wrong to think that this is a 
mechanism incapable of supporting prediction, that this is an irregular process? In this scenario, 
it seems to me, we should be able to make a perfectly good prediction: that the wheel will land 
on green 1/3 of the time. Put another way, it seems arbitrary to draw the cutoff at 50% certainty 
such that mechanisms with results above it are regular enough, and those below it are not. More 
on this in the next section. 
It may very well be that Barros could smooth out his account to accommodate my 






3.7 Dismantling the Regularity Critique 
 
In this section, I recapitulate a couple of distinctions drawn in Chapters 1 and 2; I highlight some 
recent work on abstract mechanistic explanation; and I then set about employing these theoretical 
resources to tease out a novel solution to the S&M Regularity Critique.   
 
3.7.1 Regularity Isn’t a Metaphysically Demarcating Feature of Mechanisms 
 
The first thing to say by way of response to the S&M Regularity Critique is that, contra 
(P1), mechanisms shouldn’t be required to behave regularly to begin with. As I argued in 
Chapter 2, considerations supporting this requirement rest on a confusion between metaphysical, 
epistemological, and pragmatic considerations. Rather than requiring of a causal process that it 
behave regularly in order to be a mechanism, we should acknowledge that mechanisms come in 
degrees of regularity: some highly regular, some not very regular at all.  
 However, as I also suggested in Chapter 2, the pragmatic and epistemological 
considerations cited by Andersen (and others) in support of placing a regularity requirement on 
our characterization of mechanisms are very real. Mechanisms that are regular do a much better 
job of grounding predictions, generalizations and explanations in science. And since these are the 
roles for which scientists aim to search for and describe mechanisms, we should really be 
interested in which are these explanatorily privileged mechanisms. In other words, even if 
regularity isn’t a metaphysically demarcating feature of mechanisms, we should still be 
interested in determining which are these regular mechanisms that should be given a privileged 
role in our scientific explanations.  
 Furthermore, there are good reasons to suppose that NS is exactly the sort of candidate 
mechanism that scientists rely on to fill these privileged explanatory roles. Do biologists appeal 
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to NS to ground predictions? Do they appeal to NS to support generalizations? The answer is 
undoubtedly, yes.   
Given these considerations, we might well simply re-construe the S&M regularity 
critique in the following way: 
P1*. For a mechanism to hold an explanatorily privileged position, it needs to behave 
regularly (i.e., it needs to ‘work always or for the most part in the same way under the 
same conditions’). 
 
P2*. But NS is inherently probabilistic. 
 
P3*. Given (2), NS cannot behave regularly. 
 
C1*. Therefore, NS cannot be an explanatorily privileged mechanism. 
 
Let’s call this the S&M+ Regularity Critique for its added reference to explanatory privilege.  
 
 
3.7.2 Eliminating External Irregularity 
 
So now let’s ask whether the S&M+ Regularity Critique is sound. I argue that it is not. 
The first strategy I undertake to begin to dismantle the S&M+ Regularity Critique has to do with 
the notion of regularity itself. My argument will be two-pronged: first I claim that Skipper and 
Millstein have not appreciated a few important distinctions regarding regularity in the context of 
mechanisms. When these distinctions are made salient, I argue, it becomes clear that only certain 
forms of irregularity should be seen to inhibit a process from counting as regular enough to be a 
(privileged) mechanism. The second prong of my argument will be to show that, to the extent 
that NS fails to behave regularly, it only does so in a fashion that should not be seen to threaten 
its status as a (privileged) MDC mechanism.  
Regarding the first prong, I will again rely on Andersen’s taxonomy of regularity 
originally outlined in Chapter 2.3. Andersen’s taxonomy of mechanistic regularity, recall, 
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separates out four organizational locations where a mechanism can behave (or fail to behave) 
regularly:  
R1) Regular occurrence of [a mechanism’s] set‐up conditions,  
 
R2) Regular triggering of the mechanism once set‐up conditions occur,   
 
R3) Regular operation of specific activities connecting the entities within a single  
mechanism, 
 
R4) Regular production of termination conditions once the mechanism has been 
triggered. (Andersen 2012, 419, my use of ‘R’) 
 
It also cites four levels regarding the strength of connection between these mechanism stages: 
 
(a) Deterministic: cause cannot fail to act once conditions are appropriate 
 
(b) Reliable but not exceptionless: most of the time, the cause brings about the effect, but 
there are occasions on which it does not, and we may or may not be able to provide an 
explanation for the exception 
 
(c) Sporadic: the cause fails to act often enough that it cannot be considered merely an 
exception when this failure occurs 
 
(d) Infrequent: most of the time, the cause fails to bring about its effect, but once in a 
while it does. (Ibid, 420) 
 
In 2.3, I gave some reasons why each of these senses of regularity is important for understanding 
probabilistic biological phenomena by appeal to underlying stochastic mechanisms. However, I 
now wish to suggest that some of these senses of regularity are more important for mechanisms 
to instantiate than others—at least from the standpoint of how well they can ground 
generalization, predictions, and explanations in science.  
First, a bit of review is in order. Recall that the MDC Regularity Constraint requires 
mechanisms to operate “always or for the most part in the same way”. Recall further that, as I 
argued in 2.4-2.5, while regularity should not be considered a metaphysically demarcating 
feature of mechanisms, we should privilege regular mechanisms for the role that they can play in 
scientific explanation.  
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What I argue now is that the failure of a mechanism to behave (R1) regularly should not 
be seen to matter as to whether a mechanism counts as regular enough to qualify as an 
explanatorily privileged MDC mechanism. To begin to illustrate why, think again about your 
household toaster. I might have a toaster that produces perfect toast every time I depress its lever 
and just so happen not to depress its lever much at all. This toaster would have a very low degree 
of (R1) regularity. Here is my central point. Even though this toaster fails to get regularly used, 
when used, it operates perfectly regularly. And as such, it is repeatable even if it has not (as a 
matter of fact) been repeated. A failure for a mechanism to get triggered very often should not be 
seen, by itself, to undermine its ability to count as an explanatorily privileged mechanism. The 
importance of this point for undermining the S&M+ regularity critique will become clear in a 
moment. But for now, let us turn our attention to another potentially helpful resource from 
Chapter 2.  
Another resource from Chapter 2 that I suspect might help to undermine the S&M+ 
regularity critique is the distinction we drew in 2.4.2.1 between mechanism-external and 
mechanism-internal sources of irregularity. What I wish to suggest now is that mechanism-
external sources of irregularity should not be seen to inhibit a process from qualifying as a 
privileged MDC mechanism. Let’s think about toasters one more time. If my toaster fails to 
regularly produce adequate toast because the wiring in my kitchen is bad, this would be a 
mechanism-external source of irregularity. This is because the reason it fails to achieve its output 
conditions is not due to anything within the mechanism; it is due, rather, to inhibitory conditions 
in its surrounding. Let us ask, once again, whether a failure of regularity of this sort should be 
seen to undermine the toaster’s status as a privileged mechanism. Here is the general point. Even 
the most regular mechanism can be made to fail to produce its outcome if it is inhibited 
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externally. Synaptic transmission, protein synthesis, DNA replication, all considered regular 
biological mechanisms, can be made to fail to occur by the right kind of inhibitory interference 
(e.g., if a test subject is killed). What matters for the mechanistic explanatory framework is that 
mechanisms function with some degree of regularity—when free from inhibitory influence. The 
only point I wish to emphasize is that sensitivity to external sources of irregularity should not, by 
itself, be seen to threaten whether a mechanism can function in scientific intervention and 
prediction strategies. And if this is so, then external irregularity should not, by itself, constitute a 
reason for rejecting a process from counting as an explanatorily privileged MDC mechanism.         
 If successful, the above arguments show that not all irregularity should be seen to pose a 
problem for whether a process counts as regular enough to be an explanatorily privileged MDC 
mechanism. If a mechanism simply has a low frequency of getting triggered, but operates 
perfectly regularly once it is triggered, it should still count as regular enough. If a mechanism 
fails to achieve its termination conditions regularly due entirely to external inhibiting factors, it 
needn’t be seen to fail to meet the MDC regularity requirement.   
Having established these points, let us return our attention to the S&M+ Regularity 
Critique. The second prong of my argument is to show that the sort of irregularity attributed to 
NS by Skipper and Millstein is exactly the sort of irregularly I’ve just described as entirely 
unthreatening to its status as a privileged MDC mechanism. To show why, recall (once again) 
Skipper and Millstein’s Galapagos finch example. They suggested that, given 100 equal-sized 
populations of finches in the same environmental conditions performing the same survival and 
reproductive activities, we should not expect the average beak lengths to be the same across the 
imagined populations after a few generations. On the basis of this thought-experiment, they 
concluded, “The bottom line is that natural selection is not regular in the way that MDC require 
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(presumably because natural selection is not regular in the way the mechanisms that MDC 
discuss are, such as DNA transcription and protein synthesis)” (Skipper and Millstein 2005, 
343).  I am now in a position to counter this claim. Here is my argument.     
P4. Because Skipper and Millstein’s thought experiment presupposes a starting condition 
of 100 identical populations of finches engaging in the very same survival/reproductive 
activities, the reason why we wouldn’t expect to see identical beak distribution lengths 
across these populations after a few generations must be because of non-critical 
environmental contingencies. 
 
P5. This constitutes a mechanism-external source of irregularity.  
 
P6. However, as I’ve already argued, irregularity due entirely to mechanism-external 
inhibiting factors should not be seen to preclude a mechanism from qualifying as a 
privileged MDC mechanism. 
 
C2. So, Skipper and Millstein’s finch thought experiment should not be seen to threaten 
an understanding of NS as being regular enough to qualify as an explanatorily privileged 
MDC mechanism. 
 
Some of these premises need more motivation. Regarding (P4), recall that Skipper and 
Millstein’s finch example stipulates that we are to imagine 100 identical populations of finches 
all engaging in the very same survival and reproductive activities. If this is the case, I suggest, 
the only reason we wouldn’t see the same evolutionary outcomes after a few generations must be 
differences in contingent, non-critical environmental factors between imaginative iterations of 
these finches’ evolutionary histories. Why?—because everything else is to remain constant by 
stipulation. If all of the survival and reproductive activities are to remain entirely fixed across 
iterated versions of this though-experiment, then we should expect these finches to be doing the 
exact same foraging for food, the exact same escaping of predators, and the exact same choosing 
of mates. So if all of these remain entirely constant, what else could account for a difference in 
beak-length distribution in these iterated examples? Perhaps, in some of these imagined 
evolutionary scenarios, a portion of finches get killed in a tropical storm; or perhaps some of the 
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finches get disturbed by human encroachment. And these are the imagined reasons for the 
resulting non-identical beak-lengths. Indeed, if each of the 100 finch populations truly is 
identical in genetic make-up at the imagined start point, and each of these populations engages in 
exactly the same activities with the same critical environmental factors (e.g., seeds of the same 
sizes located in the same places), what else could explain the variation in beak-length at the end 
point besides such non-critical environmental contingencies?  
 Suppose this is right, and the only factors that could explain the variation in beak-length 
at the imagined end point are contingent non-critical environmental factors. What makes these 
mechanism-external sources of irregularity—as (P5) suggests they must be? To answer this 
question requires saying something about how we might draw the boundaries around a particular 
token natural selection mechanism. And, admittedly, this isn’t easy to do. It’s not like natural 
selection comes in an obvious package like a toaster. So how do we draw the boundaries around 
a token NS mechanism? Although it won’t be possible to give a complete story regarding 
mechanism individuation here, I can point to at least some constraints on how mechanism 
individuation might proceed. Most obviously, a given NS mechanism is constituted by a 
population of organisms with variation in fitness-relative traits. In our example, these are the 
finches with varying beak-lengths. But this can’t be the end of the story for individuating this 
token NS mechanism. For NS to occur, there must also be some kind of critical environmental 
factor. In the case of the finches, this is usually presented as seeds with differing husks and seeds 
which are located in places such that certain of the finches’ beaks are better suited to forage for 
them, and certain of the finches’ beaks are worse suited for foraging for them. Outside of this 
critical environmental factor, the rest of the environment, I submit, should not be taken to be 
constitutive of the token NS mechanism. Why?—because every mechanism token (no matter 
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what kind of mechanism it is) exists in some kind of environment. Including the whole of the 
finches’ environment within the boundaries of the mechanism would rob us of any ability to 
conceive of this mechanism as having any boundary at all. So, on this line of reasoning, with the 
exception of the critical environmental factor, the rest of the finches’ environment should not be 
seen to be constitutive of the token NS mechanism.  
But if what I’m suggesting is so, then the source of the irregularity exhibited in this 
thought experiment must be entirely due to non-critical environmental perturbations to the 
purported mechanism of NS. And like the faulty wiring in my kitchen, these non-critical 
environmental perturbations must be considered mechanism-external inhibitory factors (i.e., P-
6). And if this source of irregularity is mechanism-external, it need not constitute a failure to 
meet the MDC Regularity Constraint. So, on this line of thought, Skipper and Millstein’s thought 
experiment need not preclude an understanding of NS as regular enough to be an MDC 
mechanism.     
 Consider the following objection. Skipper and Millstein might agree with me that 
mechanism-external sources of irregularity should not be seen as problematic for meeting the 
MDC Regularity Constraint. But they might deny that the irregularity described in their thought 
experiment must be seen as having a mechanism-external source. They might, for example, 
suggest that the reason why we would not expect to see identical beak-lengths after a few 
generations is not necessarily due to non-critical environmental factors. It may be that the reason 
we shouldn’t expect to see identical beak lengths in the finches is because, for NS to take place 
at all, there must be variation in a population. And one important source of variation is random 
mutation during DNA replication. But if these variations are random, then we should not expect 
the same mutations to occur across all 100 populations of finches. And if mutations occur in a 
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disparate fashion across these populations, then (of course) we would not expect the eventual 
beak-length distribution to be the same after a few generations. Furthermore, since varied 
members of populations are entities inside the purported NS mechanism, then this should be 
considered a mechanism-internal source of irregularity: one that most certainly does threaten 
NS’s ability to be seen as regular enough to be an MDC mechanism.  
 My first response to this potential objection is to (again) point to Skipper and Millstein’s 
stipulation that these 100 populations start out identical. Presuming metaphysical determinism, 
whatever mutations occur within these populations should be the same unless some difference in 
their environments brings about disparate mutations across these populations. And if it 
environmental differences that bring about these mutational differences, then it is still a 
mechanism-external source of irregularity. Perhaps, however, Skipper and Millstein argue that 
we need to take seriously the possibility that (at least some) genetic mutation occurs in a 
genuinely indeterministic manner (say, of the sort argued for by Weber 2005). On a view like 
Weber’s, the very same precipitating conditions might result in different mutational outcomes 
due to some real (perhaps quantum-level) chanciness. Since, as we’ll see, I will go on to argue 
(in Chapter 6) that the only intellectually responsible position regarding the possibility of such 
genuine metaphysical indeterminism is a disjunctivist/agnosticism regarding the metaphysical 
indeterminism question, I’ll briefly consider a response to the indeterministic disjunct to this 
objection.   
 
3.7.3 Regularity Once Mutations Occur Might be the Best We Can Do  
 
Let me briefly rehearse the dialectic so far. Skipper and Millstein use their finch thought 
experiment to motivate a claim that NS does not meet the MDC Regularity Constraint. First I 
countered this claim by arguing that, given Skipper and Millstein’s stipulation that the finch 
81 
 
populations (both in form and activity) are identical, it must be environmental differences that 
account for irregular beak-length outcomes. But environmental contingencies, I suggested, are 
mechanism-external sources of irregularity and so should not be taken to threaten NS’s status as 
an MDC mechanism. Not so, Skipper and Millstein might object. What if the reason for the 
irregular beak-lengths is actually that there is some genuine metaphysical indeterminism 
operating at the molecular level causing mutations during DNA replication? If this were so, then 
the source of irregularity would be mechanism-internal, and thereby a real threat to NS’s ability 
to meet the MDC regularity constraint. Let us call this the indeterministic disjunct of the S&M 
Regularity Critique.  
 Responding to this objection requires that I make something of a concession. Presuming 
genuine indeterministic mutation during DNA replication, it must be admitted that some of the 
finches on whose variation NS operates will mutate at different times and in different ways 
across the imagined populations of finches. This is why we shouldn’t expect to see identical 
beak-length distributions after a few generations. However, I maintain that there is a sense of 
regularity that remains. Here is my central claim.     
CC: Even if we concede that sources of variation on which NS operates are irregular, 
what NS does with them may not be. 
 
To motivate this claim, think back to Barros’s crab and snail example. Recall that the predatory 
crabs in this example have an easier time crushing their snail prey when these snails have higher 
spires on their shells. In this regard, we should expect the snails with lower-spired shells to be 
more successful in avoiding crab predation—and consequently—for snails with lower spires to 
be selected. Now imagine, a la Skipper and Millstein, iterating this selection history 100 times 
under the presumption that mutations in snail-shell-spire-height occur differently in each 
iteration. Just as Skipper and Millstien argue regarding the finches, we should not expect the 
82 
 
eventual shell height distribution to be identical across all imagined iterations. However, and this 
is the key, suppose we take each population of differentially mutated snails as separate inputs to 
the NS mechanism. In other words, suppose we take variable populations as the starting point for 
the NS mechanism to operate. The point I want to make is this: once the mutations have 
occurred, what NS does with them should be considered quite regular. E.g., NS will favor those 
members of the snail population who have the lower-spired shells. Regardless of how regularly 
these shells get distributed throughout the population, once they are, NS will carry out its task of 
preserving those individuals who are better suited to avoid crab predation. And in this respect, 
NS should still be seen to operate always (or for the most part) in the same fashion.  
 Skipper and Millstein might accept that NS operates regularly once environmental factors 
and mutation distributions are held steady. But they might simply reply that this is an empirically 
untenable position. From the standpoint of science, they might suggest, we will never be in such 
a position to control for these complexities. The result being that, as a matter a scientific practice, 
NS cannot be regular enough to play the role mechanists need it to: e.g., to support prediction 
and intervention strategies.  In response to this, I have one more strategy.           
 
3.7.4 NS as an Abstract Mechanism Type 
 
My third strategy for dismantling the S&M Regularity Critique has to do with two other 
important features of how we represent a given mechanism from Chapter 2: whether we 
represent a given mechanism as a token versus a type, and what degree of abstraction we use to 
represent a given mechanism.  
Regarding the difference between token and type mechanisms, recall that the former is an 
actualized instantiation of a given mechanism in the world, and the latter is a idealized 
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description of the general way a given mechanism operates. Recall again the way Andersen puts 
it,  
[T]he term “mechanism” may apply to either a type or a token. On one hand, the 
term can be used to pick out a single individual causal chain in the world. When a 
particular neuron fires on a given occasion, a mechanism led to that firing. On the 
other hand, the term is often used to indicate a type of causal chain, one that could 
recur on multiple instances: when a neuroscience textbook describes the 
mechanism for neuron firing, it does not describe a single instance, but rather a 
type of causal chain that presumably occurs on many occasions. In this way, 
mechanisms can explain both what happens on a single occasion, as well as what 
happens on all the occasions on which a neuron fires due to this mechanism. 
(Andersen 2012, 417) 
 
As applied to NS, on the one hand, we can give a characterization of the mechanism of NS as a 
specific, actualized instance of NS at work (like Barros’s crab/snail example or Darwin’s 
finches). And, on the other hand, we can describe NS as a mechanism type (like the schema 
given by Skipper and Millstein [figure 6 in Section 3.2]).  
Before showing why the token/type distinction is important, there is one more idea, the 
explication of which will help tremendously in addressing the remaining issues for NS as a 
mechanism: the role of abstraction in mechanistic explanation. In a recent article entitled, 
“Abstraction and the Organization of Mechanisms” (2013), Bechtel and Levy make the case that 
certain mechanistic explanations are successful by virtue of the fact that the mechanism(s) 
referred to in these explanations are allowed to remain abstract. So what, exactly is meant by 
‘abstract’ in this context? Bechtel and Levy write, “Abstraction is, of course, a matter of degree. 
Indeed to say of a description that it is abstract is to imply, or at least suggest, that a more 
concrete description is possible” (Bechtel and Levy 2013, 242). They go on to argue that, in the 
case of at least some of the phenomena targeted for mechanistic explanation, “It is always 
possible and, we argue, often desirable to overlook the more concrete aspects of a system and 
represent its organization abstractly as a set of interconnections among its elements.” (Ibid, 255). 
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I take their main idea to be this: when attempting to explain highly dynamic mechanistic systems 
with many interconnected parts, it is often beneficial to leave out some of the details. The reason 
is, as they put it, “The concrete relations that are pertinent to organization differ across different 
systems”. But, and this is key, sometimes detail-poor explanatory models enable us to “track 
those features of the system that make a difference to the behavior being explained” (Ibid, 256).  
Bechtel and Levy, in this article, point to a peculiar feature of scientific explanation, one 
that has been recognized before. Think for a moment about an example famously articulated by 
Hillary Putnam (1975) in which we are trying to explain why a one-inch square peg won’t fit 
into a circular hole with a one-inch diameter. We might explain this by appeal to a detail-rich 
account of why the specific micro-physical properties of this particular peg impede its ability to 
pass through the molecular make-up of this particular hole. But the more explanatorily satisfying 
answer here, Putnam points out, might actually be an abstract one having to do with the generic 
properties of squareness and roundness of the peg and hole as such. In giving such an 
explanation we can track the features of the system (e.g., the squareness of the peg and 
roundness of the hole) that make a difference to the behavior we’re interested in explaining. And 
those are not necessarily the micro-physical properties. The moral of the story, here, is meant to 
be that the best explanation isn’t always to the most detailed; sometimes explanations are good 
because they are abstract.  
So how do the concepts of token vs. type mechanisms and degrees of abstraction help us 
to address the S&M Regularity Critique? My answer lies in the following argument.  
P7. The degree of regularity of a particular mechanism is sensitive to two aspects of how 
the mechanism is represented: (1) whether it is characterized as a type rather than a token, 




P8. When conceived as a type with a relatively high degree of abstraction, NS should be 
understood as behaving quite regularly—at least in one of the senses that is required for it 
to function well for grounding certain generalizations, predictions, and explanations. 
 
P9. There are legitimate explanatory contexts (a la Putnam’s pegs) in which NS should be 
characterized as a mechanism type with a high degree of abstraction. 
 
C3. Given (P7)-(P9), there are legitimate explanatory contexts in which NS qualifies as 
regular enough to meet the MDC requirement. 
 
C4. So for at least for these explanatory contexts, NS escapes the S&M+ Regularity 
Critique.  
 
Premises (P7)–(P9) need more motivation to show that (C3) and (C4) follow. Starting with (P7), 
recall from section 2.4.2.2 of the previous Chapter that the idea is this. How regular a mechanism 
is seen to behave depends (1) on whether it is represented as a type (rather than a token) and (2) 
the degree of abstraction of its representation. And as we saw, there are two interesting 
correlations between abstract mechanism schemas and regularity: 
Given:  
 
(a) the existence of a large number of working mechanism tokens with  
(b) at least some features in common and  
(c) a high degree of variance in the specific make-up of the features schematized, 
  
CR1: the more abstractly a mechanism-type is schematized, the more of these mechanism 
tokens instantiate it—that is, the more of these mechanism tokens work in the way 
specified in the abstract mechanism schema.   
 
CR2: the less abstractly a mechanism-type is schematized, the more it will be the case 
that the instances it covers behave in exactly that way. 
 
To illustrate this point, think about a vending machine. There are actual vending machines in the 
world; these are vending machine tokens. There is also a vending machine type: an idealized 
representation of a machine that dispenses items selected by its user when adequate payment is 
inserted. At the token level, there are a great many differences in how vending machines operate. 
Some have coils that push candy out; some have rectangular compartments that collapse when an 
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item is selected; some have digital readout screens, and others don’t; some take dollar bills, and 
others don’t; etc. At this token level of description, vending machines do not operate always (or 
even for the most part) in the same way. They, therefore, do not seem to meet the MDC 
Regularity Constraint. However, when we characterize the vending machine type (rather than 
token), there is a significant amount of regularity in the way vending machines operate. They are 
all machines that display items for sale, take money for such items, and when payment is made, 
they all dispense purchased items in a collection area accessible by the patron. Furthermore, the 
higher degree of abstraction used to represent the vending machine type (provided the above 
qualifications [a]-[c] are met), the more regularity it exhibits. There are abstract candy vending 
machine types; there are abstract soft-drink or coffee vending machine types—all of which share 
regularities in their constitution and behavior. However, there is also the most abstract vending 
machine type that captures each of these.       
 Applying this idea to NS is straight-forward. Like the aforementioned vending machine 
tokens, actualized instances of NS (e.g., Barros’s crabs and snails) will be constituted by specific 
entities (e.g., C. maenas and L. obtusata) engaging in specific activities (e.g., snail-shell-
crushing) in specific environmental surroundings (e.g., rocky coast-lines). NS operating on 
Darwin’s finches will be constituted by different entities, activities, and surroundings. These 
concrete NS descriptions may only qualify as regular in the sense described by CR2. And that 
kind of regularity does do particularly well at grounding generalizations of the sort required from 
privileged MDC mechanisms. However, when idealized as an abstract mechanism type, NS can 
be depicted as a general kind of process (e.g., figure 6 in 3.2). And when represented with this 
high degree of abstraction, it overcomes the individual differences between its actualized token 
instances. Represented like this, NS does operate the same way every time.  
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 Furthermore, I suggest that there are legitimate explanatory contexts in which NS as an 
abstract mechanism type does real explanatory work—work that mere NS tokens cannot do. As 
with Putnam’s pegs, there are instances where we aren’t interested in the specifics of why a 
particular population has ended up with the morphological make-up that it does. But rather, we 
might be interested in why, in general, low-spired snail shells prevail in tidal pool regions across 
the globe. Here we would not want to appeal to a specific population of snails/crabs. We would 
instead want to depict the NS type as it applies to snail predation across a variety of specific tidal 
pool regions. We may even have legitimate questions about what instances of selection share in 
common at its most abstract level—in which case an answer would be to appeal to the highest 
degree of abstraction (e.g., figure 6 in 3.2).   
 In this section, I have argued that the amount of regularity a mechanism is seen to have 
depends on (1) whether it is characterized as a type (rather than a token) and (2) the degree of 
abstraction used to represent a given mechanism. I have also argued that, with regard to the NS 
mechanism type, its regularity increases with the degree of abstraction used to represent it.  I 
suggested further that (just as with Putnam’s pegs) there are legitimate explanatory contexts in 
which appeals to abstract NS mechanism types give answers that actualized NS tokens cannot 
give. All of this goes to show that (at least in certain explanatory contexts) NS should be seen to 
meet the MDC Regularity Constraint just fine. And if that is the case, then the S&M Regularity 
Critique seems to lose much of its purchase against NS as an MDC mechanism.      
 
3.8 More than a Mere Terminological Debate 
 
In the end, does it really matter what we call natural selection? Is there anything of philosophical 
import that turns on whether we term it a “mechanism”, or a “causal-process” or a “force” or a 
“hamburger”? Perhaps, one might think, the only thing that matters is that it happens—and that 
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(whatever we call it) it has been responsible for the exquisite adaptations we observe all around 
us in the natural world.  
 Like my imagined interlocutor, I am entirely against indulging in shallow terminological 
disputes for their own sakes. But, in this case, I firmly believe that there is a deeper issue belying 
this debate—and the exercise I’ve just undertaken to make arguments on one side serves to 
illustrate this point in a helpful manner.  
Following Beatty (1995), one might take the biological world to be riddled with 
contingency: too complex to formulate laws governing it. One might object to a mechanistic 
approach to explaining the living world for similar reasons: when it comes to biological 
phenomena, we don’t have something that looks like clockwork. We have a teeming, seething, 
mess. Sensitive to this exception-ridden, highly complex nature of the living world, proponents 
of the mechanistic approach, as we’ve seen, either soften their regularity requirement (e.g., 
MDC’s now oft-quoted “mechanisms are regular in that they work always or for the most part in 
the same way”) or they get rid of it altogether (e.g., Bogen, [late] Machamer, Glennan). What I 
take the arguments in this Chapter to have shown is that proponents of MDC mechanisms can do 
better than this; they can be more nuanced in how they respond to problems regarding 
irregularity; and indeed careful attention to this dissertation can provide crucial resources for 
understanding how appealing to mechanisms can explain probabilistic phenomena in the natural 
world.   
So rather than a mere attempt to vindicate the use of the word ‘mechanism’ to describe 
NS (a project which alone matters very little), I take these arguments to demonstrate a general 
strategy for thinking about appealing to mechanisms to explain stochastic biological phenomena 
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in the contingent natural world. The central features of this strategy might be summarized as 
follows: 
o Be aware of the nature and source of the irregularities that riddle your causal 
process of interest. Not all irregularity is equally damning to a process’s 
mechanistic status. 
 
o Be aware that stochasticity takes different forms, some of which do better than 
others at supporting prediction and intervention strategies. 
 
o Understand that, whether a causal process behaves regularly enough to count as a 





In this Chapter, I have explored whether the account of stochastic mechanism developed thus far 
in this dissertation can shed any light on a live debate in the mechanisms literature: whether 
natural selection operates regularly enough to be an explanatorily privileged MDC mechanism. I 
have argued that it is. To do so, I first offered prima facie reasons for why we might want to 
think about NS in mechanistic terms. I then summarized Skipper and Millstein’s regularity 
critique against NS as an MDC mechanism. Next, I looked at a recent response to Skipper and 
Milstein—one which I ultimately found unsuccessful. I then appealed to some recent work on 
abstract mechanistic explanation as well as a few distinctions drawn in earlier Chapters in order 
to alleviate the regularity critique. I concluded that, more than a mere terminological dispute, this 
debate evinces a deeper point about the prospects for appealing to mechanisms to ground 






Chapter 4. Stochastic Mechanisms and Theories of Chance 
Abstract: My goal in this Chapter is to further develop my characterization of stochastic 
mechanism by exploring how we should best understand the chanciness we attribute to them. To 
do this, I form a list of desiderata that any account of stochastic mechanism must meet. I then 
take the general characterization of mechanism offered by Machamer, Darden, and Craver 
(2000) and explore how it fits with several of the going philosophical accounts of chance: 
subjectivism, frequentism (both actual and hypothetical), Lewisian best-systems, and propensity. 
I argue that neither subjectivism, frequentism, nor a best-system-style account of chance will 
meet all of the proposed desiderata, but some version of propensity theory can. I conclude by 
showing the proposed account of propensity-backed stochastic mechanism has the added benefit 




As we saw in the previous Chapters, there are significant questions having to do with the notion 
of regularity employed in extant characterizations of mechanism. In Chapter 2, I argued that 
regularity should not be a requirement for metaphysically demarcating mechanisms from non-
mechanisms. However, I suggested that mechanisms with a high degree of regularity should hold 
a privileged position in scientific explanation. I then employed this framework, in Chapter 3, to 
help sort out an active debate in the philosophy of biology: whether natural selection is regular 
enough to be one of these privileged MDC mechanisms. I concluded that, when we are sensitive 
to the sources of irregularity that should be seen to threaten a process from counting as a 
privileged mechanism, we can see that natural selection isn’t highly irregular in any of these 
ways. As such, there are no problems with understanding natural selection as an explanatorily 
privileged MDC mechanism. 
In this Chapter, I focus on a different but related question about stochastic mechanisms. 
Specifically, I ask how we should further understand mechanisms that are irregular in a certain 
way. Namely, I ask how we should further understand mechanisms whose set-up conditions 
obtain but whose termination conditions may not (i.e., stochastic mechanisms with a less that 
deterministic strength of connection at the R2-R4 organizational locations). My goal in this 
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Chapter is to sort out which, if any, of the going conceptual understandings of chance is best 
suited to pair with stochastic mechanisms.  
Here is the plan. In Section 4.2, I first outline and explain several desiderata which I 
believe any adequate account of stochastic mechanism should meet. In Section 4.3, I then go 
about showing how subjectivist, frequentist, and best-system-style analyses of stochastic 
mechanism fail to meet one (or several) of these desiderata. In 4.4, I argue that a propensity-
backed account of stochastic mechanism is the most promising candidate for meeting these 
desiderata; it also has the added benefit, I suggest, of pairing nicely with the varied senses of 
mechanistic regularity emphasized in Chapters 2 and 3. In 4.5, I put forth a few serious 
objections to a propensity understanding of chance and show (in Sections 4.6 and 4.7) how 
making explanatory reference to the underlying mechanisms themselves allows an escape from 
(at least some of) the force of these objections.     
 
4.2 Desiderata for an Adequate Account of Stochastic Mechanism  
  
Before addressing the question of what sort of chance we want to pair with an understanding of 
stochastic mechanism, it is necessary to lay out a few general desiderata for an adequate account 
of stochastic mechanism. The list that follows by no means exhausts the features that might be 
desirable from a characterization of stochastic mechanism. Rather, the following desiderata are 
best thought of as a short list of constraints on any adequate account of stochastic mechanism.  
I begin by articulating and motivating three desiderata for an adequate analysis of 
stochastic mechanism.  
COHERENCE: any adequate account of stochastic mechanism must cohere with the 




CAUSAL EXPLANATION: any adequate account of stochastic mechanism must allow for 
descriptions of underlying mechanisms to feature in causal explanations of regularities 
seen in nature. 
 
ONE-OFF: any adequate account of stochastic mechanism must allow (at least some) 
mechanisms whose initial conditions are only ever met once to have definable, non-
extremal chances of firing.  
 
By way of briefly motivating this list of desiderata, I’ll say a few words about each. 
COHERENCE states that whatever else our account of stochastic mechanism is, it must fit with 
the way biologists actually appeal to mechanisms to explain puzzling phenomena. I take this to 
be uncontroversial. Indeed, I take it that one of the central purposes of developing this account is 
to supply some theoretical and conceptual foundations to a concept of mechanism already widely 
in use in contemporary, empirically successful life science.   
 The next two desiderata are more controversial. Beginning with CAUSAL 
EXPLANATION, I follow Wesley Salmon (1989) and James Woodward (2003) who both argue 
forcefully that giving a scientific explanation of a phenomenon requires doing more than 
subsuming it under a covering law—as the once-received deductive-nomological view of 
explanation required. To give a scientific explanation, one must lay bare the inner causal 
workings of nature. To answer why something happens, in the context of science, requires 
showing what caused it. Mechanistic explanation is a particularly strong form of causal 
explanation. When one gives a mechanistic explanation of a phenomenon, one does more than 
just describe its underlying cause; one describes the causal structure—both the entities and 
activities—that gives rise to its outputs. Furthermore, (as we’ve seen) one of the primary 
advantages of a mechanistic philosophy of science is that it provides a theoretical basis for life 
scientists to explain the uniformity we see in the natural world without necessarily having to 
appeal to laws of nature. Without going too far astray into the hotly debated issue of whether 
93 
 
there are any laws of biology, recall that there are many who doubt the existence of exceptionless 
and metaphysically necessary laws governing the natural world (Cartwright 1983, Beatty 1995). 
Ceterus paribus laws are just as fraught with controversy (Fodor 1991, Earman and Roberts 
2002). But even if that were not the case, the fact remains that life scientists actually do search 
for mechanisms (as opposed to laws) to ground their explanation of regularities observable in 
nature. So if we are to have any hope of achieving a working conception of stochastic 
mechanism that coheres with scientific practice, such an account better allow us to appeal to 
these mechanisms to causally explain observed regularities.   
 Furthermore, as stated in ONE-OFF, I suggest that our account of stochastic mechanism 
needs to accommodate an ability to assign non-extremal chances to (at least some) mechanisms 
whose initial conditions for firing are only ever met once. A good example of this is comes from 
Bogen (2005), and it is the mechanism for human evolution. In all likelihood, Bogen points out, 
the initial conditions for the mechanism of human evolution were only ever met once—and never 
will be again. However, I now suggest, most of us would say of that mechanism that there was 
some non-extremal chance it failing. Suppose, for example, a giant meteor hit at precisely the 
right time to destroy all of our closest primate ancestors. This would have been unlikely, but 
possible. Given this intuition, we had better allow (at least some) one-off mechanisms to have 
non-extremal chances.   
So now having gained some understanding of the above constraints on an adequate 
account of stochastic mechanism, we can get on with the work of seeing how various accounts of 







4.3 Subjectivism, Frequentism, and Best Systems Analyses of Chance 
 
This section comprises arguments against various philosophical theories of chance as ways of 
underpinning an account of stochastic mechanism. I argue by elimination that a propensity-style 
approach to stochasticity is the only adequate means of laying a foundation for our account of 
stochastic mechanism. 
 What is a philosophical theory of chance? For the purposes at hand, theories of chance 
should be thought of as systematic attempts to give the truth conditions for chance statements. 
When you flip a fair coin, you assign the chance of it landing heads: 1/2. When you role a fair 
six-sided die, you assign the chance of it displaying a 6: 1/6. What makes these statements true? 
This is the question philosophical theories of chance attempt to answer.   
 
4.3.1 Against Subjectivism 
 
The first account of chance that might be considered as a candidate to underpin an 
understanding of stochastic mechanism is a subjectivist one. On a subjectivist account, there are 
no objective chances: only credences. When we say of a given outcome that it has a certain 
chance of occurring, we ought to mean nothing more than that we should have a certain degree 
of belief in that outcome.
16
 Chance, on this type of account, gets replaced by credence or rational 
confidence level that some event will occur. What would an account of stochastic mechanism 
look like if we understood stochasticity in this manner? It might go something like this: when we 
say that the mechanism responsible for the release of electrical activity in postsynaptic neurons 
has a 10% chance of firing at any given time, we are not ascribing any kind of chanciness to the 
synaptic mechanism itself. Rather we mean only to assert that we ought to have a rational degree 
                                                          
16
 A classical example of this is Bruno de Finetti’s (1937) account of subjective probability. 
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of belief of .1 that this mechanism will fire on any given instance when its start-up conditions 
obtain.  
 My view is that applying this type of subjectivism about chance to our understanding of 




P1. Life scientists give mechanistic explanations of objective facts. 
 
P2. Some of these mechanistic explanations of objective facts are probabilistic. 
 
P3. The probabilities in probabilistic explanations of objective facts must be objective.   
 
P4. So (on pain of violating COHERENCE) the probabilities in mechanistic explanations 
of objective facts must be objective 
 
C1. Therefore, we have good reason to reject a subjectivist account of stochastic  
mechanism. 
 
Premise (P1) is uncontroversial: As we saw in Chapter 1, scientists appeal to mechanisms to 
explain facts about the natural world. Proteins come to exist from DNA molecules because of the 
mechanism of protein synthesis. Alleles segregate in the formation of germ cells because of the 
mechanism of Mendelian segregation. Electrical signals cross synapses in the brain because of 
the mechanism of synaptic transmission. Barring radical idealism or scientific anti-realism, the 
facts explained by these mechanisms are taken to be objective.  
As we also saw in Chapter 1, some of the mechanistic explanations of these objective 
facts are probabilistic (P2). Although Mendelian segregation occurs at rate of nearly 3:1 in the F2 
generation, it does not do so perfectly. Protein syntheses and DNA replication mechanisms, 
although highly successful, are error prone to various degrees. And vesicle release of 
neurotransmitter upon the presence of an action potential fails up to 90% of the time.   
                                                          
17
 This is a modified version of an argument defended by Lyon (2011) against a subjectivist understanding of the 
probabilities in classical statistical mechanics.  
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But why think, as (P3) states, that the probabilities in probabilistic explanations of 
objective facts must be objective? To help understand why, consider the alternative. We might 
think that, rather than objective probabilities, the probabilities in probabilistic explanations of 
objective facts might simply be a measure of our ignorance. As Lyon (2011) puts it, “…an 
explanation involving probability is not automatically a probabilistic explanation—it could be a 
probability of explanation” (Lyon 2011, 423). In other words, it may be not be that these 
probabilistic mechanistic explanations are themselves probabilistic, but rather it may be that the 
probabilities in these explanations are merely a measure of how strongly we should believe that 
the candidate explanation is the correct one. Following Lyon’s strategy, however, I don’t think 
this can be right. In other words, I don’t think that the probabilities in mechanistic explanations 
merely reflect our ignorance in the way that would be appropriate for understanding them as 
probabilities of explanation. A detailed defense of this premise is beyond the purview of this 
Chapter. However, convincing arguments have been given to this effect. An especially relevant 
(and convincing) one can be found in Millstein (2003b), in which she argues that the 
probabilities in evolutionary theory cannot be mere measures of our ignorance. Rather than 
measuring the factors in evolutionary processes of which we are ignorant, she argues, many of 
the probabilities in evolutionary theory represent causal factors about which we have 
knowledge—but knowledge we choose to ignore. She writes, “[T]his ‘ignorance interpretation 
overlooks the fact that we are aware of more causal factors than are included in the transition 
probability equation; for example, we know things about the predator and the color of the 
butterflies. Thus, we chose to ignore these causal factors, rather than being ignorant of them” 
(Millstein 2003b, 1321). Sober (2010) is another good example of someone who convincingly 
argues that the probabilities in evolutionary biology are objective.   
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Of course, these examples aren’t enough to show that all of the probabilities in 
probabilistic mechanistic explanations are objective. But, I suggest, it’s enough to provide some 
theoretical basis for accepting (P3). If Millstein and Sober are correct, then at least the 
probabilities in evolutionary theory are objective. And since evolutionary theory is one of the 
primary arenas for mechanistic explanation, this is significant support of (P3). And if we have 
significant support for the premise that the probabilities in probabilistic explanations of objective 
facts are objective, then it follows that the probabilities in mechanistic explanations of objective 
facts are objective. And if these probabilities are objective then this rules out a subjectivist 
understanding of stochastic mechanism.  
Note, however, that this argument does nothing to undermine subjectivist understandings 
of probability in all contexts (e.g., Bayesianism). These subjectivist accounts certainly have 
plenty of uses. But, as I’ve suggested here, my only point is that they don’t do well cohering with 
the way scientists actually appeal to mechanisms to explain the objective world.  
 
4.3.2 Against Frequentism 
 
On an actual frequentist (AF) view of chance, the chance of a given event occurring in a 
finite reference class is just the frequency of actual occurrences of that event relative to that 
reference class.
18
 How would an account of stochastic mechanism look on such an analysis? An 
obvious application of AF to MDC mechanism would be this: the chance of a given mechanism 
firing is the frequency of that mechanism successfully firing relative to instances over the history 
of the world where that mechanism’s initial conditions actually obtained.   
 I argue that this view of stochasticity does not cohere with what we want from an account 
of stochastic mechanism. My argument is this: 
                                                          
18
 See Venn 1876 for the origin of this view.  
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P5. On an AF view of stochastic mechanism, the chance of a given mechanism producing  
its outcome is the actual relative frequency of the occurrence of the outcome given the 
instantiation of its initial conditions throughout history. 
 
P6. Given (P5), however, the chance of a one-off mechanism must be extremal, because, 
by definition, its initial conditions are only ever met once.  
 
P7. But ONE-OFF require that (at least some) one-off mechanisms be allowed to have 
definable, non-extremal chances. 
 
C2. Therefore, an AF view of mechanism is unacceptable. 
 
(P5) is uncontroversial; it’s just the combination of MDC mechanism with an AF view of 
chance. Premises (P6) and (P7) need to be justified.  
Recall that ONE-OFF states that any adequate account of stochastic mechanism must 
allow that (at least some) mechanisms whose initial conditions are only ever met once should 
have definable, non-extremal chances of firing. The mechanism for human evolution, I 
suggested, is a plausible example of such a one-off mechanism: its initial conditions were only 
ever met once, but we nevertheless would have assigned it a definable, non-extremal chance of 
failing to succeed. But since the initial conditions for this one-off mechanism were only ever met 
once (and plausibly only ever will be met once), on an AF understanding, the mechanism for 
human evolution must be given an extremal chance of firing. But this violates ONE-OFF. 
Indeed, on an AF understanding of stochastic mechanism, every one-off mechanism whose 
initial conditions are only ever met once must be given an extremal probability of firing (1 if the 
mechanism successfully achieves its termination conditions, and 0 if it doesn’t). But this is 
exactly what ONE-OFF precludes from being the case. Thus, it appears that an AF 
understanding of chance cannot give us what we want from an account of stochastic mechanism.  
 How about a hypothetical frequentist theory of chance? Does it fare any better with 
respect to our desiderata for an adequate account of stochastic mechanism? On an HF view of 
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chance, the chance of a given event occurring is the limiting relative frequency of that event 
occurring relative to a hypothetical, infinite (or very large) series of trials of that event.
19
 The 
result of combining this type of theory of chance with our understanding of mechanism would be 
this: the chance that a given mechanism will fire (given that its start/set-up conditions obtain) is 
just the frequency of the mechanism achieving its expected outcome over a hypothetical, infinite 
(or very large) series of trials. Notice that this kind of account clearly avoids the problems of an 
AF understanding of stochastic mechanism: it has no problem rendering non-extremal chances to 
one-off mechanisms. 
 Unfortunately, I see different problems with this understanding of stochastic mechanism. 
Here is my argument. 
P8. On an HF analysis of stochastic mechanism, the stochasticity of a given mechanism is 
the limiting relative frequency of it achieving its outcome given the instantiation of its 
initial conditions over a hypothetical, infinite (or very numerous) series of (non-actual) 
trials of that event. 
 
P9. Give (P8), the chance of a given stochastic mechanism firing is grounded on a 
counterfactual.       
 
P10. Life scientists, however, appeal to the chanciness of underlying mechanisms to 
causally explain actual output frequencies. 
 
P11. But if the chanciness of a mechanism is grounded on a counterfactual, it’s difficult 
to see how it can causally explain output frequencies of actual mechanisms.  
 
P12. So, given (P8)-(P11), an HF account of stochastic mechanism fails to meet 
COHERENCE and CAUSAL EXPLANATION. 
  
C3. Therefore, a (HF) view of stochastic mechanism is not viable. 
 
Premise (P8), once again, is just the result of combining our understanding of mechanism with a 
HF theory of chance. As before, however, premises (P9)-(P12) need more defense. 
                                                          
19
 Some classic examples of hypothetical frequentists include Reichenbach 1949 and von Mises 1957. 
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 Suppose a molecular biologist observes that the mechanism of DNA replication in a 
particular population of fruit flies is significantly error prone. She notices, let’s say, that the 
DNA of flies in a given generation is only 95% identical to those in the previous generation. 
After observing several generations with similar results, she thereby generalizes that the 
mechanism of DNA replication for these fruit flies has a 5% error rate. On a HF understanding of 
stochastic mechanism, this is by virtue of the following true counterfactual: if the sequence of 
generations continued indefinitely, then the relative frequency of errors in DNA replication 
would limit to 5%.   
 Here is the problem. The scientist in this example set out to explain actual output 
frequencies of a stochastic mechanism. That is, she set out to say why we see the frequency of 
DNA replication errors that we do in an actual population of fruit flies.  On a mechanistic 
approach to explanation, the answer is that the mechanism for DNA replication fails 5% of the 
time. But an HF understanding of stochasticity grounds this chance on a counterfactual: namely, 
the non-actual world where some infinitely large (or very large) number of trials took place. Here 
is the vexing question for the HF account: how can stochasticity grounded on counterfactual, 
non-actual world causally explain anything observed in the actual world? It strikes me that it 
cannot.
20
 And if it cannot, then an HF understanding neither coheres with the practice of life 
scientists appealing to mechanisms to explain output frequencies, nor can it meet our CAUSAL 
EXPLANATION desideratum. As such, we cannot accept an HF understanding of stochastic 
mechanism.  
 Suppose, however, that the proponent of HF were to respond as follows. There are plenty 
of perfectly good causal explanations that appeal to counterfactuals. Indeed, both Lewis (1973B) 
and Woodward (2003) offer accounts of causal explanation in which counterfactuals feature 
                                                          
20
 For a particularly forceful articulation of the relevance problem for counterfactual explanation, see Salmon 1988. 
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prominently. For Lewis, to say of some even E that it is causally dependent on C is just to say 
that if C had not occurred, then E would not have occurred. That is, causal dependence just is a 
counterfactual notion. Similarly, Woodward offers an account of causation according to which 
what it means to say that some event E was caused by C is that, were we to have intervened on C 
in the right way, E would not have occurred. Like Lewis, Woodward clearly thinks that causation 
is (in some way) to be understood in by appeal to counterfactuals. But if these two authors are 
correct, perhaps there is nothing wrong with an HF account of stochastic mechanism according 
to which the chance of a mechanism firing is grounded on counterfactuals. Counterfactuals 
already feature in our causal explanations.   
 I cannot here present anything close to a detailed case against counterfactual analyses of 
causation. That said, there are many well-known objections to them—objections I find 
convincing enough to raise serious doubts about whether they constitute grounds for rejecting 
my argument. It’s far from clear, for example, whether Lewis’s counterfactual analysis can deal 
with causal preemption cases.
21
 But even if this were not the case, there are other reasons why 
we might disagree that the notion of causation necessary involves an appeal to counterfactuals. 
To illustrate this, consider a few of Woodward’s own remarks in the opening pages of his (2003) 
book, Making Things Happen A Theory of Causal Explanation. He says, “The account that I 
present is not reductive…” (Woodward 2003, 20). He adds that his account is set up to “…test or 
elucidate the content of particular causal and explanatory claims” (Ibid, 22). And “…the theory 
should enable us to make sense of widely accepted procedures for testing causal and explanatory 
claims” (Ibid, 24). If we look carefully at these claims, we can see that Woodward’s account is 
not meant to tell us what causation is. It’s explicitly nonreductive. Rather, on Woodward’s own 
                                                          
21
 Lewis’s own solution to preemption cases (1973b) is to appeal to a notion of ‘causal chain’ which is itself in want 
of analysis.   
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admission, his counterfactual analysis is meant to provide a theory for testing causal claims. One 
could absolutely agree with Woodward that testing causal claims involves seeing what would 
have happened if the purported causal event had not occurred (or occurred differently)—but 
nonetheless disagree that causation, itself, necessarily has anything to do with counterfactuals. 
Indeed, this is precisely the point made by Anscombe when she advocates her analysis of 
causation as a brute fact. She writes (1971), “If A comes from B, this does not imply that every 
A-like thing comes from some B-like thing or set-up or that every B-like thing or set-up has an A-
like thing coming from it; or that given B, A had to come from it… Any of these may be true, but 
if any is, that will be an additional fact” (Anscombe 1971, 388). For Anscombe, causation at its 
core consists simply and brutally as a “derivativeness”. As she says, “effects derive from, arise 
out of, come of, their causes”. No further analysis of causation is needed or possible. If 
Anscombe is correct, and I suspect she is, then causation need not be understood 
counterfactually. And if causation need not be understood counterfactually, then counterfactuals 
need not figure into causal explanations. And if counterfactuals need not figure into causal 
explanations, then the relevance problem for HF accounts of stochastic mechanism may well 
stand.   
 Given these considerations, I maintain that—if possible—we should avoid an analysis of 
stochastic mechanism according to which their chanciness is understood on an HF theory of 
chance. HF chances are grounded in counterfactuals. But it is far from obvious how 
counterfactually grounded chances can play any causal-explanatory role in the explaining the 
actual world. And since scientists appeal to mechanisms to explain the actual world, we have 





4.3.3 Against Best-System Analysis (BSA)  
  
Another candidate theory of chance, first put forth by David (1980, 1986), is called the 
Best-System Analysis (BSA).
22
  According to BSA, the chance of any given outcome occurring 
is whatever the best systematization of the Humean mosaic of particular facts tells us it is. What 
makes a particular systematization of the Humean mosaic of particular facts better than all the 
others?  On a BSA view, the best system is the one which achieves the most balance between the 
theoretical virtues of simplicity, strength (informativeness), and fit to the data—where the three 
are thought to tradeoff in some fashion. On a BSA understanding of chance, therefore, the 
stochasticity of a mechanism should also simply be whatever the best system tells us it is.  
 Prima facie, there are many challenges for a BSA theory of chance. How are we to 
understand how these three virtues trade-off? By what measure are we supposed to determine 
which is the system that achieves the most balance between these virtues? And what, precisely, 
is meant by ‘simplicity’? Is it the number of entities postulated in a given system? Is it the 
number of variables required to formulate the axioms of a given system? Is it the number of 
predicates used to describe a given system? Doesn’t it matter what language we use to describe 
the system? Is there any hope of achieving a canonical language where all of its predicates 
correspond perfectly to natural kinds (as Lewis thought we could)? Put these questions aside for 
the moment, and assume that a coherent version of the BSA is achievable.
23
 I argue that, even 
still, the BSA theory of chance is not amenable to our notion of stochastic mechanism.       
 My argument is this: 
P13. On a BSA account of stochastic mechanism, the chance of a given mechanism firing  
                                                          
22
 Lewis first articulated a best-system analysis of laws (1973a) and later extended it to apply to chance (1986). 
23
 Hoefer (1997) and Cohen and Callender (2009) have made considerable efforts to save the BSA account of 
lawhood which might be extended to apply to the BSA account of chance. That said, I still believe (for reasons 
outside the purview of this paper) that they have fallen short of offering and articulating a coherent BSA analysis.  
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is whatever our best systematization of the Humean mosaic of facts (the most balanced 
between simplicity, strength, and fit to the data) tells us it is. 
 
P14. However, given (P13), the chances we ascribe to mechanisms arise from merely 
systematizing particular facts and thereby cannot causally explain these particular facts 
(as CAUSAL EXPLANATION requires).  
 
C4. Therefore, a (BSA) account of stochastic mechanism fails to give us what we want  
from an account of stochastic mechanism. 
 
Here, again, the middle premise (P14) needs support.  
Recall again that CAUSAL EXPLANATION requires that, any adequate account of 
stochastic mechanism must allow for descriptions of underlying mechanisms to feature in causal 
explanations of regularities seen in nature. It strikes me, however, that a BSA account renders 
difficult to imagine how this is supposed to take place. Recall that the best system is the one that 
systematizes all of the local facts in the most balanced fashion, and the chances are whatever the 
system says they are. But which are the sorts of local facts that would inform the attribution of 
chances in the best system? It seems to me, the relevant facts must (at least much of the time) be 
the frequencies of particular kinds of events. If the Humean mosaic of particular facts includes 
the fact that roughly half of coins tossed have landed heads, then the system with the most 
simplicity, strength, and fit should ascribe a chance of .5 to a coin landing heads. Like an actual 
frequentist view, best-system chances depend on what the frequencies happen to have been. But, 
if the chances depend on the actual frequencies, then it becomes unclear what explanatory work 
the mechanisms with these chances can do by way of explaining those frequencies. As Abrams 
puts it, “Best System probabilities sometimes depend on whatever the frequencies happen to be, 
without requiring that these frequencies have any causal explanation at all” (Abrams 2012, 3). 
We want stochastic mechanisms to causally explain regular frequencies observable in nature. On 
a BSA view, however, the stochasticity we attribute to a mechanism already depends on the 
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known frequencies. Put another way, the best system systematizes the local facts. It doesn’t 
explain them—at least not in the way a mechanist requires.
24
 
 A proponent of the BSA might respond in the following way. Yes, BSA chances depend 
on whatever the local matters of fact happen to have been. And some of these facts will be the 
very mechanism output frequencies that scientists aim to explain by appeal to chancy 
mechanisms. However, the BSA proponent might point out that, on Lewis’s original view, causal 
facts are also part of the Humean mosaic. That is, causal dependencies are counterfactual 
dependencies, and counterfactual dependencies are grounded in BSA laws, which also arise from 
the best systematization of local facts. So, BSA chances are causal—at least in the sense that 
they are ultimately grounded in causal facts.    
 By way of response to this, I’ll agree that BSA chances (understood in the above 
Lewisian terms) may ultimately be grounded in causal facts. But, it still isn’t clear to me that this 
renders them capable of causally explaining any of these facts. To see why, think about what it 
means to give a causal explanation. Explanations are answers to ‘why’ questions. And causal 
explanations are answers to ‘why’ questions that proceed by identifying the cause of the 
phenomenon in question. But are stochastic mechanisms with BSA chances capable of doing 
this? BSA chances depend on local matters of fact: some of which are causal. But all of these 
causal matters of fact are already known. That’s what allows them to be systematized. How can 
the chances that supervene on these facts we already knew add anything explanatory regarding 
these facts? I can’t see an easy way.  
 Despite my inability to see how BSA chances can play any causal-explanatory role in 
explaining mechanism output frequencies, it should be noted that some proponents of the BSA 
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 It may be that a BSA analysis of stochastic mechanism would allow for other types of explanation (unificationism 
perhaps). But what I suggest here is that life scientists seek the sort of explanation where describing the underlying 
causal structure of an observed fact is what does the explaining.  
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approach have attempted to make strides in this direction (cf. especially Helen Beebee 2000). 
However, even if Beebee is correct that there is some sense to be made of the explanatory role of 
BSA chances, I maintain that there are sufficient other problems with the BSA approach to make 
it an unattractive candidate for underpinning our account of stochastic mechanism. The most 
forceful reason is this. The BSA places an incredibly important role on theoretical virtues 
(simplicity, strength, and fit). However, many have noticed that, in the realm of biology, there’s 
no reason to expect the facts should conform (or even be constrained by) these theoretical virtues 
(cf. especially Sober 1990). Why should we expect the world to conform to the best way we can 
think of to systematize facts? Why should it matter one bit whether a systematization of facts is 
simple? Sure, this makes it easier for us to understand. More than anything else, however, 
parsimony is an aesthetic virtue (see Craver 2007 for this point). If the life-sciences tell us 
nothing else, they show that the natural world is far more complicated than we could ever 
imagine.    
 
4.4 A Propensity-Backed Account of Stochastic Mechanism 
 
What I hope to have shown in the forgoing sections is that none of the theories of chance 
heretofore considered (subjectivism, frequentism [both actual and hypothetical], or a Lewisian 
best-system analysis of chance) is capable of cohering with what we want from an account of 
stochastic mechanism. There are, however, other theories of chance left to be explored, namely, 
traditional propensity theories. My aim for this section is to show that a version of propensity 
theory is the best theory of chance to pair with stochastic mechanism; at the very least, it doesn’t 
fail to meet the desiderata laid out in 4.2. It also has the added benefit, I suggest, of pairing 
nicely with the many senses of irregularity outlined in Chapter 2.  
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On a propensity theory, chance is a dispositional property or tendency of a given type of 
physical situation to produce certain outcomes over others.
25
 Following Gillies (2000), we can 
distinguish between long-run and single-case accounts of propensity. On a long-run account, a 
given event has a chance c if and only if the kind of experimental setup which can generate this 
type of event possesses a dispositional property to generate this kind of event with a 
corresponding characteristic relative frequency in the long run of trials of the setup. On a single 
case account, a given event has chance c if and only if the actual token experimental setup which 
can generate this event possesses a dispositional property (tendency) with that degree of strength. 
Because of the ONE-OFF desideratum set forth in 4.2, however, I’ll adhere to the single-case 
account.  
So what might a single-case propensity-backed account of mechanism look like? It might 
go something like this:  
Propensity-Backed Stochastic Mechanism: a stochastic mechanism has chance c if and 
only if the actual token mechanism setup which can generate this event possesses a 
dispositional property (tendency) to produce that outcome with that degree of strength.  
 
What I hope to show now is that this is the only type of account (of those considered) which 
doesn’t fail any of the desiderata set forth in 4.2. Rather than an all-out articulation or defense of 
a propensity-backed account of stochastic mechanism, however, my only hope here is to show (i) 
that a propensity theory (in its most general form) passes muster with regard to our set of 







                                                          
25
 The origins of this type of account can be traced back to Peirce (1910) and Popper (1957).  
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4.4.1 Does a Propensity-Backed Account of Stochastic Mechanism Fail our Desiderata?  
   
Starting with COHERENCE, we might ask the following: Does a propensity-style 
account of stochastic mechanism fail to cohere with the general practice of scientists searching 
for mechanisms to explain puzzling phenomena in the natural world? The answer, it seems to 
me, is no. When molecular biologists search for the mechanism for genetic mutation or protein 
synthesis, what they might well be looking for is a structure in the world that itself has chancy 
properties. When evolutionary biologists speak of the chance of natural selection endowing 
adaptive characteristics to a given population, they plausibly take this chanciness to be a feature 
of the mechanism of natural selection itself; the same goes for the release of electrical activity in 
post-synaptic neurons. This process fails up to 90% of the time, a neuroscientist might suggest, 
because the mechanism itself has chancy properties. I certainly do not claim to have access to 
what scientists actually mean when they use the term. Rather, I am content to suggest here that a 
propensity-backed account of stochastic mechanism is capable of cohering (without any glaring 
inconsistency) with what scientists actually do when they search for mechanisms to describe 
puzzling phenomena.  
Furthermore, a propensity account of stochastic mechanism, by virtue of the fact that it 
locates the chanciness of a mechanism in the world, does not run into the problems associated 
with an AF or HF account. A propensity-backed stochastic mechanism does not define the 
stochasticity of a given mechanism as a relative frequency of outputs (whether actual or 
hypothetical)—so has no problem dealing with one-off mechanisms. And under a propensity 
account, their stochasticity is an objective feature of the actual world. They are, therefore, 
perfectly well-suited for grounding causal explanations without appeal to counterfactuals.  
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 Finally, a propensity account of stochastic mechanism doesn’t require that the chances 
we ascribe to mechanisms arise out of the best systematization of local facts. And this means that 
it does not suffer from the problem we found with a BSA understanding of stochastic 
mechanism. That is, propensity-backed stochastic mechanisms don’t have the same trouble 
explaining output frequencies as a BSA understanding of stochastic mechanism seemed to have, 
because these propensities aren’t constrained by these very frequencies.   
 
4.4.2 Propensity-backed Mechanisms and Andersen’s Taxonomy of Regularity Revisited  
 
In Chapter 2, recall, we explored Andersen’s taxonomy of mechanistic regularity—
adding to it along the way. It’s worth pausing for a moment and pointing to the fact that a 
propensity understanding of stochastic mechanism has some prima facie advantages with regard 
to cohering with some elements of that taxonomy.   
 Andersen’s taxonomy of mechanistic regularity, recall, separates out four organizational 
locations where a mechanism can behave (or fail to behave) regularly:  
R1) Regular occurrence of [a mechanism’s] set‐up conditions,  
 
R2) Regular triggering of the mechanism once set‐up conditions occur,   
 
R3) Regular operation of specific activities connecting the entities within a single  
mechanism, 
 
R4) Regular production of termination conditions once the mechanism has been 
triggered. (Andersen 2012, 419, my use of ‘R’, and my use of ‘set-up’ rather than ‘start-
up’) 
 
It also cites four levels regarding the strength of connection between these mechanism stages: 
 
(a) Deterministic: cause cannot fail to act once conditions are appropriate 
 
(b) Reliable but not exceptionless: most of the time, the cause brings about the effect, but 
there are occasions on which it does not, and we may or may not be able to provide an 




(c) Sporadic: the cause fails to act often enough that it cannot be considered merely an 
exception when this failure occurs 
 
(d) Infrequent: most of the time, the cause fails to bring about its effect, but once in a 
while it does. (Ibid, 420) 
 
In support of this taxonomy, I suggested (in 2.4.1) that each of these senses of regularity applies 
in some way to the probabilistic phenomena targeted for mechanistic explanation (synaptic 
transmission, protein synthesis, DNA replication, Mendelian segregation, and natural selection). 
For that reason, it would count in favor of a propensity understanding of stochastic mechanism if 
it could shed some further light on this aspect of Andersen’s taxonomy of regularity. My 
suggestion is that it can.   
 The main reason why I think a propensity-backed understanding of stochastic mechanism 
coheres especially nicely with Andersen’s taxonomy is this: propensities are dispositional 
properties of physical situations. These dispositional properties capture/are sensitive to/partially 
depend on the many ways a physical process might go wrong.  
 Let me illustrate this with a simple example. The glass picture window in my living room 
is fragile—which is to say that it has a dispositional property to break relatively easily when 
exposed to forceful perturbations. Put another way, it has a propensity to break easily. The very 
notion that my window has such a propensity contains within it a lot of background knowledge 
about the many ways that it could break. Bricks heaved, baseballs hit, birds flying, hurricane 
winds: these are all ways my picture window could break. To say of my picture window that it 
has a fragile disposition, to say that it has the propensity to break easily, is to affirm (at least 
some) implicit knowledge of the many ways it might be shattered.  
 The same is true of mechanisms. When I say of a synaptic transmission mechanism that it 
has the propensity to fail more often than it succeeds, I am affirming (at least some) implicit 
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knowledge that there are many ways it could go wrong. That propensity, when correctly 
ascribed, is capable of capturing these varied possibilities. Note that several of the other 
candidate understandings of chance don’t seem to capture such information, at least not nearly as 
easily. On an AF understanding of chance, as we’ve seen, the chance of a mechanism firing is 
just the actual relative frequency of its successful firings. No more further explanation of why 
this frequency has obtained is available. The BSA interpretation’s insistence on supervening on 
actual facts makes it more difficult to incorporate any knowledge of modal facts regarding how 
the world might have been. The only other interpretation considered thus far that could match 
this explanatory advantage is HF. But, as we’ve seen, HF seems to have other problems.  
Propensities carry within them information about the many myriad of ways the world 
might go. This notion will be made much more precise in the next Chapter. But for now, it 
suffices to say that this at least provides a prima facie advantage of offering explanatory 
resources for accommodating the many ways a mechanism can behave (and fail to behave) 
regularly. And since, in the previous Chapters, this proved to be a helpful resource for addressing 
the regularity question, it seems this virtue is quite worth noticing.     
 
4.4.3 The Upshot for a Propensity-backed Account of Stochastic Mechanism.  
 
The upshot, therefore, is that a propensity theory is the most promising philosophical 
understanding of chance (of the ones heretofore considered) to give us what we want from an 
account of stochastic mechanism. Of course, much more will need to be said about the details of 
this propensity account—work that I shall take on in the next Chapters. For now, let’s consider 






 4.5 Three Objections and Replies  
 
The goal of this section is to consider a few serious objections to propensity theories of chance 
and show why they are not devastating to the particular propensity-backed account of stochastic 
mechanism on which we have been zeroing in thus far.
26
 To do this, I draw from an important 
line of thought put forward in both Marshall Abrams’s recent account of “Mechanistic 
Probability” (2012) and Michael Strevens’s “Probabilities out of Determinism” (2011).   
 
4.5.1 Single-case Propensities Cannot Explain Frequencies   
 
Recall that the propensity theory we have tentatively chosen to back our account of 
stochastic mechanism is a view according to which a stochastic mechanism has chance c if and 
only if the actual token mechanism setup which can generate this event possesses a dispositional 
property (tendency) to produce that outcome with that degree of strength. Recall, further, that 
part of the goal of a propensity-backed account of stochastic mechanism is to allow these 
underlying mechanisms to causally explain regularities observed in nature. In effect, then, what 
CAUSAL EXPLANATION requires is that stochastic mechanisms have to be able to explain the 
regular frequencies of a given event observed to occur in nature. Many have questioned, 
however, whether propensities connect up with frequencies at all.
27
 The worry is this: if chance 
is just a propensity of an experimental set-up to produce a particular result on a specific 
occasion, then there does not seem to be any conceptual connection to the stable, long-run 
frequencies we observe in nature. It seems, then, that (at least a single-case) propensity-backed 
view of stochastic mechanism cannot meet a key one of our desiderata.  
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 There are several other objections on which I could have here focused. Due to constraints on space, however, I’ve 
chosen those I take to be the most serious. See Eagle (2004) for others.  
27




4.5.2 Propensities are Unobservable and Un-underminable, and as Such, are not Amenable to 
Empirical Science   
 
Because, as we have just seen, (at least single-case) propensities have no obvious relation 
to frequencies, it seems impossible to undermine any purported propensity by observing any 
(apparently) anomalous frequency. Suppose, for instance, that a scientists conjectures that a 
stochastic mechanism has a propensity of .7 of producing a given outcome. But upon running 
several tests, the frequency of successful firings is much lower. Since there is no connection 
between propensities and frequencies, there appears to be no reason to give up on the conjectured 
propensity. Furthermore, propensities (like other dispositional properties) cannot be directly seen 
with the naked eye, and so cannot be an object of investigation for empirical science. This means 
that a propensity view of stochastic mechanism fails another one of our own desiderata 
(COHERENCE).  
 
4.5.3 Stipulating what Propensities Do is not Enough to Show that They Exist 
 
Propensities are able to give us what we want from a theory of chance, in large part, 
because proponents have stipulated that they are precisely the sorts of properties to play the roles 
we desire from an account of chance. However, as Hajek points out, “To be sure, one can 
stipulate that they do so, perhaps using that stipulation as part of the implicit definition of 
propensities. Still, it remains to be shown that there really are such things — stipulating what a 
witch is does not suffice to show that witches exist” (Hajek 2011). Put another way, one might 






                                                          
28 Sober makes this point. (2000, 64). 
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4.6 Drawing on a Recent Line of Thought from Abrams and Strevens 
  
Before explicitly addressing these important objections to propensity accounts of chance, I 
briefly draw from a line of thought recently formulated by Marshall Abrams (2012) and Michael 
Strevens (2011)—which I will, in the following section, make use of to address the forgoing 
objections. 
 In their respective papers, “Mechanistic Probabilities” (2012) and “Probabilities out of 
Determinism” (2011), Abrams and Strevens both argue for a general interpretation of probability 
according to which global determinism need not be a threat to objective probabilities. My current 
project of seeking a working characterization of stochastic mechanism differs largely in scope 
and details from both of these authors. Specifically, the project I am here undertaking is different 
from theirs in one important respect: I am not seeking a general interpretation of probability, but 
rather a more limited understanding of stochastic mechanism that coheres with scientific 
practice. That said, there is one move made by both of the above authors which will prove quite 
helpful in addressing the above objections to propensity theory.  This move, I suggest, is quite 
independent of the parts of their respective theories about which we differ, and can be quite 
easily separated from the rest of their theories. The main idea is this: stable output frequencies of 
a mechanism can be adequately explained entirely by reference to facts about the mechanism 
itself and the kinds of initial conditions feeding into it.   
 In his 2012 paper “Mechanistic Probabilities”, Abrams is interested in the probabilities 
that we assign to outputs resulting from certain kind of causal devices. Some devises, Abrams 
suggests, have a causal structure such that it matters very little what pattern of inputs the device 
is given in repeated trials. The pattern of outputs remains roughly the same. Take, for example, a 
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standard (fair) roulette wheel with equally-sized wedges alternating between red and black. He 
writes,  
…if the ratio of the size of each red wedge to that of its neighboring black wedge 
is the same all around the wheel, then over time such a device will generally 
produce about the same frequencies of red and black outcomes, no matter whether 
a croupier tends to give faster or slower spins of the wheel. (Ibid, 349) 
 
Why is this? He answers, 
 
The wheel of fortune divides a croupier’s spins into small regions [which Abrams 
calls “bubbles”] within which the proportion of velocities leading to red and black 
are approximately the same as in any other such region As a result, as long as the 
density curve of a croupier’s spins within each bubble is never very steep, the 
ratio between numbers of spins leading to red and leading to black within each 
bubble will be roughly the same. The overall ratio between numbers of red and 
black across all spins will then be close to the same value. In order for frequencies 
to depart from this value, a croupier would have to consistently spin at angular 
velocities narrowly clustered around a single value, or produce spins according to 
a precisely periodic distribution. (Abrams 2012, 350) 
 








He then goes on to describe the general features that a device (like the roulette wheel) has to 
have in order to have this peculiar characteristic. He calls it a causal map device (figure 10).  
 
 
Figure 10. Causal map device (From Abrams 2012, 350). 
 
Without getting too bogged down in the details of Abrams (very complicated) account, the short 
story about what he is doing is as follows. He is trying to construct an account of a certain kind 
of probability that exists in certain situations. In his words, he seeks to: “describe a realist, 
ontologically objective interpretation of probability, ‘far-flung frequency (FFF) mechanistic 
probability’. FFF mechanistic probability is defined in terms of facts about the causal structure of 
devices and certain sets of frequencies in the actual world” (Ibid, 340). 
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 Why focus on Abram’s FFF account? What is important about this account, for our 
purposes, is this: stable output frequencies of a particular mechanism get explained by mapping 
and describing the underlying mechanism and delimiting the kinds of inputs it requires. No more 
explanatory work is needed.  
This point is echoed by Strevens (2011) who also seeks to come up with a general 
determinism-friendly interpretation of probability and so, like Abrams, differs in scope from my 
own project. However, Strevens makes a similar move when explaining stable frequencies. He 
begins by asking us to imagine a coin-toss. He writes,  
In the case of the coin toss… robustness [or output frequencies] is explained by 
certain dynamic facts about the physiology of the coin-tossing together with some 
statistical information about actual pre-toss states. The same is true more 
generally. (Strevens 2011, 31) 
 
The relevant point here is the same: we can explain stable output frequencies of a given 
mechanism (in this case, a human coin-tosser) entirely with reference to facts about that 
mechanism (in this case, facts about human physiology) and statistical information about the 
kinds of preconditions feeding into the mechanism (e.g., background conditions of the toss).  
 Having pointed to a couple of features of Abrams’s and Streven’s recent accounts that I 
hope will prove helpful for addressing the objections to propensity theories of chance, let me 
pause to make explicit a few additional ways in which I’m departing from both of these authors. 
First, unlike my account, Abrams’s account of mechanistic probability is a version of actual 
frequentism. He writes, “FFF mechanistic probability is a kind of actual frequency theory in that 
it depends on actual frequencies in many natural collections” (Abrams 2012, p. 370). Second, 
Abrams explicitly states that his account of mechanistic probabilities is not meant to apply to 
single trials. He says, “there is no sense in which mechanistic probabilities should be seen as 
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probabilities of outcomes of single trials" (Ibid, 370). Strevens’s account also differs from my 
own in that he explicitly affirms its dependence on statistical information about inputs.    
Given these disparate features of their accounts from my own, an objection might arise. 
Recall that one of the reasons I gave for adopting a propensity-backed understanding of 
stochastic mechanism was that such an account needn’t depend on the very frequencies that the 
mechanism was meant to explain. However, on both Abrams’s and Strevens’s accounts, there is 
an explicit dependence on frequencies. And there is no mention of propensity. By way of 
response to this, I suggest that the roles that the frequencies play in both of these author’s 
accounts can be taken on by the propensity—thereby eliminating any reliance on frequencies. As 
emphasized in 4.4.2, propensities (by their very nature) carry with them modal information about 
what would happen to their possessors given certain kinds of interactions with the world. The 
fact that my picture window is fragile means it has a propensity to break relatively easily when 
perturbed in various ways. The assignment of a propensity to break easily already carries 
information about what kinds of inputs to it would result in what kinds of outputs. The same goes 
for mechanisms. Assigning a propensity to a synaptic transmission mechanism to fail more often 
than it succeeds already carries with it information about what kinds of inputs lead to successful 
initiation of electrical activity in the postsynaptic neurons. My suggestion, therefore, is this. The 
extent to which Abrams and Strevens both rely on statistical information about input and output 
frequencies can be taken over by the propensity we ascribe to the mechanism. And if this 
information can be taken over by the propensity, then there is no need to depend on these 
frequencies in a way that makes stochastic mechanisms explanatorily inefficacious.      
But even if the roles that frequencies play for Abrams and Strevens can be taken over by 
propensities, why should we want them to be? Doesn’t this just add a further, more mysterious 
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element to their already effective theories? The answer I propose is that it is worthwhile to 
relegate the explanatory work from the frequencies to the propensity because of the advantages 
I’ve already attributed to propensity theories in 4.3. Namely, a propensity-backed understanding 
of stochastic mechanism passes muster with regard to the desiderata laid out in 4.2. Whereas, 
frequency accounts do not.  
   
4.7 Objections Revisited and Addressed 
 
My view is that the three serious objections briefly presented in 4.5 are not devastating to the 
propensity-backed account of stochastic mechanism I’ve heretofore been attempting to motivate. 
To show this, I’ll take each one in turn and show what responses I see as available to a proponent 
of a propensity account of stochastic mechanism. The main thrust of my responses to each of the 
above objections is the following: while each of these challenges may pose a significant threat to 
propensity interpretations of chance in general, conjoining propensities with mechanisms 
provides (at least some resources) for a novel way out of each objection. In other words, 
propensities as properties of mechanisms are explanatorily stronger than either is alone. Let me 
say why. 
  Recall that the first charge against propensity accounts of chance is that they are 
incapable of explaining frequencies. This would be a major problem for my account of 
propensity-backed stochastic mechanism because my own CAUSAL EXPLANATION 
desideratum requires that mechanisms be able to explain regularities (output frequencies) 
observable in nature. To address this serious issue, I suggest we follow the line of thought just 
attributed to Abrams and Strevens and focus on features of the mechanisms themselves. In short, 
what I contend is this: while (at least single-case) propensities alone may be incapable of 
explaining frequencies, facts about the mechanisms themselves—seen as instantiating these 
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propensities—gives us additional resources to undertake this explanatory work. Here, an 
example from genetics is instructive. Gregor Mendel, a monk and schoolteacher living in 
isolation in Brno, experimented with peas in his monastery garden. In doing so, he made 
invaluable strides towards understanding the mechanisms that rule heredity. This discovery came 
about between 1856 and 1863 as he traced the inheritance patterns of certain traits in pea plants. 
When he crossed two pea plants with different traits (for example, a yellow pea producing plant 
with a green pea producing plant), he came to see a pattern in the results. He noticed strong 
tendency for a 3:1 ratio of yellow to green characters in (what we now call) the F2 generation. 
What Mendel initially observed was a frequency of outcomes such that it would have been 
natural for him to conclude that the chance of a hybrid pea plant to produce yellow peas in the F2 
generation was .75. On a propensity view of chance, this means that some features or properties 
of the physical set-up conditions give rise to a tendency for these frequencies to result. However, 
as the objection we have considered points out, postulating this propensity alone does not seem 
to explain the frequencies Mendel observed.  
What I wish to point out, on the other hand, is that conceiving of these propensities as 
instantiated by the underlying mechanism of Mendelian segregation allows for a fully adequate 
explanation of the resulting frequencies. In this case, what is needed is a description of alleles—
one coming from the father and one coming from the mother—which segregate during meiosis. 
In the pea plant example, these alleles combine in various ways such that some of the seeds are 
homozygous and some are heterozygous. To clearly visualize how alleles are distributed 





 A A 
A AA Aa 
a aA Aa 
 
Recall from Chapter 1, that in the case of the green and yellow peas, the yellow character is 
dominant, so it is represented by the uppercase ‘A’, and the green character is recessive, so it is 
represented by the lowercase ‘a’. The upper case ‘A’ always dominates over the lower case ‘a’, 
so the only time we get green peas is when there are two lowercase ‘a’s.  In the initial generation, 
the yellow pea plant will give each of its progeny a dominant yellow allele, and the green pea 
plant will give each plant a recessive green allele. So all the pea plants in the F1 generation will 
be yellow heterozygous. But in the F2 generation, when the yellow heterozygous peas have 
interbred, the resulting progeny could have any of the combination of alleles (as illustrated by the 
Punnett Square)—showing a ratio of 3:1 yellow to green phenotypes.  In short, the mechanism 
works like this: ‘A’ and ‘a’ segregate in the formation of germ cells, which then combine 
randomly at fertilization to give offspring according to the formula: 1AA + 2Aa + 1aa, and this 
mechanism explains the 3:1 ratio that Mendel observed. 
This example shows that attributing the 3:1 ratio of yellow to green peas in the F2 
generation to a propensity alone may not seem to explain the frequency of yellow and green 
peas. But when these propensities are seen as instantiated by the mechanism of Mendelian 
segregation of alleles, the frequency gets fully explained by explaining features of the 
mechanism itself. Just as Abrams explains the consistent outputs of a roulette wheel by appeal to 
the features of the wheel itself, we can explain the output frequencies of pea plant crossings by 
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appeal to the mechanism of Mendelian segregation itself. And in this way, propensities together 
with mechanisms can explain frequencies.   
 Recall the second objection: that given the dubious connection between propensity and 
frequency, there is reason to doubt whether any conjectured propensity could be undermined by 
the observation of a surprising frequency. And furthermore, propensities are not directly 
observable and as a result not amenable to empirical science. My response here is similar. As 
suggested by Abrahms and Strevens, there needn’t be any explanatory gap between propensity 
and stable output frequencies. Facts about the mechanism (and its initial conditions) bridge that 
gap. And if this bridge is sound, then anomalous output frequencies can give us reason to revise 
our initial propensity assignment—either that or reason to revise our background beliefs about 
the mechanism. Furthermore, although propensities cannot be observed directly, the mechanisms 
that instantiate them surely can. And if facts about these mechanisms are what ground the 
propensities they instantiate, then science can do enough by observing these mechanisms.   
 Regarding the third objection that we’ve stipulated (in some ad hoc fashion) the roles that 
propensities play without ever having shown that they actually exist. To fully address this 
objection would require diving head-first into the realm of the ontology of dispositional 
properties. I cannot do that here. So I’ll say two things: (1) I do not see any reason to hold 
propensities to be any more mysterious than other every-day dispositional properties. How do 
you show that something is fragile? You do different things to it, and see how easily it breaks. 
How do you check if something is poisonous? You poke tiny bits of poison into test subjects and 
see what happens. Likewise, we can check to see if a mechanism has a certain propensity by 
testing it. Initiate its start-up conditions and see how often you get the output you expect. If the 
frequency stabilizes, you can reasonably conclude that it has the corresponding propensity. No 
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deep mystery, at least not any special one. And (2), I’ll go in Chapter 5 to give a concrete 
suggestion as to one way we might describe what a mechanistic propensity actually is. I’ll 
suggest that it can be metaphysically characterized in terms of probability-weighted possibilia. If 
this suggestion is plausible, it will show that, indeed, more can be said about propensities than 




In this Chapter, I have attempted to take steps towards a working characterization of stochastic 
mechanism: one that coheres with the way life scientists actually seek out mechanisms to explain 
the natural world. To do this, I have taken the MDC characterization of mechanism and held it 
up to the main types of philosophical theories of chance (subjectivism, frequentism, Lewisian 
best-systems, and propensity). If the forgoing arguments are sound, then a propensity theory is 
the most promising type of theory of chance to give us what we want from an account of 
stochastic mechanism. To further motivate this propensity-backed account of stochastic 
mechanism, I have taken three serious objections to propensity theories of chance and shown 


















Chapter 5. A Propensity Interpretation of Stochastic Mechanism: Lessons from Fitness and Drift 
 
Abstract: The goal of this chapter is to introduce and motivate a propensity interpretation of 
stochastic mechanism (PrISM). I approach this, first, by examining some recent propensity 
interpretations of fitness and drift to see what lessons might be learned from them. I then lay out 
my own formal characterization of the propensity interpretation of stochastic mechanism and 
show how it enjoys an important advantage over propensity interpretations of fitness and drift. I 
conclude by hinting at how the PrISM might apply to one of the biological phenomena targeted 
for mechanistic explanation introduced in Chapter 1.      
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The thesis pursued thus far in this dissertation is that it makes good sense to think of the truth of 
(at least some of) the probabilistic generalizations made in the life sciences as grounded on 
biological mechanisms in the world, biological mechanisms that underlie and produce these 
observable phenomena, biological mechanisms which are themselves (in some sense) chancy: 
stochastic mechanisms. To arrive at this answer, we have seen in Chapter 2 that mechanistic 
regularity comes in various senses, and while regularity should not be considered a 
metaphysically demarcating feature of mechanisms, mechanisms with more regularity should 
hold a privileged position in our scientific explanations. We have also seen in Chapter 3 that 
appreciating these varied senses of regularity helps clarify whether natural selection should count 
as an explanatorily privileged MDC mechanism. In Chapter 4, we saw that there seem to be 
significant problems with underpinning an account of stochastic mechanism with other 
philosophical analyses of chance besides a propensity interpretation. But, as of yet, not much has 
been said about what, precisely, such a propensity interpretation of stochastic mechanism would 
amount to. I address that here.  
 In what follows, I draw a few important lessons from recent propensity interpretations of 
fitness and drift (PIF and PID) in order to present a novel propensity interpretation of stochastic 
mechanism (PrISM) according to which stochastic mechanisms are thought to have probabilistic 
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propensities to produce certain outcomes over others. This understanding of stochastic 
mechanism, once fully fleshed-out, will provide the benefits of (1) allowing the stochasticity of a 
particular mechanism to be an objective property in the world, a property investigable by 
science, (2) a way of quantifying the stochasticity of a particular mechanism, and (3) a way to 
avoid committing to the problematic causal role of propensities (and dispositional properties in 
general).  
Here is my plan. In 5.2, I discuss biological fitness and drift, paying close attention to 
some of the key features of Grant Ramsey’s recent propensity interpretations of both. In 5.3, I 
motivate and defend three lessons from these recent accounts: two positive and one negative. In 
5.4, I offer some considerations to bolster the negative lesson. In 5.5, I follow these lessons to lay 
out my own formal characterization of the PrISM—addressing potential objections along the 
way. And, in 5.6, I demonstrate how the PrISM might work by suggesting how it applies to the 
phenomena of initiation of electrical activity in postsynaptic neurons.  
 
5.2 Motivation from Fitness and Drift  
  
A natural place to start looking for resources for developing a propensity interpretation of 
stochastic mechanism is by looking at other concepts in biology that have been given propensity 
interpretations and see what lessons we might learn from them. Two biological concepts that 




Biological fitness is a probabilistic notion. Intuitively, it seems that there are many ways 





: some of these possibilities resulting in many progeny; some not. Beginning with 
Brandon (1978) and Mills and Beatty (1979), the propensity interpretation of fitness (PIF) has 
been defended by several philosophers of biology over the past few decades
30
. In its most general 
form, the PIF holds that an organism’s fitness is its probabilistic propensity to produce offspring. 
But why think of fitness this way? One of the primary motivations for conceiving of fitness in 
this manner is to avoid, what has been called, the “tautology problem”
31
. If fitness is not 
conceived of as a probabilistic propensity, and is instead defined in terms of an organism’s actual 
number of offspring (also known as ‘realized fitness’), then fitness cannot explain these actual 
outcomes in any way that isn’t tautologous and thereby vacuous. In other words, if an organism’s 
fitness is defined by how many progeny it actually has, no appeal to an organism’s fitness level 
can be made to explain its particular reproductive outcome; the two are by definition the same. 
Just as realized fitness cannot explain an organism’s actual reproductive outcome, neither can it 
serve as the basis for predicting a living organism’s reproductive outcomes. On a realized fitness 
view, an organism’s fitness level can only be determined after it has finished reproducing; so 
there can be no way to base predictions about reproductive outcomes on an individual 
organism’s fitness level. Similarly, if fitness is defined as the actual number of progeny that an 
organism produces (and not as its propensity to produce offspring), no adequate distinction can 
be made between the property of being fit and the outcome resulting from being fit; the two are 
by definition one and the same. Furthermore, unless fitness is distinguished from actual 
reproductive outcomes, we cannot think of fitness playing a causal role in how many progeny an 
organism has. We cannot say, for example, that an organism had many progeny because it was 
                                                          
29
 Following Sober (2010) and Ramsey (2012), I take it that this need not constitute a denial of metaphysical 
determinism. More on this is in Chapter 6.  
30
 Cf., Brandon and Carson (1996) and Beatty and Finsen (1989) 
31
 Mills and Beatty (1979), and Pence and Ramsey (2013)  
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very fit—at least not where ‘because’ is understood causally. The PIF was thereby introduced as 
a dispositional property of organisms—one that is ostensibly capable of (A) explaining the actual 
number of offspring an individual organism produces, (B) grounding predictions regarding the 
number of progeny an organism produces, (C) grounding a distinction between fitness as a 
property versus the outcomes that result from an organism’s fitness, and (D) underpinning an 
understanding of fitness as causal.   
Given these sorts of considerations, Mills and Beatty (1978) and Brandon (1978) offer 
probabilistic propensity definitions of fitness of the following sort
32
: 
PIF: x is fitter than y in [environment] E = x has a probabilistic propensity >.5 to leave 
more offspring than y. 
 
Despite its intuitive appeal, however, many have noticed significant problems with this 
definition. The most serious one, articulated forcefully by Rosenberg and Bouchard (2008), is 
that it is false. They write, “…there are many circumstances in which the organism of greater 
fitness has the propensity to leave fewer immediate offspring than the organism of lower fitness; 
as when for example, the larger number of a bird's chicks all die owing to the equal division of a 
quantity of food which would have kept a smaller number viable” (Rosenberg and Bouchard 
2008). Put another way, it simply is not the case that an organism with a higher propensity to 
leave more immediate offspring will end up with the higher number of viable offspring in the 
end. Environmental contingencies can get in the way. In response to this problem, attempts were 
made to advance more abstract schematizations of this definition—or to hedge it with various 
ceteris paribus clauses—but other problems seem to crop up (cf., Sober 2001; Walsh, Lewens, 
and Ariew 2002; Matthen and Ariew 2002; Ariew and Lewontin 2004).  
                                                          
32
 Taken from Rosenberg and Bouchard (2008) 
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Grant Ramsey (2006) offers a novel way of characterizing the PIF, one that does not 
appear to suffer the problems plaguing the original PIF approach. He calls his characterization 
“Block Fitness”. He writes, “Fitness, I will argue, is best conceived as a function of the 
probability distribution of all the possible numbers of offspring the individual might produce” 
(Ramsey 2006, 487-488). In his 2012 paper, Ramsey gives this helpful description.  
Consider an organism O with genome G in environment E. Assuming that O’s 
fitness is non-zero, there are a number of distinct ways that such an O with G can 
interact with its environment. It might be eaten by a predator early in life and die 
without leaving behind any progeny, or it might live a long life and leave behind a 
large number of progeny. Let’s designate each of these possible ways O could live 
its life in E (henceforth O’s possible lives) with L. Thus O has a large set of 
possible lives, L1, L2, . . . , Ln. Each of these possible lives will have a probability 
associated with it. The understanding of fitness as a propensity, then, can be 
explicated in terms of the properties of this set of possible lives (with their 
associated probabilities). Holding E constant, a change from one G to a different 
genome G! will change the properties of the Li (i.e., different genes can lead to 
differences in fitness)… The fitness of O consists in the properties of O’s set of 
possible lives (with their associated probabilities). Fitness is thus quantified via a 
function on O’s probability-weighted possible lives. (Ramsey 2012, 6)  
 
As seen here, Ramsey characterizes an organism’s fitness as a probabilistic propensity. However, 
this propensity does not merely take features of an organism’s actual life as its categorical base
33
, 
but instead is a function of all of an organism’s probability-weighted possible lives. More on the 
specifics of how this is meant to work is coming in subsequent sections. But, for now, it’s worth 
pointing to a couple of the benefits this approach is meant to afford its adherents. Since Ramsey 
conceives of fitness as consisting in properties of the whole set of an organism’s possible lives 
rather than the actual number of offspring it has, he can still maintain the benefits of the original 
PIF (A-D listed above). Because, on Ramsey’s account, an organism’s fitness is a propensity 
(albeit one that gets explicated in a new way), it can still explain the actual reproductive 
outcomes of an organism in a way that isn’t obviously tautologous. It can still serve as the basis 
                                                          
33
 Aka: metaphysical or supervenience base 
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of predicting what the actual reproductive outcomes of its possessor will be. It can still ground a 
distinction between fitness as a property vs. an outcome. And (at least on Ramsey’s account), it 
can still serve as the basis for speaking of fitness as causally efficacious. In addition to 
maintaining these benefits of the original PIF, Ramsey’s account isn’t subject to the same 
objection leveled by Rosenberg and Bouchard. Rather than characterizing one organism as fitter 
than another merely based on its having a higher propensity to leave more immediate offspring, 
Ramsey’s notion of block fitness requires that an organism’s fitness be a function of all of the 
possible ways its whole life might go. On this view, information regarding how many progeny 
(e.g., baby birds) can get adequately fed until reaching maturity gets included in the Li.—thereby 
eliminating the kind of counterinstances described by Rosenberg and Bouchard in which having 
more progeny might actually result (in the end) in lower fitness.   
 Ramsey’s PIF contains a few features that I suggest provide an excellent template for the 
propensity interpretation of stochastic mechanism. But before making these explicit, let’s look at 
another biological concept regarding which it is appealing to give a propensity interpretation: 




Biologists think of drift as that which happens when a population changes over time—
where these changes are not the result of selection. Consider, for example, a population of snails 
half of which are pink, and half are which are yellow
34
. Imagine further that the yellow snails are 
twice as fit as the pink ones because of the greater resistance to the sun that their coloring affords 
them. Scientists observing these snails expect, therefore, that the population of yellow to pink 
snails should increase from 1/2 of the population to 2/3 in the subsequent generation. However, 
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 Example owes to Roberta Millstein (1996, S15) 
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after observing these snails for one generation, they find that the population of yellow snails 
actually decreases from 1/2 to 2/5 of the snail population. Because this change in the population 
is not due to selection (selection would have increased the relative proportion of yellow snails), 
they attribute this unexpected result to drift. Despite the seeming straight-forward nature of this 
common understanding of drift as non-selective change in a population, however, more precise 
philosophical analyses of drift vary greatly. There are those who argue that drift cannot be 
distinguished from selection and so cannot be conceived of as a distinct evolutionary process at 
all (e.g., Matthen and Ariew 2002). There are those who argue that drift is a distinct evolutionary 
process from selection, but it can only be defined in terms of actual evolutionary outcomes (e.g., 
Brandon 2005). And there are some (e.g., Millstein 2002) who argue that drift is distinct from 
selection by virtue of the kind of process it is (indiscriminate vs. discriminate sampling of a 
population). The details of these debates are beyond the purview of this paper. My goal, as with 
fitness, is only to see whether there are any features of a propensity interpretation of drift (PID) 
that might be useful in fleshing out my propensity-backed understanding of stochastic 
mechanism.  
Again, Ramsey’s recent account may be instructive. Ramsey (2012) argues that, rather 
than a population-level process of indiscriminate sampling (a la Millstein), drift should be 
characterized as an individual-level probabilistic propensity which he calls ‘driftability’. His 
characterization of driftability, as we’ll see, shares many of the same features as his PIF. He 
writes, “Driftability, then, can be identified [equated] with intra-organismic heterogeneity 
[differences] in the Li [set of an individual’s possible lives] and can be quantified by a function 
on this heterogeneity” (Ramsey 2012, 7). As with fitness, an organism’s driftability is a 
propensity—understood as consisting in properties of the set of possible ways that organism’s 
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life might go. Each of these possible lives has a probability associated with it. And its overall 
propensity for drift is quantifiable by a function on these differences. Again, we’ll say more 
about what this means in later sections. But for now, it’s worth reemphasizing the purported 
benefits of conceiving of drift in this way. On Ramsey’s view, we should conceive of drift in this 
way (once again) because it allows us to divorce the outcomes of evolutionary drift from the 
process of drift; it makes driftability an objective property of individual organisms (as opposed to 
a measure of our ignorance). And, as with fitness, this interpretation enables us to speak causally 
about drift (e.g., “There are more white rabbits than grey ones in this population because of 
drift.”).  
Rather than offering a critical examination of Ramsey’s version of the PID, however, I 
aim instead to focus on a couple of its key features as starting points for my own propensity 
interpretation of stochastic mechanism.   
 
5.3 Three Lessons from Fitness and Drift  
 
Before adducing lessons from Ramsey’s PIF/PID, let’s pause and take stock of where we are in 
my overall project. Recall that I have taken it as my goal in this dissertation to develop a way of 
grounding probabilistic generalizations in the life sciences in the context of mechanistic 
explanation. To do this, I have focused on the (now widely accepted) MDC characterization of 
mechanism:  
MDC: Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of 
regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions (MDC 2000, 3) 
 
As we saw in the last Chapter, combining the MDC characterization of mechanism with other 
major interpretations of chance (subjectivism, frequentism, and best system analyses) violated 
one (or more) of the desiderata we set forth for an adequate account of stochastic mechanism. As 
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such, I settled on a propensity-backed account of stochastic mechanism which I characterized 
quite broadly as this. 
Propensity-Backed Stochastic Mechanism: a stochastic mechanism has chance c if and 
only if the actual token mechanism setup which can generate this event possesses a 
dispositional property (tendency) to produce that outcome with that degree of strength.  
 
At the end of Chapter 4, however, there were many important questions about this propensity-
backed understanding of stochastic mechanisms that were left unanswered. Metaphysically 
speaking, what is a mechanism’s propensity? What does a mechanism’s propensity have as its 
categorical base? Can a mechanism’s propensity to produce a certain outcome be quantified? If 
so, how? And what, if any, is the causal role played by a mechanism’s propensity?  
Now, I believe we are in the position to take some important steps toward answering 
these questions by drawing three important lessons from Ramsey’s PID/PIF. Two of these 
lessons are positive; one is negative. That is, the first two lessons are ways in which I suggest 
Ramsey’s PIF/PID provides potentially beneficial resources for understanding propensity-backed 
stochastic mechanisms, and the third is a way in which I think our account of stochastic 
mechanism should depart from Ramsey’s approach.     
3 Lessons from Fitness and Drift: 
 
(L1) Propensities are aptly understood as having probability-weighted possibilia as their 
categorical base.  
 
(L2) Propensities are quantifiable via a function of these probability-weighted possibilia. 
 
(L3) If we can, we should avoid committing to a view which requires defending the 
causal efficacy of propensities (and dispositional properties in general).   
 
An analysis of how (and whether) these lessons can be applied to the propensity interpretation of 
stochastic mechanism will be made explicit in the later sections of this Chapter. But, for now, I 
can make a few general remarks by way of motivating the first two lessons. One reason why I 
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take lesson (L1) to be potentially beneficial for an account of stochastic mechanism has to do 
with an analogy to the tautology problem for realized fitness. Recall that if an organism’s fitness 
is simply defined as the actual number of offspring it produces, then an organism’s fitness can’t 
explain these reproductive outcomes in any way besides one that is tautological. It strikes me that 
there is a corresponding worry for stochastic mechanisms. If we take a view of stochastic 
mechanism according to which its chance of firing is merely defined as its relative frequency of 
successful firings given the instantiation of its initial conditions, then there can be no appeal to a 
mechanism’s stochasticity as a means to explain these actual outcome frequencies. From the 
point of view of biology, however, the point is (at least sometimes) to say why we see certain 
probabilistic output frequencies from biological mechanisms. If the only answer available is that 
the mechanism is stochastic—where this is simply defined in terms of its frequency of outputs—
then this explanation is vapid and empty. Another reason why (L1) seems beneficial when 
applied to an account of stochastic mechanism is that it endows stochastic mechanisms with 
predictive power they wouldn’t have if their stochasticity were understood merely in terms of its 
relative frequency of actual outputs. Just as with the PIF/PID, if a mechanism’s stochasticity 
were defined solely in terms of its actual output frequencies, then it would make little sense to 
base predictions on this stochasticity; the outputs are already known. Furthermore, In Ramsey’s 
terms, Lesson (L1) provides a way of differentiating between the stochastic mechanistic process 
and the product of the stochastic mechanistic process. That is, a propensity-backed 
understanding of stochastic mechanisms allows us to divorce its nature as a probabilistic process 
from the results of that process. If we understood the stochasticity of a mechanism solely by 
virtue of its actual output frequencies, it seems no such conceptual divide is possible. And lastly, 
following lesson (L1) means that the propensities instantiated by stochastic mechanisms need not 
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be deeply, metaphysically mysterious. We aren’t just saying what the propensity does without 
saying what it is. Lesson (L1) endows us with (at least the potential for) some further 
metaphysical understanding of what the propensity of a given mechanism is, on what it is 
instantiated, and where it is to be found. The propensity of a given mechanism is a dispositional 
property with possibilia as its categorical base. Of course, much more needs to be said about how 
this lesson should get applied. However, the forgoing considerations, I hope, provide some prima 
facie reasons for taking seriously the potential advantages of following Ramsey’s approach in the 
way specified in (L1).       
Regarding lesson (L2), Ramsey’s PIF/PID gives an important hint as to what might be 
needed to precisely calculate the value of a mechanism’s propensity to produce a given outcome. 
Following Ramsey’s approach means that we can conceive of the value of a given mechanism to 
produce a certain output as quantifiable via a function of the mechanism’s probability-weighted 
possibilia (much more on this in 5.5.1). Without diving into the details here, however, it’s (once 
again) worthwhile to suggest that following (L2) would amount to the following prima facie 
advantage: it would mean that a definite value for a given mechanism’s propensity to produce a 
certain output can, in principle, be attained. This seems an especially worthwhile feature if 
scientists are to appeal to stochastic mechanisms to make precise predictions.  
I’ll say more about the benefits from applying lessons (L1) and (L2)—as well as their 
potential shortcomings—when it comes time to explicitly formulate the PrISM and apply it to a 
specific example (5.5-5.7). But first, I need to say something about one important way in which I 







5.4 Lesson Three: Are Propensities Causally Efficacious? 
 
In this section, I distance myself (in part) from Ramsey’s PIF/PID. On Ramsey’s view, in order 
to speak coherently, we must allow for fitness and drift, conceived of as propensities, to be 
causally efficacious. In what follows, however, I offer some reasons why I disagree that 
dispositional properties should be conceived of as, themselves, causally efficacious. I then admit 
that this appears to lead to an inconsistency with an argument made in Chapter 3. I resolve this 
inconsistency by appeal to a distinction made by Jackson and Pettit (1990) between causal 
efficacy and causal relevance.   
 
 5.4.1 When a Wine Glass Breaks in the Sink 
 
There seem to be good reasons for defenders of propensity interpretations of fitness and 
drift to want these propensities to be causally efficacious. If these propensities are conceived of 
as causally efficacious, we can coherently speak of reproductive and evolutionary outcomes as 
having been caused by fitness and drift(ability) respectively. We can say that this snail had more 
progeny because he was more fit; and that the driftability of the individual snails in a given 
population caused its particular evolutionary outcome.   
While there is no disputing the appeal of being able to coherently make such utterances, it 
comes at a cost. Namely, defenders of the causal role played by these propensities have to 
explain how propensities (and dispositional properties in general) can cause anything. Ramsey 
realizes that this might be difficult. Regarding drift, he says, 
There are of course long-standing debates in metaphysics over the nature of 
dispositional properties, their relationship to their categorical bases, and whether 
(and how) dispositions have causal efficacy. By characterizing driftability as a 
dispositional property, the cogency of driftability and the justification for the 
claim that driftability causes evolution therefore rests on particular views of 
dispositional properties. I will try to remain as neutral as possible about these 
debates and point out that all that my view needs is for dispositions to be causally 
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efficacious with respect to their manifestations. Thus, I need it to be true that 
glasses can break because they are fragile, where ‘because’ is understood 
causally… What is required is the claim that dispositions can at times (correctly) 
be said to cause their manifestations. (Ramsey 2012, 10)  
  
As indicated here, Ramsey’s account requires that dispositions be causally efficacious with 
respect to their manifestations in order to garner the benefit of being able to speak causally about 
fitness and drift. As he says, he needs it to be the case that glasses can break because they are 
fragile. To illustrate why this (apparently modest) claim might not be so easy to defend, think for 
a moment about a cheap wine glass. Suppose that when it comes time to do the washing-up after 
an evening of Dionysian indulgence, you accidentally knock a wine glass over in the sink, and it 
cracks to pieces. What was the cause of this? More specifically, what caused the glass to break? 
Putting aside the herculean task of untangling the literature on philosophical analyses of ‘cause’, 
let’s focus instead on what is required for a good causal inference. Here I follow Cartwright 
(1983) whose view is that we make our best causal inferences “…where our general view of the 
world makes us insist that a known phenomenon has a cause; where the cause we cite is the kind 
of thing that could bring about the effect and there is an appropriate process connecting the cause 
and the effect…“ (Cartwright 1983, 4). Let’s apply Cartwright’s criteria to the case of the cheap 
wine glass breaking in the sink. I suspect there are few who would argue that the phenomenon of 
the wine glass breaking lacked any cause at all. With regard to her second and third criteria, we 
might ask ourselves: what kind of thing could bring about the breaking of a cheap wine glass? 
What sort of process would we deem appropriate to have brought this about? As he states above, 
Ramsey’s view is committed to the fact that the fragility of the glass caused it to break. But is 
fragility (conceived of as a dispositional property) the kind of thing that could have brought that 
about? Put another way, are dispositional properties like fragility causally efficacious? My 
inclination is that they are not. To show why, consider the following contrastive query. Which 
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makes more sense: (1) it was the fragility of the inexpensive stemware that caused it to break, or 
(2) it was the force of impact on the stainless-steel sink together with the particular molecular 
structure of the glass that caused it to shatter? If your intuitions match mine, (2) is much the 
more reasonable answer. The fragility of the glass didn’t cause the break. Indeed fragility doesn’t 
do anything. In Cartwright’s terms, fragility isn’t the kind of thing that brings about effects. The 
glass breaking was a causal result of it forcefully impacting against the rigid surface of the sink.  
Of course, Ramsey is correct that we want to say that the cheap wine glass broke because 
it is fragile. However, we should notice that there is an important ambiguity in the word 
‘because’. Sometimes it is used causally; and sometimes it is used explanatorily. I submit that, in 
the case of the wine glass, fragility comes in when we explain why the glass broke. Why did 
your tipping-over the glass cause it to shatter?—on account of the fact that it is cheap and fragile. 
The glass’s fragility provides an explanatory reason why it broke. When we say that it broke 
because it is fragile, we mean to explain the occurrence of it breaking rather than to elucidate the 
specific causal history of its breaking. To use an example from biology, consider life-expectancy. 
Life-expectancy, like fitness and driftability, is a dispositional property. But, following Sober 
(1984), it hardly seems like an organism’s life-expectancy causes it to die or continue living. 
Rather, life-expectancy is a value we assign an organism based on the sorts of causes that might 
result in its death and how likely we think it is that any of these causes might come about. We 
wouldn’t say that an organism’s life expectancy caused it to die; however, life expectancy can 
help explain why an organism dies when it does.      
 On the basis of these considerations, I conclude that (at the very least) it is difficult to 
explain how propensities are themselves causally efficacious
35
. As such, if we can avoid an 
                                                          
35
 This worry is amplified by the so-called ‘Humphrey’s Paradox’. (Cf. Fetzer 1981)—wherein propensities, if 
conceived of as causal, cannot make sense of inverse conditional probabilities. 
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account of stochastic mechanism that commits to the causal efficacy of its propensities, we 
should. Hence, lesson (L3).    
 
5.4.2 Objection: can we still meet CAUSAL EXPLANATION? 
 
Suppose we accept that propensities (and dispositional properties in general) do not seem 
to be causally efficacious. In doing so, we may have opened ourselves to a difficult objection 
regarding something argued for in Chapter 4. Recall that one of the key desiderata we employed 
for sorting out which interpretation of chance to adopt for our account of stochastic mechanism 
was: 
CAUSAL EXPLANATION: any adequate account of stochastic mechanism must allow for 
descriptions of underlying mechanisms to feature in causal explanations of regularities 
seen in nature. (3.2) 
 
Indeed this desideratum played a key role in dismissing several of the alternative interpretations 
of chance (e.g., frequentism and BSA). However, by arguing as I have above that propensities 
(and dispositional properties in general) should not be seen as causally efficacious, it appears we 
might have undercut our own ability for propensity-backed stochastic mechanisms to causally 
explain.  
 
5.4.3 Response: Distinguishing Causal Efficacy from Causal Relevance  
 
In their 1990 paper “Program Explanation: A General Perspective”, Jackson and Pettit 
make a distinction between causal efficacy and causal relevance, and correspondingly, a 
distinction between two kinds of causal explanation: process explanation and program 
explanation. Here, I will argue that, when properly understood, these distinctions show how 
propensities can meet the proposed CAUSAL EXPLANATION desideratum offered in Chapter 4 
despite not being causally efficacious. Specifically, I argue that, even though propensities are not 
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themselves causally efficacious, they are nevertheless causally relevant. And by virtue of this 
causal relevance, they are entirely apt for featuring in causal explanation—albeit of the sort 
described by Jackson and Pettit as ‘program explanation’ rather than ‘process explanation’. To 
motivate this strategy, I’ll need to lay out some of the formal features of Jackson and Pettit’s 
argument.   
 Jackson and Pettit begin by making the following uncontroversial assumption about 
causal explanation: “A causal explanation of something must direct us to a causally relevant 
property as opposed to a causally irrelevant property of the factor it identifies as explanatory: a 
property relevant to the causal production of the effect explained” (Jackson and Pettit 1990, 108). 
One way in which properties are causally relevant, Jackson and Pettit suggest, is by being 
causally efficacious. They define a causally efficacious property with regard to an effect as “a 
property in virtue of whose instantiation, at least in part, the effect occurs; the instance of the 
property helps to produce the effect and does so because it is an instance of that property” (ibid, 
108). A property F fails to be causally efficacious of an effect e, on the other hand, if it meets all 
of the following conditions: 
 (i) there is a distinct property G such that F is efficacious in the production of e only if G 
is efficacious in its production;  
 
(ii) the F-instance does not help to produce the G-instance in the sense in which the G-
instance, if G is efficacious, helps to produce e; they are not sequential causal factors;  
 
(iii) the F-instance does not combine with the G-instance, directly or via further effects,  
to help in the same sense to produce e (nor of course, vice versa): they are not coordinate  
causal factors. (Ibid, 108) 
 
Like me, Jackson and Pettit do not take fragility to be a causally efficacious property. This is 




The property of fragility was efficacious in producing the breaking only if the 
molecular structural property was efficacious: hence (i). But the fragility did not 
help to produce the molecular structure in the way in which the structure, if it was 
efficacious, helped to produce the breaking. There was no time-lag between the 
exercise of the efficacy, if it was efficacious, by the disposition and the exercise 
of the efficacy, if it was efficacious, by the structure. Hence (ii). Nor did the 
fragility combine with the structure, in the manner of a coordinate factor, to help 
in the same sense to produce e. Full information about the structure, the trigger 
and the relevant laws would enable one to predict e; fragility would not need to be 
taken into account as a coordinate factor. Hence (iii). (Ibid, 109) 
 
I take the forgoing argument to be further demonstration of the thesis I offered in 4.4.1: 
dispositions like fragility are not causally efficacious. But the help that Jackson and Pettit can 
offer my account does not stop there. Even more important than the above argument against the 
causal efficacy of fragility, Jackson and Pettit argue that causal efficacy is not the only kind of 
causal relevance. Indeed, there is another kind, and it just so happens that dispositional 
properties (like fragility) fit into it quite nicely.  
 To illustrate this second kind of causal relevance, Jackson and Pettit appeal to the notion 
of a computer program. They write,  
A useful metaphor for describing the role of the [causally relevant but non-
causally efficacious] property is to say that its realization programs for the 
appearance of the productive property and, under a certain description, for the 
event produced. The analogy is with a computer program which ensures that 
certain things will happen - things satisfying certain descriptions - though all the 
work of producing those things goes on at a lower, mechanical level. (Ibid, 114, 
italics added) 
 
The realization of an abstract, higher-order dispositional property (like fragility), on Jackson and 
Pettit’s view, programs for the appearance of causally efficacious properties at the level of the 
stuff doing the causing. While it’s the physical bits and pieces of machinery inside my computer 
that do the work of causally producing the letters that are now appearing on my screen as I’m 
typing, there are many bits of programming code that constrain how this physical causation can 
occur. Fragility works the same way. Although the fragility of a glass doesn’t physically cause it 
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to break, its realization ensures that many different kinds of physical interventions would cause it 
to break. Just as the programming in my computer is causally relevant to the effect of words 
appearing on my screen, so is fragility causally relevant to the effect of a cheap wine glass 
breaking in my sink. This shows that the property of being fragile can be seen to be causally 
relevant without being causally efficacious. It also shows that explanations appealing to first-
order, concrete causal properties are not the only kinds of causal explanations we can give about 
the world. In addition to these first-order causal explanations. which Jackson and Pettit call 
process explanations, there are also explanations that appeal to these higher-order, abstract, 
properties. These are called program explanations.  
 These distinctions from Jackson and Pettit, I suggest, are exactly what is needed to 
undermine the objection considered in 4.4.2. Here is the precise point. While propensities are not 
causally efficacious, they are nevertheless causally relevant. And causal relevance is all that is 
needed to meet CAUSAL EXPLANATION.  Put another way, the propensity of a given stochastic 
mechanism is causally relevant to that mechanism’s output in exactly the same way that fragility 
is causally relevant to the event of a cheap wine glass breaking in my sink. This is because the 
realization of a propensity programs for the realization of lower-order efficacious properties 
and, in these circumstances, for the occurrence of the event in question.
36
     
 
5.4.4 Objection: But Aren’t BSA Chances Causally Relevant?  
 
 Suppose that Jackson and Pettit’s distinction between causal relevance and causal 
efficacy (as well as the corresponding distinction between program explanation and process 
explanation) does the work I’ve argued that it does. That is, suppose that propensities can be seen 
to meet CAUSAL EXPLANATION in the sense of being causally relevant even if they are not 
                                                          
36 This conclusion has the added benefit of cohering nicely with two recent papers defending the causal relevance 
of dispositions: Mckitrick (2005) Vicente (2002). 
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causally efficacious. A new objection seems to arise. Namely this: aren’t BSA chances causally 
relevant in just the same way that propensities are? And if so, wouldn’t this negate the argument 
I offered (in 4.3.3) against a BSA understanding of stochastic mechanism?  
 Before I offer my response to this objection, let’s ask why it might seem that BSA 
chances are causally relevant in the same way that propensities are. Recall that, on the BSA 
interpretation, the chance of any given outcome occurring is whatever the best systematization of 
the Humean mosaic of particular facts tells us it is. BSA chances might seem to be causally 
relevant in the following sense. Just as the word processing program I’m currently using 
constrains the kinds of causally efficacious interactions I can have when typing these words, so 
too does BSA chance amount to a constraint on the space of possible causal events that can take 
place in the world. When the BSA, for example, tells us that there is a 1/6 chance of a six-sided 
fair die landing on six when I roll it, what it is doing (in effect) is giving us some information 
regarding what kinds of constraints there are on the ways that I can be causally efficacious in 
rolling a six with a fair die. E.g., I shouldn’t expect to be able to roll a six ten times in a row. If 
this is correct, then it seems BSA chances are causally efficacious in just the same way that 
propensities are. And if this is correct, then it seems we no longer have any theoretical basis for 
dismissing a BSA interpretation of stochastic mechanism on the grounds that it fails to meet 
CAUSAL EXPLANATION.        
Despite its apparent force, I argue that this objection rests on a mistake. Specifically, I 
suggest that, on the BSA, the facts constrain the chances; not the other way around. So BSA 
chances aren’t causally relevant in the way that propensities are. 
To see why, consider again the example of my word processing program. On Jackson and 
Pettit’s view, what makes this program causally relevant is the fact that “[it] ensures that certain 
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things will happen - things satisfying certain descriptions - though all the work of producing 
those things goes on at a lower, mechanical level” (Ibid, 114). Now ask yourself, do BSA 
chances ensure that things will happen? Put another way, do BSA chances place constraints on 
the way that causal events can occur in the world? My intuition is that the answer to both of 
these questions is no. Rather, it seems to me that (by their very definition), BSA chances are 
constrained by the causal facts—not the other way around. Indeed, the central point of the BSA 
account of chance is that the chances supervene on the Humean mosaic of particular matters of 
fact. Given this central feature of the BSA account, I argue, it must be that those facts constrain 
the chances; it doesn’t work the other way. And if this is so, BSA chances are not causally 
relevant in the way that my word processing program is. My word processing program, given 
that it is realized on my computer, makes it such that certain ways of poking my keys will 
produce the appearance of certain symbols on my screen (and not others). But BSA chances 
don’t make anything be the case in the natural world. As such, I take the objection offered in this 
section not to threaten the arguments I gave in 4.3.3 after all.  
 
5.5 A Propensity Interpretation of Stochastic Mechanism 
 
Having now motivated (L3) and defended it against a couple of possible objections, I now 
propose to examine the prospects for applying the two positive lessons, (L1) and (L2), that we 
adduced from Ramsey’s PIF/PID in order to begin to formulate my own propensity interpretation 
of stochastic mechanism (PrISM).  
Before addressing (L1) and (L2) specifically, however, let’s see what the basic form of 
the PrISM is going to be. Following the template from Ramsey, we can describe the PrISM in 




Consider a mechanism M operating in an environment E. There are a number of factors 
(both internal to M and from E) that influence whether the mechanism successfully fires. 
The set-up conditions for a particular M might or might not obtain. The particular entities 
and activities might get interfered with by the E once the mechanism is triggered. And an 
M’s termination conditions may or may not occur even after triggering. Consequently, 
there are a number of possible ways the mechanism can act. Let’s designate all the 
possible ways the mechanism can act with F (as in ‘possible firing’). Each of these ways 
the mechanism can go (F1, F2, F3,… Fn) will have a probability associated with it.  The 
propensity of a given stochastic mechanism can be understood as metaphysically based 
on the properties of the entire set of Fs. (Call this set Fi.). More specifically, the 
propensity of a given stochastic mechanism is a function over its probability weighted Fs.  
 
On the basis of this description, I characterize the PrISM in its most general form as this.  
  
PrISM: the propensity (Pr) of a given stochastic mechanism to fire can be identified with 
heterogeneity [differences] in the Fi [set of a mechanism’s possible firings] and can be 
quantified by a function on this heterogeneity.  
 
So far, this is just the direct application of Ramsey’s approach to the PIF/PID to notion of 
stochastic mechanism. What needs to happen next is to more carefully examine whether 
Ramsey’s approach works when applied in this way to our notion of stochastic mechanism. To 
do this, I’ll look at the prospects of applying both (L1) and (L2) individually.   
 
5.5.1 On the Prospects for Applying Lesson 1 
 
Recall that the first feature of Ramsey’s PIF/PID that seemed it might be beneficial to 
apply to an account of stochastic mechanism was this.  
(L1) Propensities are aptly understood as having probability-weighted possibilia as their 
categorical base.  
 
Recall, further, that the reasons motivating the application of (L1) to stochastic mechanisms were 
directly analogous to Ramsey’s own reasons for understanding fitness and drift(ability) in this 
manner. Namely, (L1) means we have some resources for offering an analysis of propensities 
such that they aren’t entirely mysterious. If propensities can be understood as having probability-
weighted possibilia as their categorical base, then we can have some idea (metaphysically 
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speaking) of what they are. And this would, at the very least, offer the some response to critics 
who argue that propensity theorists merely say what propensities do without saying what they 
are.  
 If we follow (L1), what can we say about what propensities are? At the very least, we can 
say what their categorical base is. Just as fitness (as a propensity) can be explicated in terms of 
the properties of the set of an organism’s heterogeneous possible lives, so too can the 
stochasticity of a mechanism (as a propensity) be explicated in terms of the properties of the set 
of a mechanism’s heterogeneous possible firings. The propensity of a particular vesicle 
mechanism to successfully fire only 10% of the time can be given further analysis. It can be 
explicated in terms of the properties of the set of the possible ways this mechanism could operate 
under various conditions. More on the details of this will come in 5.7. But before we get to the 
details of how these propensities get calculated, it will be helpful to pause and consider a few 
objections to applying (L1) to our account of stochastic mechanism.   
 
5.5.1.1 Objection: Didn’t We Argue (contra HF) that Non-actual States Can’t be Explanatory?  
 
 The first serious objection that needs to get considered is this. Didn’t we argue in 4.3.2 
that the problem with a hypothetical frequentist interpretation of stochastic mechanism is that it 
ultimately grounds the stochasticity of a mechanism on counterfactuals? And wasn’t our reason 
for not wanting to do this that it doesn’t make sense to causally explain actual output frequencies 
of mechanisms by reference to counterfactuals?  However, isn’t that precisely what is going on 
here when we apply (L1)? In other words, aren’t we ultimately appealing to non-actual states 
(possible mechanism firings) as a metaphysical analysis of the very propensities we’re supposed 
to be using to causally explain actual output frequencies?  
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 By way of response to this objection, I want us to think carefully about what is doing the 
explaining. As I argued earlier in this Chapter, propensities themselves are not causally 
efficacious. But, following Jackson and Pettit, they can be seen to be causally relevant. That is, 
just like my word processing program, propensities constrain the kinds of causal interactions its 
possessor can accomplish. My response to the above objection regarding HF is the same one I 
gave to the BSA objection. The counterfactuals appealed to on an HF understanding of chance 
are not causally relevant in this way. Why? – because (once again) the counterfactual long-run 
frequencies appealed to by HF don’t make anything be the case in the actual world. To see why, 
consider again my chance of rolling a six with a six-sided fair die. On an HF account, my chance 
is 1/6 because, on a counterfactual infinite (or very large) series of trials of me rolling that die, 
the relative frequency of instances of the die landing on six will eventually draw ever closer to 
reaching a limit of 1/6. But, just as we did with the BSA objection, ask yourself whether this HF 
counterfactual is causally relevant in the same way my word-processing program is. I submit 
that, once again, it is not. My word processing program makes it the case that certain symbols 
appear on my screen when I type. The counterfactual infinite (or very large) series of trials in 
which I role a fair six-sided die doesn’t make it the case that I will role a six roughly 1/6
th
 of the 
time here in the actual world.   
 Now ask yourself whether a propensity fairs any better in this regard. I think it does. To 
see why, recall the example of my picture window. It has a dispositional property of being 
fragile. That is, it has a propensity to break relatively easily when struck by things like baseballs, 
bricks, flying birds, and hurricane-force winds. Does the property of being fragile in this way 
make it the case that it will react by breaking when causally interacted with by baseballs, bricks 
and the like? It seems to me plausibly so. It is by virtue of instantiating the property of fragility, 
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that my picture window is susceptible to breaking in all of these possible ways. Just as Jackson 
and Pettit suggest, being fragile programs for this to be the case—just as Microsoft Word 
programs for it to be the case that my font switches to italics when I press control ‘i’.  
 Granted, much more needs to be said in order to fully specify why propensities are 
causally relevant and hypothetical frequencies aren’t: more than I can say here. But I can say one 
last thing that helps motivate this claim. Propensities, by definition, are objective properties in 
the actual world. Just like computer programs are objectively realized on my computer. Even 
though they carry in them (they have as part of their content) information about modal 
possibilities, propensities do exist as part of the furniture of the actual universe. The hypothetical 
frequency of my infinite roles of a six-sided fair die, on the other hand, exists nowhere in this 
universe. And perhaps this is part of the reason why hypothetical frequencies seem less equipped 
for featuring in causal explanations of the actual world than do propensities.  
 
5.5.1.2 Objection: the Ramsey Approach Leads to a Vicious Regress 
 
Even if I have succeeded in showing that propensities meet CAUSAL EXPLANATION 
even if they carry modal information, there remains another serious objection to applying (L1) to 
an account of stochastic mechanism. And I fear it is an even harder one to deal with. 
Recall that (L1) states that propensities are aptly understood as having probability-
weighted possibilia as their categorical base. It seems any follower of (L1) owes some kind of 
story about what these probabilities are, where they come from, and how we get them. The 
problem is, as we’ll see, it’s unclear what (if anything) can be said in answer to these questions 
without running into some kind of trouble. 
Consider first the following kind of answer. I don’t care where you get the probabilities 
weighting these possible ways a mechanism could fire. Get them wherever you want. I’m not 
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trying to offer a general interpretation of how to understand all probabilities—in all instances 
where they occur. The important thing is that you do the best you can to assign probabilities to 
these possible mechanism firings given whatever evidence you have. And once they get 
assigned, (however they get assigned) we can calculate the propensity of the mechanism to 
achieve various output conditions via a function of these probability weights. If this process 
leads to the identification of a propensity that varies widely from the results we go on to observe 
when testing the mechanism in question, then we can always go back and adjust our initial 
probability weight assignments. 
The problem with this approach, however, is that it seems to undermine the very 
advantage that (L1) was supposed to bestow. Namely, if we say nothing about what these 
probabilities are, then the mysterious aspect of propensities that we were trying to mitigate 
against (by offering a further analysis in terms of probability-weighted possibilia) simply gets 
moved back one step to the probabilities we assign to the possible mechanism firings on which 
the propensity is categorically based. In other words, rather than making propensities less 
mysterious, (L1) merely relocates the mystery one step below. And this seems like a serious 
problem.  
  Perhaps, then, if we are to maintain the benefit of applying (L1), we do owe some story 
about what these underlying probabilities are. Sadly, telling this story may prove difficult. The 
reason is that it seems we may, by the very same arguments offered in 4.3, end up having to say 
that these underlying probabilities have to (themselves) be propensities. But then, those 
propensities, if we are to understand what they are, will also have to analyzed in terms of 
probability-weighted possibilia. And those underlying probabilities will also have to be analyzed 
as propensities. And on, and on. In short, it seems we have a vicious regress on our hands.   
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What (if anything) can be done to avoid this regress? One option would be to explore an 
alternative route for understanding these propensities—one that does not follow (L1).  
  
5.5.1.3 An Alternate Route: Following Abrams 
 
Suppose the forgoing arguments succeed in showing that the prospects for applying (L1) 
to our analysis of stochastic mechanisms are quite dim. Suppose we now find ourselves 
convinced that (L1) either pushes the mystery of propensity back a step or it results in a 
pernicious explanatory regress. Does that put the proverbial final nail in the coffin for the 
PrISM? Not necessarily. There’s another way to proceed.  
The other way is this. Rather than following Ramsey’s approach of grounding 
propensities on the heterogeneity of the underlying probability-weighted possible ways a 
mechanism might fire, we might take an approach inspired by Abrams (2012). The Abrams-
inspired approach does just the opposite of what the Ramsey approach does. Rather than 
grounding an understanding of a mechanism’s propensities in terms of the heterogeneity of their 
underlying probability-weighted possibilia, we might understand the heterogeneity of possible 
ways a mechanism might fire in terms of the very mechanisms themselves. That is, we might 
ground our understanding of the stochasticity of mechanisms by appeal to features of the 
mechanisms themselves. On this way of looking at it, structural features of the mechanism itself 
specify the propensities it has to operate in various ways. Recall that, as we saw in 4.6, Abrams 
explains the smooth probability distribution we see in the outputs of a fair roulette wheel (despite 
highly variable inputs) by appeal to facts about the mechanism itself. This smooth output 
distribution can be understood, according to Abrams, by paying attention to facts like the equal-




Just as Abrams appeals to facts about the roulette wheel to explain the probability we 
assign to its outputs, we might explain a mechanism’s propensity to fail some percentage of the 
time by appeal to facts about that mechanism’s structure. And in doing so, we don’t need to 
appeal to further (and equally mysterious) underlying probabilities. 
Even if it succeeds at avoiding the regress attributed to the Ramsey approach, however, 
the Abrams-inspired approach comes at its own costs. First, the Abrams-inspired approach seems 
to leave us back where we started in terms of the brute, unanalyzability of propensities. Yes, we 
can learn about the structural features of the mechanisms that instantiate these propensities. But 
we can’t say much at all about what the propensities are. And second, as we saw in 4.6, Abrams 
explicitly affirms a reliance on frequencies in a way that we’ve argued against doing.  
So where is there left to go from here?  
 
5.5.1.4 Gesturing at an Argument from Balance 
 
 In the spirit of intellectual honesty, it may be that we need to admit that neither the 
Ramsey-inspired approach nor the Abrams-inspired approach are without serious drawbacks. 
And as such, it may be that all we can do is ask which are the theoretical costs we’re more 
comfortable absorbing.  
 To sum up, applying the Ramsey-inspired (L1) has the following real advantages and real 
costs: 
 
Ramsey-inspired (L1) Payoff: it offers a resource for further analyzing the metaphysics of 
propensities—thereby making them less mysterious 
 
Ramsey-inspired (L1) Costs: on pain of merely pushing the mystery back a step, we owe 
a story about what the probabilities weighting the Fs are. And depending how this story 




If we follow the Abrams-style approach instead, there are also real advantages and 
disadvantages: 
Abrams-inspired Payoff: avoids the risk of explanatory regress 
 
Abrams-inspired Costs: leaves propensities mysterious, and relies heavily on frequencies. 
 
Given these difficult trade-offs, the question now becomes, on which approach is the price right? 
I cannot give an answer to this question that takes anything like the form of a deductive 
argument. In the end—as is always the case with such things—what matters is how much we end 
up caring about the garnering the respective benefits vs. how much we care about avoiding the 
respective costs. Having said that, my view is that the traction that the Ramsey approach has 
gotten for understanding other concepts in biology in terms of propensities may (itself) lend 
additional motivation for trying to follow his lead. If only for the sake of unification with his 
other promising accounts, it seems that (if possible) it would be a good idea to see how far we 
can take the lessons adduced from Ramsey’s well-received PIF/PID accounts.  
 
5.5.2 On the Prospects of Applying Lesson 2 
 
Suppose we decide to stick with the Ramsey approach after all. There still remains the 
difficult task of exploring the prospect for applying (L2). Recall that (L2) states: propensities are 
quantifiable via a function of these probability-weighted possibilia. Regardless of whether there 
is an adequate story to be told about the probabilities we use to weight these possibilia, we still 
need to figure out, with regard to stochastic mechanisms, what this function might possibly be.  
In the space I have remaining in this (already long) Chapter, I won’t be able to tackle this 
project in a high degree of detail. However, I can at least say something about what a candidate 
function might look like as well as a few words on its viability in the context of science.   
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 So what function might be required in order for us to be able to calculate the propensity 
of a mechanism to achieve a particular output? Suppose for example, we wanted to calculate the 
overall propensity of a given synaptic transmission mechanism reach its termination conditions 
(e.g., to result in post-synaptic electrical activity). In its most general form, we can place the 
following constraint on such an equation (where T signifies achieving termination; f signifies 
some function; and p signifies some set of probability-weighted possibilities). 
 
Pr(T) = f (p) 
 
That is, whatever else we say about the prospects of applying (L2), the basic form of any 
equation calculating the propensity for a given stochastic mechanism to reach termination 
conditions has to take the forgoing general form. The equation has to tell us that the propensity 
of achieving termination conditions equals a function of its probability-weighted possibilities.  
 Now, the question becomes: what is this function? The only suggestion I can think to 
offer is also the most obvious. It’s the standard way of expressing the average probability of 
some event given a bunch of known conditional probabilities of that event given various 
background conditions—each with its own know probability: the law of total probability. 
Informally, the law of total probability says that, given the occurrence of some event A, with 
known conditional probabilities given a range of possibilities (Bn)—each with its own known 
probability itself—the total probability of A equals the sum of the probability of A given B1 
times the independent probability of B1 plus the probability of A given B2 times the independent 
probability of B2 plus the probability of A given B3 times the independent probability of B3, and 
so on until all the Bs are included in the sum.  
 Formally, the equation looks like this: Pr(A) = 
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This is easy to apply to the PrISM: the total propensity of a given stochastic mechanism to 
achieve termination conditions [Pr(T)] = 
             
 
   
 
 
Now that we’ve seen one obvious candidate for applying (L2) to the PrISM, let’s ask briefly 
whether it is a good one.  
One consideration that might count in favor of this candidate function is that it was the 
very mathematical model first introduced by Brandon (1978) and Mills and Beatty (1979) in the 
very first formulations of the PIF. If it worked for an organism’s overall fitness—conceived of as 
a propensity—then it might well work for understanding the overall propensity of a stochastic 
mechanism to reach termination. The problem, however, is that the above function didn’t end up 
working very well as a way of understanding the PIF. Without going into the details, the above 
way of calculating an organism’s overall fitness ran into several counterexamples (cf. Pence and 
Ramsey 2013 for specifics on these counterexamples). In short, the above way of calculating an 
organism’s overall fitness can’t handle variance (in possible offspring over an organism’s 
lifespan, of the timing of selection, and the timing of reproduction). 
One positive feature of the prospects of using this candidate function for the purposes of 
applying (L2) to the PrISM is that stochastic mechanisms aren’t subject to the same problems 
with variance that the fitness seems to be. The overall propensity for a mechanism to reach 
termination doesn’t necessary vary over the time the mechanism exists, and it isn’t sensitive to 
the timing of selection and reproduction the way that fitness is. And if this is so, our candidate 
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function may not need to take ever increasingly complex form—as it seems to have done in the 
case of the PIF.  
That said, adopting the above candidate function as a means of applying (L2) to the 
PrISM does suffer at least one major shortcoming. It doesn’t really offer anything new to the 
PrISM. Statisticians and mathematicians have known and used the law of total probability for the 
better part of the 20
th
 century. If this is the manner in which we choose to calculate the overall 
propensity of a stochastic mechanism to achieve termination, what is the rest of the PrISM really 
adding that is useful to science?  
In response to this apparent shortcoming, I can only say this. Even if it is the case that 
this feature of my PrISM analysis is not (itself) novel, that doesn’t preclude its application from 
being novel and interesting. In other words, even if statisticians and mathematicians have availed 
themselves of the law of total probability for decades, it could still be worthwhile to have found a 
new and interesting place to apply it. And if the mechanistic approach to the philosophy of life 
sciences succeeds in supplying a framework to replace the laws-based deductive-nomological 
explanatory approach, as I hope it will, this novel application could add to its success by 
supplying a method for scientists to calculate overall propensities of stochastic mechanisms for 
supporting probabilistic generalizations in the life sciences.      
 
5.5.3 Following lesson 3: An important advantage of the PrISM 
 
The final lesson we have yet to explore the prospects for applying to the PrISM is (L3).  
As we saw in 5.4, there are some good reasons for avoiding a commitment to the causal efficacy 
of propensities (and dispositional properties in general). What I wish to point out here is that 
departing from Ramsey’s approach in this way paves the way for the PrISM to enjoy a 




P1. Ramsey’s PIF/PID requires propensities to be causal. 
  
P2. As seen in 4.4, the causal efficacy of propensities is (at best) difficult to defend. 
  
P3. But the PrISM need not endorse the causal efficacy of propensities because the  
mechanisms themselves can be seen to do the causal work. 
 
P4. Thus, the PrISM can retain the general advantages of a propensity interpretation (e.g., 
objectivity, causal explanation, scientific investigability, and grounding of 
predictions/interventions) without the metaphysical cost of having to defend the causal 
efficacy of dispositional properties.  
 
C1. Given (iv), the PrISM therefore holds an important advantage
37
 over Ramsey’s 
PIF/PID. 
 
We have already seen that Ramsey explicitly commits to premise (P1). The truth of premise (P2) 
depends on the arguments given in 4.4. Premises (P3) and (P4) need more support to show that 
(C1) follows. In an effort to provide such support, let’s look at an example of the PrISM in 
action.       
 
5.6 Example: Synaptic Transmission   
 
To illustrate the PrISM in action—as well as its advantage over Ramsey’s PIF/PID—let’s  see 
how it might apply to an example from neuroscience.     
Initiation of Electrical Activity in Post-synaptic Neurons 
 
There are gaps between the neurons in our brains called synapses. Electrical signals must 
traverse these gaps in order to continue on their path through our nervous system. Very 
roughly, the chemical process goes like this: a brief pulse of electricity (called an ‘action 
potential’) travels down a hollow tube in the neuron called an axon. This occurs because 
the axon is filled with (and surrounded by) an aqueous solution containing charged ions. 
At rest, the membrane surrounding each neuron is polarized; its inner surface is 
negatively charged relative to its outer surface. Upon contact with the action potential, 
however, the charge of the axon’s membrane rises enough to open specific gates in the 




) into the cell causing the 
                                                          
37 When I say that the PrISM holds an important advantage over the Ramsey’s PIF/PID, I do not mean to suggest 
that it can do a better job of explaining fitness and drift than his can. I do not intend to construe the PRISM as a 
proper alternative to Ramsey’s interpretations. How much work the PrISM can take over from the PIF/PID depends 
on to what extent the phenomena that these conceptual frameworks are intended to explain are mechanistic.  
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membrane to depolarize. Other positively charged ions (mainly K
+
) flow out of the 
membrane to cause repolarization in its wake. What results is a wave of electricity 
flowing down the axon until it reaches the synapse, at which point a chemical (called a 
neurotransmitter) is released and moves across the synapse binding to specific proteins 
on the neighboring neuron. However, this process is not very dependable. In fact, 
according to some estimates, the release of neurotransmitters can fail to result in the 
successful initiation of electrical activity in postsynaptic neurons up to 90% of the time.
38
 
 This example constitutes a probabilistic phenomenon of interest to life scientists. And 
importantly for us, neuroscientists explain this phenomenon mechanistically. The successful 
release of electrical activity in postsynaptic neurons fails up to 90% of the time because of 
features of the mechanism of postsynaptic actuation. Because this phenomenon is both 
probabilistic and explained by appeal to a mechanism, the mechanism underlying and productive 
of this phenomenon is clearly a stochastic mechanism. This example is, therefore, ripe for 
analysis by the PrISM.  
 Here is how it might go. Call the mechanism for transmission of electrical activity across 
a particular synapse in my brain M. Now consider a point in time (call it t) when the membrane 
surrounding each neuron is at rest and polarized. At t, there are many ways that M might fire, 
depending on the environmental factors E particular to the chemical make-up of my brain at t. 
Call the set of these possible firings Fi. Each of these Fs (F1, F2, F3… Fn) has a probability weight 
assigned to it. For example, we might say that the probability that depolarization occurs but no 
neurotransmitter signal is released is .6; the probability that polarization occurs and the 
neurotransmitter is released is .1; the probability that insufficient release of positive ions leads to 
no polarization at all is .3; etc. We might also know the probabilities of this mechanism reaching 
termination conditions given each of these scenarios. If we do know all of this, according to the 
                                                          
38
For detailed mechanistic analysis of this phenomenon, see the original MDC (2000) paper and Craver’s book 
Explaining the Brain (2007). For discussion of the science behind successful vs. unsuccessful instances of 
neurotransmitter release, see Kandel et al. (2000). For detailed discussion of how this case relates to MDC’s 
regularity requirement, see Bogen (2005) and Andersen (2012). 
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PrISM, we can calculate of the overall propensity of this M to lead to successful termination 
conditions (e.g, the release of electrical activity across the synapse) as a function of these 
probability-weighted possibilities such that the output of this function is the propensity value Pr 
that the stochastic mechanism will successfully terminate.           
Where the PrISM departs from Ramsey’s PIF is on the issue of causality. As we’ve seen, 
Ramsey’s view is committed to saying that the propensity (whether it’s fitness or driftability) 
causes the reproductive or evolutionary outcome. However, if we follow lesson 3 (as argued for 
in 5.4.), then it seems difficult (at best) to see how this could go. At this point, a real advantage 
of the PrISM becomes salient. If we adopt the PrISM, we can relegate the causal work to the 
token mechanism rather than the propensity. It is not that the disposition to fail at a rate of .9 
caused the mechanism not to fire in a given instance. Rather, this particular actuation 
mechanism, the particular entities and activities out of which it is composed, does the causing. 
Of course, we do want to say that we observe the output frequency of this mechanism because it 
has a propensity of .9 of failing to fire. But, as I suggested in 4.4, this need not mean that we 
must commit ourselves to the causal efficacy of the mechanism’s propensity. This propensity, 
rather, should be seen to explain why the actual mechanism does the causal work when it does. 
Applying the PrISM to this case makes salient several virtues of this kind of approach. 
When neuroscientists say that successful transmission of electrical activity across a given 
synapse fails up to 90% of the time, we now have a helpful conceptual framework for explaining 
what makes this true. It is true because the mechanism underlying and productive of this 
phenomenon is a stochastic one with a propensity of .9 to fail. Whether we decide to follow the 
Ramsey-inspire approach or the Abrams-inspired approach, there is more that we can say about 
this propensity than we couldn’t without the PrISM. Plus the analysis offered in this Chapter 
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means that the chanciness of this mechanism exists in the world, instantiated by a real, existing, 
mechanism. It can be investigated by science. And once discovered, it can be the basis for 
explaining and predicting actual outcomes.   
5.7 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have drawn on a few recent propensity interpretations of fitness and drift in an 
effort to adduce some important lessons for my own propensity interpretation of stochastic 
mechanism. If successful, the PrISM may prove a novel way of grounding probabilistic 
generalizations in the life sciences: one which allows for the stochasticity of a mechanism to an 
objective feature of the world, one which endows descriptions of stochastic mechanism with 
explanatory and predictive power, and one which need not commit to the causal efficacy of 

















Chapter 6. The Threat of Determinism: Synthesizing Emergent Chance and Multilevel 
Mechanisms  
 
Abstract: In this chapter, I explore whether—and if so, how—the propensity interpretation of 
stochastic mechanism (PrISM) developed thus far can handle the threat of metaphysical 
determinism. The answer I pursue is that it can. To show how, I first outline a few influential 
arguments for and against biological indeterminism and suggest that the only tenable 
philosophical conclusion available is an agnosticism as to whether there is genuine 
indeterminism at play in the biological world. As such, I pursue a disjunctivist strategy according 
to which what we say about the PrISM depends on which side of the biological determinism 
debate prevails. To accommodate the more difficult determinism disjunct, I draw on recent view 
from the philosophy of probability, emergent chance, according to which objective chance can 
exist at one level of description even if determinism holds at a different level. I then apply this 
idea to mechanism levels to show that genuine propensities may be able to exist at one 
mechanism level even if another mechanism level (within the same mechanism hierarchy) is 




~ Given for one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by which nature is 
animated and the respective situation of the beings who compose it—an intelligence sufficiently 
vast to submit these data to analysis—it would embrace in the same formula the movements of 
the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be 
uncertain and the future, and the past, would be present to its eyes”. (Laplace 1814, 4) 
 
~ There is no chance without chance. If our world is deterministic there are no chances in it, save 
chances of zero and one. Likewise, if our world somehow contains deterministic enclaves, there 
are no chances in those enclaves”. (Lewis 1986, 120) 
 
The suggestion put forth thus far in this dissertation, recall, is that we can ground the truth of (at 
least some) probabilistic generalizations in the life sciences by appeal to stochastic mechanisms 
in the world: mechanisms that have probabilistic propensities to result in certain outputs over 
others. In the previous Chapter, we explored the prospects for understanding these propensities 
as (1) categorically based on, and (2) quantifiable via a function of probability-weighted possible 
ways a particular mechanism might fire. The question now arises: what is meant by possible 
ways a mechanism might fire? For example, what are we committed to when we say of a 
particular synaptic transmission mechanism in the brain that it might result in an initiation of 
electrical activity across a particular synapse—or when we say of a particular DNA replication 
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mechanism in a living organism that it might result in the mutation of a particular strand of DNA 
during replication—or when we say of a particular Mendelian segregation mechanism in a 
hybrid pea plant that it might result in the growth of yellow peas, or it might result in the growth 
of green peas?  
One natural way of interpreting these statements is this: once the start up conditions of 
the mechanism underlying these phenomena obtain, there are multiple ways it might turn out—
some more probable, and some less. On an interpretation like this, these utterances appear to 
commit us to a ‘garden of forking paths’
39
 stemming out from a given mechanism such that 
whichever mechanism output actually obtains is just one of many results that might have 
obtained. On a view like this, there appear to be genuine alternate possibilities for mechanism 
end-states. On a view like this, it seems the very same mechanism history can lead to different 
futures. On a view like this, there is genuine biological indeterminism.     
If there is genuine indeterminism at play in the natural world, and it extends up to 
biological mechanisms, then the propensity interpretation of stochastic mechanism (PrISM) laid 
out in the previous chapters seems to be a readily available way to characterize them. The 
propensities argued for and defined in the previous chapter, we might easily suggest, just are the 
dispositional tendencies for these mechanisms to behave in the indeterministic manner just 
described.   
However, as we shall see, there seems to be plenty of good reason to doubt whether there 
is genuine indeterminism at play in the biological world. Indeed there seems to be some 
convincing reasons to think that many, maybe all, of the stochastic biological phenomena we 
seek to explain mechanistically are either themselves fully deterministic or the result of 
underlying processes that are ultimately deterministic. From the point of view of this 
                                                          
39
 To borrow Borges’s landmark phrase 
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dissertation, this is a cause for justified concern. The reason is as simple as it is worrisome. 
Supposing global determinism holds, then it would seem that any philosophical theory that 
makes reference to propensity fails on the outset. Why?—Because propensities seem straight-
forwardly antithetical to determinism. A traditional understanding of propensity, recall, is that a 
propensity is a dispositional property of certain states of affairs such that the same generating 
conditions (e.g., flip of a fair coin) sometimes end up going one way (e.g., heads) and other times 
in other ways (e.g., tails). Global determinism is the very denial that this ever occurs. On a 
deterministic worldview, the entire history, past and present, of the world supervenes on the 
world’s laws of nature such that there is only one way that any given event can turn out. In the 
eyes of the infamous Laplacian demon, there simply are no chances to be found. Therefore, on a 
deterministic worldview, the unfortunate upshot appears to be the following. If global 
determinism holds, the probabilities we assign to mechanism outputs are nothing more than 
measures of our ignorance about the complex ways mechanism inputs lead to outputs. In other 
words, on a deterministic worldview, there is no sense to be made of stochastic mechanisms 
other than a subjectivist one. Since I have already argued (in 4.3.1) that a subjectivist 
understanding of stochastic mechanism is untenable for the life sciences, it appears that 
determinism is a real threat to the PrISM proposed thus far. 
 My goal in this chapter is to do my best to dismantle this threat of determinism. Here’s 
how I plan to go about it. In section 6.2, I briefly articulate some of the arguments for and against 
indeterminism operating at the level of biology. After demonstrating that any ability to arbitrate 
between these opposing positions rests on empirical matters uninvestigable in this dissertation, I 
adopt, in 6.3, an agnosticism about metaphysical determinism. In 6.4, I suggest that the most 
reasonable strategy for moving forward, given our inability to arbitrate the determinism issue, is 
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to maintain a kind of disjunctivism—whereby what we say about the PrISM splits in two 
directions depending on whether we assume indeterminism or determinism in the biological 
world. Because it is relatively easy to situate the PrISM on the biological indeterminism disjunct, 
I spend the remainder of the chapter showing how it fares on the biological determinism disjunct. 
In 6.5, I briefly outline List and Pivato’s recent view of emergent chance. And in 6.6, I lay out 
Carl Craver’s analysis of multilevel mechanism—pausing to point out, in 6.7, a few important 
features regarding which the two approaches are complementary. In 6.8, I then attempt to 
synthesize the two approaches using the example of spatial memory in rats as a plausible 
instance where chance emerges at one mechanism level even if others are deterministic. In 6.9, I 
anticipate a serious objection to this approach: that this determinism friendly version of 
propensity is no propensity at all. I then respond, in 6.10, with an argument for why, even on the 
biological determinism disjunct, we can reasonably locate this view in the propensity camp.      
 
6.2 For and Against Biological Indeterminism  
 
There is an open debate as to whether there is genuine metaphysical indeterminism operating in 
the biological world. Some argue that there are good reasons for thinking that there is (Brandon 
and Carson 1996, Stamos 2001, Glymour 2001, Sober 2010). Some argue that there is not 
(Rosenberg 1994, Graves et al. 1999, Millstein 2003[a and b], Weber 2005). 
 Proponents of genuine indeterminism in biology give at least two general kinds of 
arguments to support their position
40
. Let’s call the first type: Argument from Quantum 
Indeterminism (QI), and the second type: Argument from Autonomy. Brandon and Carson (1996) 
provide a good example of the first type of argument. Citing population genetics as their 
example, the general form of their argument is this.  
                                                          
40
 This distinction owes to Millstein (2003a) 
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Argument from QI:   
P1. There are scenarios where a single mutational event affects the end state of an 
entire population of organisms.  
 
P2. Single mutational events occur at the molecular level, and as such, are subject 
to the effects of quantum indeterminism. 
 
C. Therefore, the end state of a population of organisms is the result of 




Prima facie, this argument appears unproblematic. Biological populations, as with everything in 
the biological world, are the product of evolution by natural selection. And mutation is the grist 
for the mill of natural selection. If the biological populations are affected by mutations that occur 
as the result of indeterminism at the quantum level, then it seems to follow the end state of the 
biological population is the result (at least in part) of indeterministic processes.  
Some, however, have noticed problems with this line of reasoning. For one, there isn’t 
much consensus among physicists as to whether there is indeterminism operating at the quantum 
level. Whether there is quantum indeterminism depends crucially on how one interprets 
Heisenberg uncertainty—a topic that is infamously divisive in study of the foundations of 
physics
42
. But even if we allow an interpretation of quantum mechanics according to which there 
is random chance operating at the molecular level, some have pointed out that there is, at best, a 
tenuous relationship between the chances we assign at the quantum level and the chances we 
assign at the biological level—where these chances often fail to match up in a way that would 
suggest quantum chances bubble up to the biology level
43
. It would seem that proponents of the 
argument from QI, at the very least, owe an explanation of the disparate chance values between 
the quantum and macromolecular levels.  
                                                          
41
 see also Stamos (2001).  
42
 See Beller (1999) for a nice survey of the issues surrounding Heisenberg uncertainty.  
43
 Cf. Rosenberg (2001) on this point. 
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 Motivated in part by reasons like these, some philosophers take the approach of arguing 
for biological indeterminism in a way that does not rely on quantum indeterminism. Bruce 
Glymour (2001) provides a good example of the second type of argument for biological 
indeterminism. Focusing specifically on what he calls ‘random search strategies’, he argues 
roughly in the following manner.   
Argument from Autonomy:   
P4. It is selectively advantageous for predators to generate search paths for prey that 
maximize the amount of the patch searched while minimizing energy expenditure. 
 
P5. Doing this requires that the search path be generated by a mechanism characterized 
by a random variable R.  
 
P6. R is essentially indeterministic.  
 
C2. Therefore, we have good reason to believe that there is indeterminism operating at 
the biological level. (Glymour 2001, 525 – 526) 
 
Notice that the above argument makes no reference whatever to quantum level indeterminism. 
As Glymour has it, genuine indeterminism can be demonstrated to be a requirement for the 
optimal foraging patterns exhibited by predators searching for their prey. Without delving into 
the details of Glymour’s account, it is worth mentioning that there are some controversial 
assumptions made. For one, we might question the role that optimality assumptions should play 
in biological models. Whether we are entitled to believe that evolution by natural selection 
settles on optimality is a topic of heated debate among philosophers of biology
44
. Furthermore, 
even if it can be demonstrated that an optimal search path is best modeled with a random 
variable, it is a further step to assume that these search strategies are actually adopted in nature. 
And even if we can make the move from optimality to actual biological phenomena, questions 
remain about whether the apparent randomness of foraging behavior is the result of underlying 
                                                          
44
Cf. Beatty (1980),  Richardson (2003), Potochnik (2009), Bolduc and Cezilly (2012) 
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processes that are ultimately deterministic. It would be a mistake to assume that, just because a 
phenomenon is best modeled using a random variable, that the physical processes which bring it 
about exhibit genuine metaphysical indeterminism.    
Putting these concerns aside, let me re-emphasize that my goal in this chapter is not to 
advocate or critique either of these types of arguments for biological indeterminism. Rather, it is 
to offer these arguments as examples of why we might think there is genuine indeterminism 
operating at the biological level. If either of the above arguments is sound, or indeed any other 
argument for biological indeterminism, then the PrISM seems to be an easy way to characterize 
the mechanisms that generate this indeterminism. Whether the indeterminism results from QM or 
independently, the propensity instantiated by a given stochastic mechanism can simply be 
characterized as its disposition to behave indeterministically. (More on this is in Section 6.4.)   
 What about biological determinism? What reason, if any, do we have for thinking that the 
processes operating at the biological level are, in fact, fully deterministic? One sort of argument 
for biological determinism is the following (Rosenberg 1994, Horan 1994).  
P7. Quantum indeterminism, if it exists, is only at play at the microphysical level, and 
only in systems that are sufficiently isolated.  
 
P8. Biological systems are macroscopic systems that strongly interact with their 
environments.  
 
C3. Therefore, their behavior is only subject to deterministic physical laws and should be 
considered entirely deterministic.  
 
In other words, indeterministic quantum effects, if there are any, can only exist at (i) a size-level 
which is sufficiently microscopic so as to subvert the physical laws governing macroscopic 
objects and (ii) in at a sufficient level of isolation from other systems. These effects disappear, 
however, as we move upwards from the level of atoms and chemical bonds to systems the size of 
a living cell or above—as these objects fail to meet the requirements set forth in both (i) and (ii). 
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Therefore, we should understand biological systems as fully deterministic. As Weber puts it “If 
biological systems behave stochastically—which they certainly do—this stochasticity is not of 
the objective kind known from QM [quantum mechanics], for example, as in radioactive decay. 
Instead, biological stochasticity is only apparent; it reflects our inability to predict the behavior 
of complex systems” (Weber 2005, 664). 
Returning to the topic of mechanism, Richardson makes the following related charge 
regarding our, by now familiar, initiation of electrical activity in post-synaptic neurons example: 
Return for a moment to the 90% rate for the nerve transduction failure. This is 
descriptive. It captures what I call the phenomena. The phenomena seem to be 
clearly stochastic. The other indeterminacy would concern what I’d think of as the 
mechanisms. So there are diffusion rates for the diffusing molecules, which are 
essentially features characterized by statistical mechanics. The two are of course 
connected. The indeterminacy of the synaptic transmission rate depends, after all, 
on the diffusion rate. But the diffusion rate is one settled by molecular dynamics. 
It’s important to be careful here. The systems here are thought of as deterministic, 
and not stochastic. Diffusion is typically thought of in Newtonian terms, and so 
deterministic. The models are stochastic. The phenomena are stochastic too, but 
that’s because they abstract from the factors that would fix them. Put another way, 
the aggregate patterns are stochastic, but every case is deterministic.” (Robert 
Richardson [personal correspondence])
45
   
As Richardson rightly points out, questions about determinism can be directed towards at least 
three disparate explananda: models, phenomena (used in the Bogen/Woodward [1988] sense), 
and single cases. And we must take care to keep these separate. It may well be that the best way 
to model a complicated, albeit ultimately deterministic, phenomenon is stochastically. And it 
may equally be that a given phenomenon, conceived of in the regularistic Bogen/Woodward 
sense, are best thought of as chancy—but this chanciness only arises as a feature of abstracting 
from the deterministic factors that fix single-cases. The fact that we might best model something 
stochastically, or characterize phenomena as stochastic, need not have any bearing on whether 
each individual case is deterministic. In fact, some of our best science (e.g., molecular dynamics) 
                                                          
45
 This position is further supported by Weber (2005). 
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seems to suggest that, in the case of synaptic transmission, these single-case instances of synaptic 
transmission are best thought of as deterministic. If this is indeed the case, then stochasticity may 
only appear as a feature of the way we model synaptic transmission as a generalized 
phenomenon—and if so, the actual case-by-case mechanisms may still be best thought of as fully 
deterministic.  
The upshot of this discussion, I believe, is that the debate about biological indeterminism 
is at best complicated and at worst intractable. But where does that leave us? For the purposes of 
developing the PrISM for grounding probabilistic generalizations in biology, where should we 
stand on the issue of biological indeterminism vs. biological determinism? Below, I propose an 
answer that won’t settle the matter, but one that I believe to be prudent in the face of uncertainty.     
 
6.3 Agnosticism about Biological Determinism/Indeterminism 
 
In the previous section, I highlighted several claims that feature in various arguments regarding 
the role determinism plays at the biological level.   
(QI) There is genuine indeterminism operating at the quantum level. 
  
(QI Manifestation) Under the right circumstances (e.g., when mutations affect 
populations), quantum indeterminism can manifest at the biological level. 
 
(Autonomous I) There is indeterministic behavior operating at the biological level (e.g., 
in optimal foraging patterns) independently of whether there is QI. 
 
(Single-case D) Biological stochasticity (at least in the case of synaptic transmission) is 
only a feature of our models and of the way we aggregate single-cases into a given 
phenomenon. Single-case outcomes are best understood to be deterministic.     
 
All of these claims, as we’ve seen, have been marshaled in arguments for or against biological 
indeterminism. However, it must be noted that each of these claims has an empirical flavor. 
Whether we have justification for affirming their truth depends on the science; a priori, armchair 
reasoning won’t (and shouldn’t) settle the matter.  That said, the science simply isn’t in. With 
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regard to QI, as von Plato puts it, “The various attitudes towards this microphysical 
indeterminism are reflected in the interpretations of the Heisenberg uncertainty relations. They 
have been given a purely ontological, as well as an epistemological interpretation, to mention the 
most extreme positions” (von Plato 1982, 53). Thus, I submit that the existence QI is not a secure 
foundation for any argument regarding biological indeterminism.  
Even less understood are which, if any, are the avenues on which quantum 
indeterminism, if it did turn out to exist, could travel up to the macro level. And even if we could 
settle this matter, there remains the difficulty of squaring up the different chance values we 
ascribe between levels. As to the issue of autonomous biological indeterminism, it may well be 
that foraging patterns are best modeled stochastically using a random variable. But as we’ve just 
seen, the fact that a phenomenon is best modeled using a random variable needn’t mean that the 
phenomenon is indeterministic. And even if the phenomenon is indeterministic, that needn’t 
mean that every single-case foraging pattern is fully indeterministic. All of these issues rest on 
the science.  
 Because I would not deign to settle these issues, I suggest that the only tenable 
philosophical position (following Millstein 2000) is to adopt an agnosticism about the above 
claims regarding biological determinism and see where to go from there.  
  
6.4 Disjunctivism  
  
Supposing agnosticism about biological determinism is the only prudent philosophical position 
given the lack of scientific consensus, how do we proceed? Recall that, as stated in 5.1, the 
PrISM seems to handle biological indeterminism quite easily, but seems not to square up with 
determinism very well at all. Given this observation, I submit that what we say about the PrISM 
depends crucially on which way the biological indeterminism debate ends up going. In other 
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words, given our inability to arbitrate the biological determinism debate, any answer to the threat 
of determinism should take a disjunctive form. Either indeterminism exists at the biological 




Indeterminism at the Biological Level? 
 
/    \ 
Yes            No 
                                                       /                     \   
     The propensities are just dispositions              \ 
       to behave indeterministically                    Emergent chance (to be explicated in 5.5)    
 
 
As the picture suggests, I take it that the PrISM is relatively easily characterized if there is indeed 
genuine indeterminism operating at the level of biological mechanisms: the propensities 
described in the previous chapter just are the dispositions of stochastic mechanisms to behave 
indeterministically. Suppose, for example, the argument from QI is sound, and biological 
populations take the form that they do because of mutation events taking place at the molecular 
level: mutation events that are due (at least in part) to indeterministic quantum events. It strikes 
me that we can say, without any difficulty, that a particular DNA replication mechanism has a 
propensity to fail to replicate fidelously. And this propensity just is the disposition for this 
mechanism to behave indeterminsitically.
46
  
 Something similar can be said of the argument from autonomy. If it is true that optimal 
foraging patterns require a random variable, then we can say of the mechanism productive of 
these foraging patterns that it has a propensity to produce one foraging pattern over another. And 
the propensity of this mechanism just is its tendency to produce random paths.   
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 It is worth noting here that—if this genuine indeterminism exists—it may only do so on one level of explanation. 
In which case, we may still need emergent chance even on the indeterminism disjunct.   
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Suppose, on the other hand, that the arguments against biological indeterminism ring 
true. Suppose, for example, that apparent random behavior at the quantum level is an artifact of 
the processes by which we measure quanta. Or suppose that, if there is quantum level 
randomness, this indeterminacy fails to manifest at the biological level (e.g., at the level of 
chromosomal assortment, synaptic transmission, DNA replication, etc.). If either is the case, then 
the stochasticity we observe in the biological world seems to be either (i) merely a feature of the 
models we use to represent its complexity or (ii) a byproduct of our aggregation of deterministic 
single-cases under a given regularistic phenomenon. Call this scenario the difficult determinism 
disjunct. Since this disjunct is a perfectly consistent worldview, we’ll need a way of making 
sense of the PrISM that squares up with it. As we shall see, I am cautiously optimistic that one is 
available. The answer, I go on to suggest, lies in an analysis of emergent chance according to 
which objective chanciness can exist at one level of description even if it doesn’t at another.  So 
let’s see how this might work.  
 
6.5 Emergent Chance  
 
Having affirmed an agnosticism about whether determinism holds together with a disjunctivist 
strategy to proceed, we can now begin to take on the difficult deterministic disjunct. The central 
question is this: is there any reasonable construal of propensity such that it can coexist with 
determinism? Following a recent view in the philosophy of probability, I argue that there is a 
sense in which it can. Specifically, I advocate a strategy formulated in a 2013 paper by List and 
Pivato (henceforth, L&P) which they call ‘emergent chance’ and apply it to the multilevel 
understanding of mechanism advocated by Craver (2007). The goal is to show that genuine 
indeterministic propensities can be seen to exist at certain mechanism levels even if others are 
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fully determined. This approach, if successful, will open the door for there to be propensities in 
existence at the biological level—even if other levels operate in a fully deterministic fashion.   
Because L&P’s view is quite complex, I’ll have to gloss over many of the details of their 
account and focus on their central ideas. In its most simplified form, L&P can be understood to 
argue as follows: 
L&P’s Central Argument: 
 
P9. All it takes for a probability function (or family of probability functions) to count as 
objective chance is for it (them) to relate in the right way to various other pertinent 
concepts surrounding chance (e.g., credence, possibility, the future, intrinsicness, 
lawfulness, and causation). 
 
P10. Given a certain formal framework together with a few uncontroversial assumptions, 
it can be shown that these criteria can be met at one level of description even if it cannot 
at another. 
 
C4. Therefore, objective chance can exist at one level even if it does not at another.   
 
To motivate this argument, I’ll say something about both premise (P9) and (P10).  
Beginning with (P9), L&P adopt a modified version of Shaffer’s (2007) list of criteria for 
objective chance. Summarized roughly, they are: 
Chance-credence: If you have information about the objective chance of an event, you 
should set your credence level to match that information. 
 
Chance-possibility: If you assign a non-zero chance to an event, it must be possible for 
that event to occur. 
 
Chance-future: to say (at some time t) that some event has a non-extremal objective 
chance of occurring requires that the event take place in the future.  
 
Chance-intrinsicness: If you assign an objective chance to an event occurring after a 
certain history, then you must assign the same chance to any intrinsic duplicate of such an 
event with such a history. 
 
Chance-causation: If some event appears causally relevant to another event, then the first 




Chance-lawfulness: The laws operating at a given level must be seen to determine the 
chances at that level.  
 
Following Shaffer, L&P consider these criteria to be platitudes about objective chance. 
Each of them constitutes an important relationship that we would (pre-theoretically) expect 
objective chance to hold with respect to other important concepts surrounding chance. According 
to Shaffer and L&P, any probability function that meets these criteria qualifies as what they call 
non-degenerative, objective chance (3). In other words, a probability function that meets these 
criteria should not be seen to degenerate into merely subjective, epistemic chance. By way of 
contrast, consider an example where the probabilities we assign fail to meet all of these 
conditions. Suppose that you role a pair of fair dice, but your friend covers them with her hand 
before you see them. Suppose you then are asked to assign the chance that the value of the dice 
totals up to 7. Since you know that there are 36 possible rolls of the two dice—all of which are 
equally probable. And there are 6 ways to roll 7. You know that the probability of rolling 7 is 
6/36 or 0.1667. But this cannot be an objective chance. Why?—because it fails the chance-future 
desideratum. You’ve assigned a non-extremal chance to an event that has already happened: 
you’ve already rolled the dice. So what you are evaluating is not the objective chance that the 
value of the dice comes up 7, but the degree of confidence that you have that this was the result. 
In this case, the chance you assign to a value of 7 degenerates into merely epistemic chance.  
 Returning to L&P’s central argument, let’s look at what kind of definitions and 
assumptions they make to get emergent chance off the ground. First we need to get straight on a 
bit of the technical terminology they employ—some of which should be familiar from 1.7. 
Among the main technical notions we need from L&P are determinism and indeterminism. But 
to get adequate formal definitions of these, we’ll need to borrow their definitions of ‘time’, 
‘state’, and ‘history’ (L&P 2013). According to L&P, we can define time as a set of points 
173 
 
(called T points) ordered linearly; and we can define the state of a given system at each time as 
given by an element of some state space S. A history, on L&P’s framework, is a temporal path 
through some state space, (histories can be seen to play the role of possible worlds—the 
collections of which they represent with Ω). Furthermore, for any history h and any time t, L&P 
designate ht to denote the truncated history up to time t (defined as the restriction of the function 
h to all points in time up to t in the relevant linear order). Together, these notions allow for 
straightforward formal definitions of deterministic and indeterministic histories:  
A history h is deterministic if, for every time t, its truncation ht has only one 
possible continuation in the set of possible histories, Ω, where a possible 




A history h is indeterministic if, for some time t, its truncation ht has more than 
one possible continuation in Ω. Thus indeterministic histories allow branching, 
while deterministic histories do not. (Ibid, 3) 
  
In addition to their definitions of deterministic and indeterministic histories, we also need an 
understanding of what L&P’s take levels to be. As L&P have it, and this is crucial, levels are not 
global size-levels
47
. Rather, their use of ‘level’ refers to a level of description whereby what 
counts as a given level depends on which state space has been delimited. They write,  
The state space S could be, for example, the set of all possible microphysical states, and 
Ω the set of all possible microphysical histories. Often, however, we wish to employ 
higher-level descriptions, for example by describing the state of water as liquid or frozen, 
rather than as a complex configuration of individual molecules, or by describing a tossed 
coin as landing heads or tails, rather than as following a particular finely specified 
physical trajectory. (Ibid, 11) 
 
As this quotation demonstrates, L&P understand levels not to be entirely mind-independent 
substrates in the world, but as contingent on the what sort of description one aims to give. In this 
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 traditionally implied, for example, in the work of Wimsatt (1976) 
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sense, what makes ‘on the same level’ as another thing is whether they both exist in the state 
space delimited by the one doing the describing.  
The last bit of theoretical scaffolding needed from L&P is two of their key assumptions: 
(i) Higher-level states and histories supervene on lower-level states and histories.  
 
(ii) Higher-level states are often multiply realizable by lower-level states.  
 
Regarding (i) supervenience is a kind of dependence. To use an easy example, we might say that 
the top speed of a vehicle supervenes, all things equal, on its engine. In saying this, we mean that 
no change can be made to the top speed of a vehicle without, all things equal, having made some 
change in its engine. Regarding (ii) for something to be multiply-realizable at one level, there 
must be more than one lower-level configuration that gives rise to it. For example, the higher 
level description of water as frozen admits of several lower level realizers; there are a myriad of 
ways that hydrogen and oxygen molecules can be precisely arranged to realize frozen water. 
Like L&P, I take these assumptions to be uncontroversial.   
 With these technical definitions and assumptions in place, we can now introduce the 
central feature of L&P’s account of emergent chance: course-graining of disparate levels of 
description. L&P state, 
The relationship between the different levels can be formally captured by the idea of 
coarse-graining: each higher-level state corresponds to an equivalence class of lower 
level states, consisting of all its possible lower-level realizations. Call a partition of the 
state space S into such equivalence classes a coarse-graining of S, and let S* denote the 
set of all equivalence classes [my use of star]... let σ denote the function that maps each 
lower level state s in S onto its higher level state s* onto S*.  (Ibid, 11) 
 
L&P apply the same idea to histories:  
 
For each lower-level history h in Ω, the corresponding higher-level history h is the 
function from T into S such that, for each t in T, h(t) = σ(h(t)). The set of all possible 




This notion of course-graining is the crucial final piece of the puzzle to allow for 
emergent chance. The idea is this: For any course graining function σ and sufficiently large set of 
possible histories Ω, there can be indeterministic histories in Ω* even when all histories in Ω are 
deterministic. To illustrate how, L&P provide an example of course-graining from the real 
numbers to the integers (figure 11). Part (a) depicts a simple system at the lower level of 
description (Ω). Time is plotted on the horizontal axis (T={1,2,3,...}), and the state of the system 
on the vertical one. Here the state space S is the set of all real numbers. The figure displays five 
deterministic histories, from time 13 t = 1 to time t = 25. Part (b) shows the same system at a 
higher level of description (Ω*), obtained by coarse-graining the state space S into S*. 
Specifically, S* is the set of all integers. The coarse-graining function σ maps each real number s 
in S to the closest integer s* in S* (with the usual rounding convention). In this coarse-grained 
description, there is now one indeterministic history, supervenient on the 5 lower-level 







Figure 11. Course graining (From List and Pivato 2013, 13). 
 
As figure 11 shows, the result of course-graining (a) into (b) is that there are genuine forking 
paths in (b) while there are not in (a). While each of the 5 histories plotted in (a) is deterministic, 
there is a single history in (b) resulting in several different outcomes.  
Importantly, this transformation is not simply the result of ignoring the fine-grained 
information in (a). It is rather that, when we use the language at the (b) level of description, this 
model meets all the criteria for non-degenerative, objective chance. As L&P put it, “when 
evaluating chance and (in)determinism at a higher level of description, only higher-level 
language is available” (Ibid, 14).  When we limit ourselves to one level of description, we must 
only allow ourselves the language available in that state-space. And when we do so, chance 
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literally emerges. We know this because, at the (b) level of description, all of the platitudes for 
non-degenerative, objective chance are met.  
 
6.6 Multilevel Mechanisms 
 
Supposing L&P’s account of emergent chance is sound, why does it matter for the project of 
dismantling the threat of determinism for the propensity interpretation of stochastic mechanism? 
In answer to this question, it will help to draw on the work of Carl Craver—who has produced 
the most thorough analysis of multilevel mechanisms in the mechanisms literature. Using his 
analysis as well as one of his central examples, we show a direct application of emergent chance 
to multilevel mechanisms. And in doing so, we will have shown a plausible instance where 
genuine, non-degenerate chance may be able to exist at one mechanism level even if 
determinism holds at another. And if the level at which chance emerges can be shown (plausibly) 
to be the biological level, then there may be room for propensities at play in stochastic 
mechanisms after all.   
  Carl Craver (2007) introduces an account of multilevel mechanisms as a way of 
capturing “the central explanatory sense in which explanations in neuroscience (and elsewhere in 
the special sciences) span multiple levels” (Craver 2007, 163). Because explanations in our most 
successful special sciences appeal to multiple levels, and many of these explanations are 
mechanistic, there seems to be a need for a philosophical analysis of multilevel mechanisms. 
However, as Craver correctly points out, talk of ‘levels’ in science is often ambiguous between 
many senses of the term. As such, Craver carefully disambiguates different understandings of 
levels, offering arguments against most of them, and settling on his own preferred understanding. 
For example, Craver argues that mechanism levels should not be understood merely as levels of 
different sized objects (e.g., societies, organisms, cells, molecules, atoms). Additionally he 
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claims, “levels of mechanisms are not monolithic divisions in the structure of the world” (Ibid, 
190).   
Craver’s central idea is that mechanism levels are levels of behaving components. As he 
puts it, “Lower-level components are made up into higher-level components by organizing them 
spatially, temporally, and actively into something greater than a mere sum of the parts” (Ibid, 
189). Regarding organization, Craver says “organization is the interlevel relation between a 
mechanism as a whole and its components” (Ibid, 189). Figure 12 represents a Craver-style 
multilevel mechanism. At the top level is an entity S engaging in an activity ψ. At the second 
level, there are four X’s θ-ing organized in S’s ψ-ing, And at the bottom level, four P’s are ρ-ing 
such that they are organized in X3’s θ-ing. On Craver’s view, mechanism levels are local and 
only definable within a compositional hierarchy. Examples of multilevel mechanisms operating 
in the biological world are the mechanisms in the spatial memory system, the circulatory system, 
the osmoregulatory system, and the visual system (Ibid, 191).




So to sum up, according to Craver, levels of mechanisms are levels of composition, but 
this composition relation is not to be understood as merely spatial or material; instead, levels of 
mechanisms relate to one another by virtue of the relationship of composition. As Craver has it, 
mechanism levels are distinguishable by virtue of a compositional relationship. Different 
mechanism levels need not correspond to different size levels or spatial locations.  
 
6.7 Complementarity of L&P’s Emergent Chance and Craver’s Multilevel Mechanisms: Toward 
a Solution to the Difficult Determinism Disjunct 
Before moving to a concrete example in which both L&P’s account of emergent chance and 
Craver’s analysis of multilevel mechanism apply, it’s worth pausing to highlight a few features 
of these two accounts regarding which they seem to complement each other quite nicely.   
A. Neither view espouses global, monolithic levels. 
B. Both views assume or imply the acceptance of supervenience and multiple 
realizability—so are amenable to emergence 
 Let me say something about each. With regard to (A), neither L&P nor Craver accepts a 
view of levels according to which they are understood monolithically. That is, on neither of these 
views does levelhood merely correspond to size or objecthood. Rather, both views accept a 
degree of relativism regarding levelhood. For L&P, the content of a level is relative to the state-
space delimited by the inquiry and can only be described by the language endemic to that state-
space. On Craver’s view, the content of a level is relative to the organization of the mechanism 
responsible for the phenomenon in question.  
 With regard to (B), L&P’s view explicitly assumes supervenience and multiple-
realizability between levels—such that objective chance can emerge at a higher level—even 
when it isn’t present at a lower one. However, it is important to notice that Craver implicitly 
endorses emergence when he claims of multilevel mechanisms that “Lower-level components 
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are made up into higher-level components by organizing them spatially, temporally, and actively 
into something greater than a mere sum of the parts” (italics added for emphasis). As this 
quotation demonstrates, Craver endorses a view of mechanism levels according to which the 
active entities at one level constitute a higher level that is ‘greater than the sum of its parts’. 
Emergence, as it’s commonly defined, just is this relation. So on Craver’s view, higher 
mechanisms emerge from lower ones.   
 Having just highlighted these important complementary features of Craver’s multilevel 
mechanism and L&P’s account of emergent chance, there is an important qualification to make.   
C. L&P’s account of emergent chance does not require levels to stand in a compositional 
relation.   
As evidenced in the previous section, Craver endorses a view of multilevel mechanism according 
to which mechanism levels, by definition, stand in a compositional relation with one another. 
L&P, on the other hand, make no such requirement of disparate levels of description. That said, 
however, this need not prevent the successful union of these views. After all, there is a clear 
sense in which different levels of composition (a la Craver) can still be understood as different 
levels of description (a la L&P). Recall that, for L&P, what it takes to specify a distinct level is 
only to delimit the state space encompassing the entities at that level. Craver’s levels of 
composition approach merely places a restriction on what sorts of state spaces we can delimit. 
Namely, the state spaces delimited must correspond to what composes state spaces at a higher 
level. As such, there is no conflict between the two approaches—at least when applied to 
mechanism levels.    





6.8 Synthesizing Emergent Chance and Multilevel Mechanism: Spatial Memory in Mice and 
Rats 
I cannot undertake a detailed defense of the two views outlined above. So here is a modest claim: 
If L&P succeed at formally systematizing emergent chance, and if Craver offers a plausible 
analysis of multilevel mechanisms, and the two positions complement each other, then we have 
the resources to show that it may be possible for genuine propensities to exist at the certain 
mechanism levels even if determinism holds at others. And in doing so, we will have offered a 
route for the PrISM to escape the threat of determinism. Given the conditional nature of this 
claim, I’ll proceed under the assumption that both L&P’s account of emergent chance and 
Craver’s analysis of multilevel mechanism are successful—and that they cohere with one another 
without contradiction. Having done so, we can proceed to explore a concrete example wherein 
the synthesis of emergent chance and multilevel mechanism can begin to show its merits.  
 
6.8.1 A Multilevel Mechanistic Analysis of Spatial Memory in Mice and Rats 
 
Consider the spatial memory of mice and rats. To investigate this phenomenon, 
researchers have placed these animals in a variety of testing environments (e.g., radial arm 
mazes, sunburst mazes, and three-table problems). In one particularly revealing test, the Morris 
water maze
48
, test subjects are placed in a circular pool containing opaque fluid covering an 
occluded platform. The mice and rats are then trained to use various environmental cues (e.g., 
colored shapes) to locate the platform and escape the water. During the test, various parameters 
are recorded (e.g., time spent in each quadrant of the pool, time taken to reach the platform, and 
total distance traveled). Successful escape from the water appears to reinforce a desire to quickly 
find the platform, because on subsequent trials, with the platform in the same position, subjects 
demonstrate an ability to locate the platform increasingly quickly. The thought is that this 
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 Developed by Richard Morris (1981) 
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improvement in performance occurs as a result of learning and memory for the location of the 
hidden platform relative to the visual cues. After a sufficient number of trials, a high-performing 
rat is able to swim directly from any release point to the platform.  
This phenomenon lends itself nicely to multilevel mechanistic explanation. In other 
words, the mechanism productive of the ability for mice and rats to learn and remember the 
location of the occluded platform admits of a multilevel analysis. As Craver describes in detail 
(ibid, 167), part of the explanation of mice and rats’ spatial memory learning is at the gross 
anatomical level. More specifically, researchers now think that the hippocampus, a region in the 
medial temporal lobe, is required for spatial memory learning. This is evidenced by the fact that 
subjects with lesions to the hippocampus show significant deficits in maze learning. Some 
researchers even suggest that we have good reason to think the hippocampus, in itself, functions 
as a kind of spatial map.   
But how is this apparent spatial-map-functionality of the hippocampus explained? 
According to Craver, the answer seems to lie at the next mechanism level down: which he calls 
the cellular-electrophysical level. At the cellular-electrophysical level, spatial memory appears 
connected to a process called “Long Term Potentiation” (LTP). LTP is understood as a long-
lasting enhancement in signal transmission across neurons resulting from synchronous 
stimulation. LTP has for several decades been thought to play a role in memory. More 
specifically, neuroscientists have speculated that the brain stores memory by altering the strength 
of connections between neurons that are simultaneously active—and that much of this takes 
place in the hippocampus.
4950
  
                                                          
49
 LTP occurs at synapses that terminate on dendritic spines (a small membranous protrusion from a neuron's 
dendrite that typically receives input from a single synapse of an axon) and uses the transmitter glutamate. 
Researchers have discovered that several of the major pathways within the hippocampus fit this description. 
50
 This idea was formalized by Donald Hebb (1949) 
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But the mutlilevel mechanism responsible for spatial memory learning in rats doesn’t 
bottom out at the electro-physical level with LTP—for there are even lower-level mechanisms 
which give rise to LTP in the hippocampus. Craver calls this mechanism level, the molecular 
level (169). He writes,  
When the presynaptic neuron is active, it releases glutamate (GLU). This 
glutamate binds to N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptors on the postsynaptic 
cell. The NMDA receptors change their conformation, exposing a pore through 
the cell membrane. If the postsynaptic cell is inactive, the channel remains 
blocked by large Mg2+ ions. But if the postsynaptic cell is depolarized, these 
Mg2+ ions float out of the channel, allowing Ca2+ to diffuse into the cell. The 
rising intracellular Ca2+ concentration sets in motion a long chain of biochemical 
activities” (Craver 2007, 169).  
 
Researchers know that NMDA receptors play an essential role in LTP taking place in the 
hippocampus because drugs that interfere with NMDA receptors block LTP and have major 
effects on some types of memory, especially spatial memory.  
Figure 13 (from Craver 2007, 166) illustrates the multiple levels in the mechanism of 
learning and memory in rats. As the figure shows, the phenomenon of rats learning to navigate 
through mazes is explained by a mechanism with multiple levels: the spatial map functionality of 
the hippocampus at the gross anatomical level, synapses inducing LTP at the electro-physical 
level, and NMDA receptor binding and bending at the molecular level. And these levels are 
organized into a hierarchy of part-whole relations to one another such that each of the lower-





Figure 13. Multilevel mechanism of spatial learning in rats (From Craver 2007, 166).  
 
6.8.2 Spatial Memory and Emergent Chance 
 
With a concrete example of a multilevel mechanism operating in the biological world 
now in hand, let’s see whether L&P’s account of emergent chance can shed any light on it. What 
I suggest is this: the afore-described example of the multilevel mechanism of spatial learning in 
rats is a plausible instance where genuine (non-degenerative) chance may exist at one 
mechanism level even if determinism holds at different level. In the case of rats’ spatial learning, 
this could take place in two ways: 





B) Both the molecular and electro-physical levels are fully deterministic, but chance 
emerges at the gross anatomical level. 
 
Important disclaimer: my aim here is not to show that either of these possibilities actually is the 
case. Much more modestly, rather, I offer these as instances where the requirements for 
emergent chance may plausibly be met between mechanism levels in the natural world. To 
motivate this modest claim, I’ll subject the example of spatial learning in rats to the criteria 
required for L&P-style emergent chance and demonstrate why I think it might be able to meet 
them.      
As articulated in Section 5.5, there are several characteristics that must obtain between 
levels of description in order for L&P-style emergent chance to exist. First, and most obviously, 
the phenomenon in question must admit of multiple levels of description—each with its own 
defined state-space. Second, higher levels must stand in a supervenience relation to lower levels 
such that higher levels are multiply-realizable by their supervenience bases; i.e., each higher-
level state must correspond to an equivalence class of lower level states, consisting of all its 
possible lower-level realizations. Third, there must be an available coarse-graining function that 
maps each lower level state onto its higher level state.  I’ll say something about each.  
To begin with, as summarized above, I take Craver to have demonstrated quite clearly the 
sense in which the case of spatial memory in rats admits of a multilevel description. And just as 
L&P require, each mechanism level delimits a distinct state-space with a corresponding language 
of description. The gross-anatomical level defines as its state-space a specific region of the brain: 
the hippocampus; and adopts descriptive terms like ‘spatial maps’ and ‘memory storage’. The 
electro-physical level defines as its state space particular neurons inside the hippocampus, and 
takes as its descriptive terms: ‘axons’, ‘synapses’, ‘long term potentiation’, and ‘signal 
transmission’. And the molecular level defines as its state space particular molecules organized 
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in and around these neurons; it takes as its descriptive terms: ‘glutamate’ (GLU), ‘N-methyl-D-
aspartate’ (NMDA), ‘Mg
2+
 ions’ and ‘Ca
2+
’. 
Furthermore, with regard to the multiple realizability/supervenience requirements, it 
seems uncontroversial to espouse a supervenience relation between these mechanism levels. In 
other words, no change in the memory storage of particular rat’s hippocampus will occur without 
some change at the electro-physical level. The same goes between the electro-physical level and 
molecular levels. Additionally, and only slightly more controversially, there is a clear sense in 
which higher mechanism levels seem plausibly to be multiply realizable by lower ones—at least 
if what this means is that the same phenomenon can be brought about by (and explained by) 
underlying mechanisms that either have different components or components acting in different 
ways. Craver seems to admit this when he writes, “There are no doubt epistemic difficulties of 
determining when two mechanistic contexts are equal, but there is no conceptual difficulty 
seeing how the same type of phenomenon could be explained by different components in 
different contexts” (Craver 2007, 160). The phenomenon of rats’ memory storage, for example, 
can occur via different specific instances of LTP. Likewise, LTP can be instantiated by different 
specific molecular activities. All that is necessary for the spatial memory example to meet L&P’s 
supervenience/multiple realizability requirement is that each higher level state (e.g., memory 
storage in the hippocampus, or LTP across neurons) corresponds to an equivalence class of lower 
level states (e.g., the set of possible electro-physical or molecular realizers of these higher level 
states). It strikes me that such a regimentation is achievable.  
The only thing left, then, is to explore whether there might be a course-graining function 
that obtains between these levels. In other words, we must now ask whether there is a function 
that maps each lower level state s (e.g., molecular level or electro-physical level state) in S (set of 
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possible lower-level states) onto its higher level state s* (e.g., gross anatomical level state) in S* 
(the set of possible higher level-states). My view is that there may indeed be such a coarse-
graining function available. However, I lack both the space and technical prowess to produce one 
here. That said, the rough idea is that we should be able to come up with a function that will map 
each of the molecular states in the set of possible states that make up the electro-physical 
supervenience base onto a particular electro-physical state—just as L&P have a function from 
the real numbers to the integers. And in doing so, we will have shown that there may be multiple 
deterministic histories at the molecular level even if there is one indeterministic history at the 
electro-physical level. The same strategy applies between the electro-physical level and the gross 
anatomical level.  
 
6. 9 Objection: But are these Non-degenerate Chances ‘Propensities’? 
  
Suppose we accept everything argued for thus far: that (i) L&P’s account of emergent chance is a 
plausible construal of how non-degenerative chance can exist at one level of description even if 
it does not at another level; (ii) Craver offers a plausible analysis of multilevel mechanisms, (iii)  
these two accounts seem complementary in some important respects; and (iv) given these three 
forgoing conclusion, it may well be the case that genuine, objective, non-degenerative chance 
can exist at one mechanism level even if another mechanism level is fully deterministic. Suppose 
we even accept that the example of spatial memory in rats provides a good application of the 
union of these views. What reason do we have to designate these emergent, biological-level 
chances as propensities? After all, none of this theoretical scaffolding does us any good unless it 
defends the propensity interpretation of stochastic mechanism against the threat of determinism. 
Without any such independent argument for understanding these emergent chances as 






I offer such an independent argument here. My strategy is this. I adopt a list of criteria offered by 
von Plato for something to count as a propensity interpretation, and show that the emergent 
chance view of multilevel mechanisms meets these criteria just fine.  
von Plato’s writes,  
According to the propensity interpretation of probability, at least the following is required 
of probabilities as objective propensities:  
 
(1) a propensity is a physical property of the experimental arrangement;  
 
(2) it is a dispositional property, having an underlying structural basis;  
 
(3) and it concerns individual events.” (von Plato 1982, 62 [numbering added for 
organizational purposes]) 
 
Following this list, we shall now investigate whether the synthesis of Craver’s analysis of 
multilevel mechanism and L&P’s view of emergent chance meets these qualifications. 
 Regarding (1), the chance that emerges at higher mechanism levels is a physical property 
of the experimental arrangement. Namely, the propensity is a property instantiated by a given 
rat’s spatial memory mechanism as it interacts with the water maze. Regarding (2), the 
propensities exhibited by these rats have as their underlying structural basis their respective 
spatial memory mechanisms. Regarding (3), there are propensities for stochastic decision-
making at each individual maze-navigation task; so there are propensities of individual events.  
 As such, von Plato’s requirements for a propensity interpretation are fully satisfied. And 
we, therefore, have good reason to construe the chances that emerge at higher mechanism levels 








In this chapter, I have surveyed a few of the general ways philosophers argue for and against 
biological indeterminism. I have concluded that the only philosophically prudent position 
regarding this debate is to adopt an agnosticism about the central claims made therein. As such, I 
have advocated a disjunctivist approach whereby what we say about the PrISM splits in two 
directions depending on which side of the biological indeterminism debate prevails. I suggested 
that, if the arguments for biological indeterminism are sound, the propensities postulated by the 
PrISM just are the dispositions of stochastic mechanisms to behave indeterministically (whether 
this indeterminism is the result of quantum-level indeterminacy or it can be seen to exist 
independently). On the other hand, if determinism holds, I argued that a recent view of emergent 
chance together with an understanding of multilevel mechanisms may provide a way of 
dismantling the threat of determinism. Provided that the explanadum in question meets the 
criteria for multilevel mechanistic analysis, and provided that a course-graining function obtains 
between these levels, then it may well be that genuine, non-degenerate chance can exist at one 
mechanism level even if others are fully deterministic. The example of spatial memory in rats, I 
suggested, may be a good example where these conditions are met. I concluded by offering an 
independent argument for why these emergent chances should be understood as propensities. 
The result of these arguments, I hope to have shown, is that determinism may not be such a 









Chapter 7. Conclusion 
 
Abstract: In this concluding Chapter, I first briefly summarize the main arguments offered in the 
dissertation. I then undertake two remaining tasks: (1) to suggest a few future avenues of 
research in the philosophy of science opened by this dissertation and (2) to suggest a few 
potential applications of my account to further areas of empirical study.  
 
7.1 Dissertation Summary 
 
In this dissertation, my goal has been to develop an account of stochastic mechanism for 
grounding probabilistic generalizations in the life sciences. To do this, in Chapter 1, I first 
offered some historical context for the reemergence of mechanistic philosophy in the life 
sciences. I then offered examples of probabilistic phenomena in biology for which an account of 
stochastic mechanism seems explanatorily necessary and useful: synaptic transmission in the 
brain, protein synthesis, DNA replication, and evolution by natural selection. To begin to 
understand whether these probabilistic phenomena can be explained mechanistically, in Chapter 
2, I examined the extent to which processes should be required to behave regularly in order to 
count as mechanisms. To do this, I examined and augmented a taxonomy of mechanistic 
regularity offered by Andersen (2012). But I argued, contra Andersen, that regularity (of any 
sort) should not be considered a metaphysically demarcating feature of mechanisms. However, 
mechanisms with a high degree of regularity should hold a privileged role in scientific 
explanations. In Chapter 3, I then set about using the taxonomy of mechanistic regularity 
developed in Chapter 2 to help sort out an active debate in the philosophy of biology: is natural 
selection regular enough to count as a (privileged) MDC mechanism? My answer was yes, and 
from this debate I drew some deep consequences for the prospects for grounding probabilistic 
biological generalizations in a mechanistic explanatory framework. In Chapter 4, I then set about 
exploring how we should understand the chance we ascribe to (a certain sort of) stochastic 
mechanisms: those whose outcomes are irregular even when their stet-up and triggering 
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conditions obtain. To do this, I formed a list of desiderata that any account of stochastic 
mechanism must meet. I then took the general characterization of mechanism offered by 
Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000) and explored how it fit with several of the going 
philosophical accounts of chance: subjectivism, frequentism (both actual and hypothetical), 
Lewisian best-systems, and propensity. I argued that neither subjectivism, frequentism, nor a 
best-system-style account of chance can meet all of the proposed desiderata, but some version of 
propensity theory can. By pairing an account of stochastic mechanism with a propensity 
interpretation of chance, I suggested, some of the shortcomings of each position could be 
avoided. Borrowing from recent propensity accounts of biological fitness and drift, in Chapter 5, 
I then went on to explore the prospects of developing a propensity interpretation of stochastic 
mechanism (PrISM) according to which propensities are (i) metaphysically analyzable and 
operationally quantifiable via a function of probability-weighted ways a mechanism might fire 
and (ii) not causally efficacious but nonetheless explanatorily useful. By appealing to recent 
analyses of deterministic and emergent chance, in Chapter 6, I argued further that this analysis 
need not be vulnerable to the threat of metaphysical determinism.    
 In what remains of this concluding Chapter, I set forth two further tasks: (1) to suggest a 
few future avenues of research in the philosophy of science opened by this dissertation and (2) to 
suggest a few applications of the analysis of stochastic mechanism heretofore offered in this 
dissertation to further areas of empirical study. Far from an exhaustive list of future projects 
opened by my account, I take the following potential areas of applicability to merely be a small 






7.2 Avenues for Future Philosophy of Science Research 
 
In this section, I propose a few potential avenues for future research in the philosophy of science 
opened by this dissertation. I focus on three: (i) additional work on the metaphysics of 
mechanism, (ii) an exploration of the epistemology of propensity, and (iii) potential implications 
for debates on statisticalism vs. causalism with regard to natural selection. I’ll say something 
about each.  
 
7.2.1 More on the Metaphysics of Mechanism 
 
Recall that, in section 2.4.3 of Chapter 2, I briefly discussed whether Andersen is correct 
that mechanists need to appeal to regularity as a means of distinguishing between one-off 
mechanisms and mere single causal chains. I suggested that mechanists do not need to rely on 
regularity for this reason, but may instead be able to appeal to mechanisms’ organizational 
structure as a means of underpinning a distinction between mechanism and causation in general. 
But I admitted that much more would need to be said to make this precise. One avenue of future 
research opened by this dissertation would be to attempt to augment MDC’s list of organizational 
properties in order to better establish a metaphysical difference between processes we wish to 
deem as mechanisms and those we would only want to understand as run-of-the-mill causation. 
Here is a hint of how it might go.   
The MDC view, recall, states that entities in a mechanism must be (1) located (2) 
structured, (3) oriented; and a mechanism’s activities must have (4) temporal order (5) rate, (6) 
duration. In future research, I propose to add to this list. At first pass, here are some further 
organizational properties of instantiated by mechanisms but not by mere single causal chains: (7) 
connectedness, (8) existence absent triggering, and (9) temporal persistence. As a precautionary 
note, it will be important to stress that not all mechanisms instantiate each of these properties. As 
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such, my guess is that (7) – (9) will best be thought of as the sort of family resemblance 
characteristics offered for other tenuous biological concepts (e.g., species or gene). What is 
important for the purpose of distinguishing single causal chain from one-off mechanism is that 
one-off mechanisms generally instantiate (at least) some of these properties; and single causal 
chains generally do not. Of course, much more will need to be said to make this precise. For 
now, it will suffice to briefly indicate what I take each of these proposed organizational 
properties to be. But I’ll leave the rest for future research.   
7. One of the properties that mechanisms sometimes have, that mere single causal chains 
do not, is (what I’m calling) connectedness. A one-off mechanism comprises several 
entities connected to one another. The entities in WWI only bump into each other.  
 
8. A second property of a one-off mechanism that mere single causal chains do not have 
is (what I’m calling) existence absent triggering. One-off mechanisms exist as an 
organized system even if they never gets triggered. The events that brought about WWI 
did not exist as an organized structure until the assassination of the Archduke.  
 
9. Similarly, we might describe a third property of one-off mechanism that is absent from 
a mere single causal chain: (what I’m calling) temporal persistence. One-off mechanisms 
persists as a system of organized entities for the period of time after its construction until 
its detonation. The events leading up to WWI only existed at the instants that they 
occurred.   
 
MDC also say of mechanisms that they produce regular outcomes in ways that are “non-
accidental and support counterfactuals” (Ibid, 7-8). They write,  
For example, if this single base in DNA were changed and the protein synthesis 
mechanism operated as usual, then the protein produced would have an active site that 
bonds more tightly. This counterfactual justifies talking about mechanisms and their 
activities with some sort of necessity (Ibid, 8).    
 
As indicated by this quotation, another potential means for distinguishing the metaphysical 
properties of mechanisms from those held by run-of-the-mill causation might have to do with 
counterfactual support and natural necessity. Thus, another future project might be to more 
carefully specify what (if any) special relationship to counterfactuals held by mechanisms. And if 
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a special relationship could be found, what (if any) conclusions might be drawn about 
mechanisms’ relationship to natural necessity.   
 
7.2.2 An Exploration of the Epistemology of Propensities 
 
In Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation, I laid out several considerations in favor of a 
propensity interpretation of stochastic mechanism. I anticipate, however, that many philosophers 
of probability will have objections to this. One of the main reasons why philosophers of 
probability have not taken kindly to propensity accounts of objective chance is that they are 
epistemically untenable. Carl Hoefer (2007), for example, writes:  
…propensities are epistemologically hopeless (i.e., one can only claim that statistics are a 
reliable guide to propensities via arguments that are all, in the end, ineffective—usually, 
circular). (Hoefer 2007, 551) 
 
Here, Hoefer suggests that proponents of propensity accounts of objective chance run into a 
serious epistemological problem. They can’t give an adequate account of how propensities come 
to be known. If the propensity proponent attempts to argue that statistics reveal propensities, they 
run the risk of circularity. After all, we might imagine Hoefer wondering, how could one expect 
statistics to be a reliable guide to propensities unless one already presumed propensities to 
generate the observed statistics? In other words, the only way to establish that statistics are any 
kind of reliable guide to propensities is to already have knowledge that propensities are what 
brought about these statistics in the first place.   
Although I cannot here offer such an argument, my suspicion is that the PrISM might 
offer some potential resources for answering to these kinds of epistemic concerns about 
propensities. In short, my suspicion is this: stochastic mechanisms could provide an epistemic 
entry point between the propensities and the statistics—thereby breaking the vicious circle.  
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As I argued in Chapter 4, propensities together with stochastic mechanisms seem to 
afford special advantages when paired with one another, advantages absent from either alone. 
One of the most important of these advantages is that mechanisms are actual, existing structures 
in the world. This allows mechanisms to be the objects of empirical study by scientists. Indeed, it 
is through experimentation on these actual, existing mechanisms that scientists might get some 
independent epistemological traction on what lies between propensities and statistics. On my 
view, propensities are dispositional properties instantiated by stochastic mechanisms. This allows 
there to be antecedent science for determining a given stochastic mechanism’s propensity to 
successfully fire, science that goes beyond merely keeping track of output frequency statistics of 
a given mechanism. The mechanism can be intervened on to determine details about why the 
output frequency statistics are what they are. If my account offers hints at a methodology for 
determining why mechanisms have the output frequencies they have, then postulating 
propensities for a given mechanism is not just a matter of observing its output frequency 
statistics.   
 
7.2.3 Implications for Debates between Statisticalists vs. Causalists about NS 
 
In Chapter 3, recall that I argued that natural selection can survive the regularity critique 
leveled at it by Skipper and Millstein. As such, natural selection seems perfectly amenable to an 
analysis via the account of stochastic mechanism developed in this dissertation. If this is so, there 
is one current debate in the philosophy biology that a PrISM analysis of natural selection might 
help to sort out. Namely, is natural selection a causal process or a non-causal, purely statistical 
phenomenon? (cf., Millstein 2006; Forber and Reisman 2007; Abrams 2007; Matthen and Ariew 
2002, 2009; Glennan 2009; Lange 2013). 
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 Here, again, my suspicion is that an understanding of natural selection as a propensity-
backed stochastic mechanism would supply some potentially unificatory answers to several of 
the concerns motivating both sides of this debate. On the one hand, token instances of natural 
selection (e.g., Barros’s crab example) are understood as fully causal. Individual entities (e.g., 
crabs and snails) engage in causally productive activities (e.g., predation and reproduction), with 
the result that more fit organisms tend to survive (e.g., snails with lower-spired shells will come 
to dominate). On the other hand, however, typed schematizations of natural selection are not 
causal. They are abstract representations which generalize over specific token instances of 
selection. Furthermore, as I argued in Chapter 4, the chance we ascribe to natural selection 
should be conceived of as propensities which are themselves causally inefficacious, but which 
are nevertheless causally relevant. If fully fleshed out, my suspicion is that many of the worries 
on both sides of the casualist/statisticalist debate would fall away.  
 
7.3 Potential Applications of the PrISM to Further Areas of Empirical Study  
 
In addition to the forgoing topics in the philosophy of science, this dissertation has potential 
applications to several further areas of empirical study. Here, I mention four such possible 
avenues: (i) human neuroscience, (ii) foundations of physics, (iii) game/decision theory, and (iv) 
medicine.  
 
7.3.1 Human Neuroscience  
 
Recently, neuroscientists have become increasingly interested in studying various 
stochastic processes taking place in the human brain. It strikes me as highly plausible that these 
stochastic processes might fit nicely into the framework I’ve offered in this dissertation.  
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 One example of a stochastic process recently studied by neuroscientists interested in the 
human brain is something called binocular rivalry. Researchers have found that, when humans 
are presented with stimuli dichoptically, their perception alternates between the two stimuli in a 
stochastic manner. Over the last four decades, there has been rigorous debate (cf., Blake et al. 
1971; Tong 2001; Urte 2011) over how to explain this phenomenon. However, there seems to be 
a growing consensus that binocular rivalry is the result of a dynamic competition between 
multiple levels of the visual system’s hierarchy (Roumani and Moutoussis 2012). According to 
Roumani and Moutousis, “The role of low- and high-level adaptation mechanisms in controlling 
these perceptual alternations has been a key issue in the rivalry literature. Both types of 
adaptation are dispersed throughout the visual system and have an equally influential, or even 
causal, role in determining perception” (Roumani and Moutoussis 2012). This explanation 
coheres with the account offered in this dissertation because (i) it involves postulating a 
mechanistic basis for this stochastic phenomenon, and (ii) this mechanistic basis spans multiple 
levels of description. The considerations laid out in Chapters 2-4 of this dissertation, I suspect, 
might help precisify the manner in which these stochastic brain phenomena (like binocular 
rivalry) have a mechanistic basis. And the work I’ve done in Chapter 6 in which I propose a 
synthesis between levels of mechanisms and emergent chance might do well to buttress the inter-
leveled nature of this phenomenon.  
 
7.3.2 Foundations of Physics 
 
The foundations of physics is another area of empirical study to which this dissertation 
might have potential applicability, although my lack of expertise in this area certainly 
necessitates that I would need collaborators to accomplish it.  
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 Microphysicists have long debated the extent to which quantum mechanics is 
fundamentally stochastic (cf., for example, Aron 1979, 1986; Prugovečki 1984, Butterfield 2007; 
and Khrennikov 2011). Although the account offered in this dissertation has been developed, in 
large part, to provide metaphysical and explanatory resources for biology, it would be worth 
exploring the extent to which it might also provide similar resources to physics. The possibility 
of pursuing such a project is made more plausible by recent work by Mauricio Suárez, a 
philosopher of physics who has recently published several highly-regarded papers in which he 
defends a role for propensity theory in quantum physics (Suárez 2007, 2013, and forthcoming).   
 
7.3.3 Game/Decision Theory 
 
Beyond human neuroscience and foundations of physics, this dissertation might have 
potential applicability to several topics in game theory and decision theory.  
 In a 1997 paper entitled “Stochastic Evolution of Rationality”, Falmagne and Doignon 
investigate “possible mechanisms explaining how preference relations are created and how they 
evolve over time.”  They go on to postulate  
…a preference relation which is initially empty and becomes increasingly intricate under 
the influence of a random environment delivering discrete tokens of information 
concerning the alternatives. The framework is that of a class of real-time stochastic 
processes having interlinked Markov and Poisson components. (Falmagne and Doignon 
1997, 107). 
 
Once again, the work I’ve done in this dissertation seems applicable here because (i) 
mechanisms play a significant explanatory role for these researchers, and (ii) there are stochastic 
processes at play in the way humans make decisions.    
In an experiment on the stochastic nature of human decision-making, Sopher and 
Narramore (2000), explore the relative merits of stochastic vs. deterministic models of human 
choice. This seems to be another excellent opportunity for my account to weigh in. Specifically, 
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my appeal to a determinism-friendly understanding of stochastic mechanism might, once again, 
provide an interesting middle ground between these stochastic vs. deterministic understandings 
of human decision-making. Similar applicability might arise from current debates surrounding 





In a couple of recent papers on cancer cells, Jean-Paul Capp argues that stochastic gene 
expression is “the driving force of cancer” (Capp 2011, 2012).  Prominent philosopher of 
biology, Joel Velasco, also has a recent paper on whether the probabilities associated with 
stochastic gene expression should be understood objectively or subjectively (Velasco 2012). He 
suggests that  
…while our best models of the phenomena in question are stochastic models, this fact 
should not lead us to automatically assume that the processes are inherently stochastic. 
After distinguishing between models and reality, I give a brief introduction to the 
philosophical problem of the interpretation of probability statements. I argue that the 
objective vs. subjective distinction is a false dichotomy and is an unhelpful distinction in 
this case (Velasco 2012, 5). 
 
This statement by Velasco shows many commonalities with the conclusions I have drawn 
throughout this dissertation. In particular, Velasco recognizes that stochastic models need not 
indicate stochasticity in the phenomenon being modeled—a key feature of my account. As such, 
another interesting potential application of my work on stochastic mechanisms would be to bring 




In this concluding Chapter, I have briefly summarized the main conclusions of this dissertation. I 
then offered three potential avenues for future research in the philosophy of science opened by 
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my account: more on the metaphysics of mechanism, an exploration of the epistemology of 
propensity, and potential implications for debates between causalists and statisticalists about 
natural selection. I also pointed to four further areas of empirical research to which my account 
has potential applicability: human neuroscience, foundations of physics, game/decision theory, 
and medicine. Far from an exhaustive list of future projects opened up by this dissertation, I take 
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